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ABSTRACT 
 
This case study examined the extent to which social media can help build and 
strengthen the social capital of communities in the face of natural disasters. It 
investigated Tacloban City, an area hit hardest by Super Typhoon Haiyan on 08 
November 2013. Haiyan is considered as the most powerful tropical cyclone in 
recorded human history. With the vast international attention it received, it also 
highlighted the growing role of Facebook in facilitating and influencing disaster aid 
and response, particularly in a developing country such as the Philippines. 
Social capital describes how networks and resources within the community 
are made available to people through their connections with others. This concept is 
gaining popularity because of the increasing role of social media during disasters. 
While its effects on the behaviour of people in disasters are generally perceived to 
be useful, few studies have actually examined how social media changes the way 
people mobilise themselves in a disaster-stricken and politically tensed society.  
Separate interviews and focus group discussions among selected residents 
of two coastal communities (Barangays 89 and 48-B), selected members of two local 
NGOs (Community & Family Services International and Operation Blessing - 
Visayas), and three members of the city government (vice-mayor, urban and 
environmental consultant, and city councillor) revealed that Facebook extended the 
geography of the social capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan. It 
allowed the survivors to inform their families and relatives, who are residing in 
different countries, of their condition and consequently receive physical help, like 
money and goods, from them.  
However, as a mediated form of communication, Facebook was limited in 
addressing the socio-political realities of Tacloban City, which was marked by 
widespread mistrust and uncertainty. Paradoxically, Facebook has amplified the 
structural inequalities already present in Tacloban City before it was hit by Super 
Typhoon Haiyan. While it enhanced strong ties, it has failed to forge weaker ties. As 
a result, it has instead widened the gap between those who have more power over 
the access to resources and those who have less. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“Truly, the Filipino rises to his finest self during trying times, the more trying the times, the 
finer the rising. Or it is in times of disaster that the Filipino ceases to be a disaster, thinking of 
others first before self.” 
             – Conrado de Quiros, Filipino columnist 
 
1.1 Super Typhoon Haiyan Hits Tacloban City 
On the morning of 08 November 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan, considered as 
the most powerful tropical cyclone in recorded human history to date (Sedghi, 
2013), made its landfall in the Philippines. Its sustained winds of up to 315 
kilometres per hour (Mullen, 2013) were mostly felt in the central islands of the 
archipelago, particularly Tacloban City. The gusts of wind were so strong that it 
created a wall of water as high as seven metres, much like a tsunami or a tornado 
carrying water (Flores, 2013). 
 This storm surge, as identified by weather experts, was a phenomenon that 
this coastal city had never experienced before. As the waters speedily rose, bringing 
with them forceful waves, the shocked residents could only hope that whatever they 
were clinging onto or standing at would be strong enough to keep them alive. They 
were only warned of heavy rains and extremely strong winds enough to damage 
their houses. Yet as the storm waters waned, it was very clear that this super 
typhoon was more than that. 
 With electricity and communication lines completely cut off, the city was 
isolated from the rest of the nation and the world. From midday until late afternoon 
of the day itself, there was limited news coverage about the city. No one knew, even 
the residents themselves were unaware, of the extent of the damage. The gravity of 
the disaster was only recognised when residents started to walk outside and look 
for their families and loved ones. 
 The dead lay on the streets along with animal carcasses. Houses and 
buildings suffered major damage; many were totally waterlogged. Cargo and 
passenger ships were carried by the storm surge across land and residences (mostly 
informal settlements), ending up in the middle of the roads. Fallen trees and other 
debris blocked the streets. It did not take long after a rotting stench filled the air. 
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Numerous people, even those who were seriously injured, were just walking 
to and fro “like zombies going nowhere.”1 At some point, there were bouts of panic 
and frenzy as some residents would report news of disaster relief teams 
approaching. Ironically, news spread easily that time.  
“Radyo Bagtas” or “Radio on Foot,” as the locals would jokingly call it, was the 
primary source of information during the first few weeks after the super typhoon 
hit. Residents reported receiving ‘news’ through people they met on the streets. 
Frustratingly, most of these stories were often false. Even the city mayor was 
reported dead at some point. No one can blame whoever started such a malicious 
statement: “there was no government at that time.”2 It was every person for 
themselves. 
This collective feeling of abandonment was clearly manifested in several 
incidences of looting. The overall tension reached its peak when some store owners 
had to use their guns and fire warning shots to scare hungry and exhausted 
residents away. There was an overall feeling of agitation in the air. Clearly, the 
people were desperate for help. 
 Meanwhile at the grounds of the city government hall, the Department of 
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) had set-up a satellite wireless internet 
station where residents could access their Facebook accounts for a maximum of 
three minutes. This service was immediately available the night after the super 
typhoon hit. Thousands of typhoon survivors lined up just to be able to post an 
update on their social media feed, saying that: first, they are alive and second, they 
needed help. 
 Those who were able to save their smartphones (mobile phones with 
Internet accessibility) went to the battery charging stations, also in the city 
government hall, and accessed their Facebook accounts through their devices. It is 
notable that Facebook was the only webpage that was allowed access in the system. 
It was also the top application users thought of using once they had their mobile 
phones fully charged. 
                                                          
1 Actual comment made by NGO worker #8 during a focus group discussion in Tacloban, 07 July 2014. 
2 Actual comment made by community resident #12 during a focus group discussion in Tacloban, 10 July 
2014. 
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 Interestingly, a lot of people outside of Tacloban had likewise turned to 
Facebook as a means of getting information about the super typhoon. Private chat 
messages and Wall posts flooded the accounts of those who were in Tacloban when 
Super Typhoon Haiyan struck. The majority of these correspondences were from 
families and relatives of Tacloban residents from different parts of the world. 
Indeed, it was from them that aid reached those who were in Tacloban faster than 
that which came from the government. 
Money from family members and relatives working in Singapore, Japan, USA 
and other countries were transferred to kin based in Manila, Cebu, Davao or other 
key cities in the Philippines. This money was then used to buy food and water, which 
were remarkably transported to Tacloban despite limited access to ports and roads 
during that time. Cash was useless during the first few weeks after the super 
typhoon hit since most of the shops and markets were closed. The relief goods then 
were the lifeline of the surviving residents. 
 
1.2 Research Question 
  Undeniably, the development and use of technology has changed the way 
communities have organized and expressed themselves. This is evident with the 
increasing use of social media. Social networking sites, such as Facebook, have not 
only revolutionised the way people communicate but also the way people facilitate 
relationships, especially among those who are dispersed geographically (Quan-
Haase & Wellman, 2004). 
Interestingly, these transformations within the community have reciprocally 
influenced the development and use of the social media technology. The last five 
years have seen an increasing role of social media during disasters, making it one of 
the most popular sources of information during emergencies, next to radio and 
television (Lindsay, 2012). It has been used by individuals and organizations to send 
out warnings, update their families and friends of their whereabouts and condition, 
mobilise volunteers, and raise funds for disaster relief (Crowe, 2013; McWilliam, 
2013; Muralidharan, Rasmussen, Patterson & Shin, 2011; Dabner, 2012; Sutton, 
Palen & Shklovski, 2008; Yates & Paquette, 2011). 
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Compared to traditional internet and communication technologies (ICTs), 
social media has the ability to both provide access to timely information and 
promote social connectedness among its users. This social aspect of technology has 
encouraged researchers to look beyond social media as an emergency and disaster 
management tool and utilise it as a means to foster “social capital,” an important 
aspect in building disaster-resilient communities (Taylor, Wells, Howell & Raphael, 
2012; Dufty, 2012; Aldrich, 2012). 
Social capital describes how networks and resources within the community 
are available to people through their connections to others (Aldrich, 2012). This 
concept is now gaining attention in disaster management literature as most 
researchers and practitioners observe that reliance on technological, scientific, 
economic, financial, and political means alone are insufficient in post-disaster 
recovery (Dynes, 2005). They argue that survivors with strong social networks have 
access to needed information, tools and assistance and therefore, recover faster and 
better (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Joshi & Aoki, 2014). 
Social media, as a social networking system, uses the natural connections 
between people to fill the connectivity gap created by dispersed populations who 
no longer share a common geography but still maintain relationships, such as 
families and friends. As more people gain access to communication technology, 
social media can offer potential for forming new partnerships as groups that 
previously worked in isolation can be connected to new networks they once had 
limited access to. 
The Philippines, with a total population of 92 million, has over two million of 
its nationals working overseas (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2014). This means 
that one in 47 Filipinos has a family member or close relative who is working outside 
the country. Significantly, despite being an archipelago, Filipinos are known to have 
strong kin-based networks (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). It is no surprise then that 
the Philippines is reported to have the biggest number of Facebook users in relation 
to its actual population (Universal McCann, 2008).  
The use of Facebook by Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan is a prime 
example of how social media extended the geography of the city’s social capital. It 
illustrated that social cohesion is a good defence during disaster and can be utilised 
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no matter how geographically dispersed a community is. As a developing country 
with limited technological and scientific resources, this is a Filipino asset that, if 
reinforced, would prove beneficial during disasters.  
In the Gallup-Healthways Global Well-Being Index for 2013, the Philippines 
registered a high level of community well-being and a thriving social well-being at 
42 percent and 35 percent, respectively. The index, which sought to measure 
people’s perceptions of their well-being, was done before Super Typhoon Haiyan 
happened. It recognised the Philippines’ unique opportunity to capitalise on its 
assets, which include a balanced economic outlook (despite reported poor financial 
well-being) and resilience against external shocks during the financial crisis 
(Yanoria, 2014). 
Interestingly, looking at the country’s social capital by analysing a national 
survey on social relations, Abad (2005) found out that Filipinos are very strong in 
maintaining close contacts with close family and friends or bonding social capital. 
However, there is a scarcity in bridging social capital, which denotes a general lack 
of trust towards strangers or people who do not belong to their personal network. 
The isolation of the poor and marginalised sectors is also suggested. According to 
the survey, those who bond and trust more are likely to be males, urban residents, 
better educated persons, those with higher family incomes and, to some extent, 
older people. 
Unfortunately, this national social capital is reflected in development and 
disaster management efforts in the country. Characterised by social inequalities and 
unreasonable government policies, Ranada (2014) refers to this as “the calamity of 
mistrust.” This is further complicated by the “politics of risk” between the 
government and the NGOs’ disaster management efforts (Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2009). 
In a survey conducted by Porio (2011), residents of flood-prone areas in 
Metro Manila were asked: “Whom do you ask for help during floods, tidal surges, 
and emergencies?” The results revealed that forty-five percent (45%) of 
respondents said they would ask help from relatives. Only thirteen percent (13%) 
would seek help from their local authorities.  
Recognising this socio-political condition, there is clearly a need to explore 
ways in strengthening the social capital of communities in the Philippines, especially 
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those who are most vulnerable to natural disasters, such as the city of Tacloban. 
With the widespread and noteworthy use of Facebook after Super Typhoon Haiyan, 
most disaster management and development practitioners are now looking into the 
potential of the said social networking system. As an open and more accessible 
channel of communication, it is hoped to allow more collaboration, cooperation, and 
wider information exchange – especially among the marginalised and poor 
communities. 
With this conceptualisation and on-the-ground realities in mind, this 
research then is guided by the central question: 
To what extent did Facebook strengthen and utilise the social capital of 
Tacloban City in the face of Super Typhoon Haiyan? 
To answer the overall question, the following sub-questions are also asked:  
1. What were the different types of social capital available in Tacloban 
City following Super Typhoon Haiyan? 
2. Who did the survivors from different economic backgrounds 
contact after Super Typhoon Haiyan? Why did they choose these 
networks? 
3. What are the social factors that facilitated Facebook to utilise the 
social capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan? 
4. What are the social factors that limited Facebook from utilising and 
strengthening the social capital of Tacloban City after Super 
Typhoon Haiyan? 
  
1.3 Overview of the Thesis 
 This thesis is divided into eight parts. The first part is this introduction which 
provides the background, outlines the relevant concepts, and presents the research 
question of this case study. The second part is the literature review, which gives a 
theoretical foundation of the concepts through which the questions will be 
approached and answered. The third part familiarises the reader with the Philippine 
society and politics as it focuses on Tacloban City, the location of the study. The 
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fourth part describes the methodology used, including the writer’s research 
philosophy, as well as logistics and practice (such as site selection, research timing, 
and ethical concerns). The fifth and sixth parts describe the social capital of 
Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan and the extent to which Facebook 
strengthened and utilised this social value, respectively. The seventh part probes 
further into the formation of the city’s social capital through basic concepts of 
Filipino social psychology and political culture. This thesis concludes with a 
summary of the results and its implications in the development of Tacloban City 
after Super Typhoon Haiyan. 
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CHAPTER 2: DISASTERS, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
“Crisis – a term borrowed from medicine and describes a phase in the condition of a patient 
when a timely intervention can spell the difference between recovery or decline, or life and 
death. The Chinese were correct in combining two ideograms: it’s both danger and 
opportunity.”  
     – Randolf David, Filipino sociologist 
 
In order to better understand the ideas outlined in the previous chapter, this 
literature review provides a theoretical backdrop on the concepts of disaster 
resilience, social capital, and social media. It is divided into five parts: (1) the 
definition of resilience and its application in disaster management; (2) the origin of 
social capital and its related components; (3) the role of social capital in building 
disaster-resilient communities; (4) the rise of social media as an important 
technology during disasters; and, (5) the role of social media, particularly Facebook, 
in enhancing social capital during disasters. It concludes with a section on the 
available literature – thus highlighting the research gap – on disaster management, 
social capital and Facebook use in the Philippines. 
 
2.1 Building Disaster-Resilient Communities 
Communities helping themselves before outside aid arrives is the vanguard 
of humanitarian action. This is what the literature has been suggesting through the 
concept of resilience in disaster management since the 1980s (Dufty, 2012; Ronan & 
Johnston, 2005). From the Latin word resilire, which means to ‘leap back, rebound 
or recoil,’ (Prosser & Peters, 2010) resilience was first studied within the context of 
how ecosystems respond to natural disturbances. It is assumed that an ecosystem, 
as a network of interactions between organisms and their environment, can adapt 
organically to natural hazards. Hence, without humans and their social spheres, 
hazards are simply natural events (Haque & Etkin, 2012). 
  This paradigm regarding resilience during disasters, however, is a product of 
theoretical and practical constructs that have seen much refining and reshaping 
over the last four decades (Manyena, 2006). The history of its application has been 
disputed, especially regarding its origins and adaptations in various disciplines. 
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Consequently, this has effects on how it is being utilised in disaster management 
practice and policy (Aldunce, Beilin, Handmer & Howden, 2014). 
2.1.1 The meaning of resilience 
 In classical mythology, the symbol of resilience was the reed because of its 
capacity to both sway in the breeze and to withstand the fierce storms that would 
uproot mighty trees (Prosser & Peters, 2010). In the English language, the first 
serious use of the term “resilience” was in mechanics, in 1858, referring to the 
quality of steel beams to withstand severe pressure without breaking (Alexander, 
2013). Eventually, this would be used in everyday speech, referring to an 
individual’s indomitable spirit or, in a more conservative sense, a tendency to resist 
change. Nowadays, a resilient person refers to someone who can weather the storms 
of life and emerge unscathed.  
The field of Physics, which is considered to be the pioneer in using the 
concept, uses resilience to describe objects that are invulnerable to the impact of 
external forces (Prosser & Peters, 2010). Meanwhile in Chemistry, resilience refers 
to the capacity of a body to return to its original form (Wilson, 2012). In Engineering, 
resilience is a measure of a material’s capacity to withstand impact, as well as to 
absorb and release energy through elasticity when stressed (Atkins & Escudier, 
2013). 
However, it is in the field of Social Sciences that the study of resilience has 
significantly evolved (Manyena, 2006). In a more general sense, resilience is used in 
the field of Health to describe immunity to sickness. In Psychology and Social Work, 
it refers to a capacity to function in immensely demanding settings, as well as the 
ability to cope with stress (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche & Pfefferbaum, 
2008). 
Norman Garmezy is attributed to be one of the pioneers in conducting 
research on resilience in the area of psychology. Garmezy’s investigation regarding 
competence, schizophrenia and the psychopathology of children in stressful 
situations led him to investigate why some patients could ‘bounce back’ and do well 
in life while others could not. He identified differences in the backgrounds of the two 
group of patients and suggested that the availability of psychosocial resources might 
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contribute to counteracting the negative influence of adversity and promote 
behavioural adaptation (Garcia-Dia, DiNapoli, Garcia-Ona, Jakubowski & O’Flaherty, 
2013). 
This analysis of individual risk and adaptability then encouraged further 
research on adults and later, within group settings. In Sociology, resilience is used 
to describe the capacity of groups to cope with stresses resulting from changes in 
their environment. It was also applied in Business Management to describe the 
capacity of an organisation to use disruptive events to propel an organisation to 
move forward (Whitehorn, 2011). 
As references to resilience have continued to increase, so have the criticisms. 
Across these definitions, however, there is a general consensus on two important 
points: first, resilience is better conceptualised as an ability or a process rather than 
as an outcome; and second, resilience is better theorised as adaptability than as 
stability (Norris et al., 2008). Auspiciously, these two points on resilience aptly 
characterise a dynamic and complex context such as a disaster. 
2.1.2 Disaster resilience: paradigm, policy, and practice 
For many years, disasters have been viewed as natural phenomena which 
humans have to deal with (Dynes, 2005; Bhatt & Reynolds, 2012). For countries that 
have monetary and scientific resources, the best strategy to make themselves safe 
is to control nature by applying geophysical and engineering knowledge to public 
policy (Aldrich, 2012; Haque & Etkin, 2012). Since there are fewer casualties in more 
developed countries, this technocratic approach has been widely adapted, especially 
by developing countries. 
However, this traditional paradigm fails to recognise the growing costs 
associated with responding to disasters – especially in a context where repeatedly 
raising operating budgets is not an option (Prosser & Peters, 2010). Moreover, this 
form of disaster response uses a pathological perspective of social work wherein 
disaster survivors are seen as victims or people with a disorder or problem (Dynes, 
2005; Greene & Greene, 2009; Wang, Chen & Chen, 2013). This is most evident 
among poor communities, which are seen as most vulnerable during disasters. 
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While it is obvious that natural calamities such as major floods and 
earthquakes have killed many people in the last two millennia, it is the “secondary 
and tertiary effects of these events that most often cascade into other socioeconomic 
processes, break down resource thresholds, and ultimately may cause the most 
human suffering” (Haque & Etkin, 2012, p. 5). Amartya Sen (1981) even went 
further by proposing that famines and epidemics are not caused by natural events 
per se but the social conditions that limit the access of the poor to food and nutrition. 
With inadequate resources, the poor’s reliance on outside humanitarian aid before, 
during, and after disasters has only proven to be unsustainable, thus placing more 
lives at risk (Gaillard & Mercer, 2010). 
Development economists have come to a similar conclusion, suggesting that 
disasters are, to a large extent, human-induced and are, to a less extent, predictable. 
These experts have calculated risk indices, or expressions of the relative 
vulnerability of a country, and urge that disaster relief should be planned according 
to particular geographical, social, and cultural conditions (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). 
Researchers have also suggested that countries mainstream disaster prevention 
into their annual development plans.  
From a development perspective, resilience has been defined as the capacity 
to meet developmental tasks in spite of serious threats (Greene & Greene, 2009). 
Additionally, rehabilitation and reconstruction programs are considered 
development opportunities (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). Not surprisingly, the recent 
years have seen terms such as ‘building’ or ‘making’ cities resilient to denote, among 
others, efforts taken by various stakeholders to address issues of urbanisation and 
climate change, prevalent in many cities in developing countries (Manyena, 2006; 
Joerin, Shaw, Takeuchi & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mileti, 1999; Bhatt & Reynolds, 
2012).  
Internationally, the UN Millennium Declaration of 2000 and the 
accompanying UN Millennium Development Goals have brought about an increasing 
awareness on the integral link between reducing poverty and natural disasters 
(Cutter et al., 2008). Meanwhile, the Hyogo World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
held in 2005 in Kobe, Japan identified several ways for building hazard resilience. 
The top two ways are integrating disaster prevention and vulnerability reduction 
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perspectives into sustainable development policies and increasing local capacities, 
such as state institutions and community mechanisms (UNISDR, 2005).  
Locally, this has led to a growing shift to instead ‘build up’ the available 
mechanisms that are ‘built-in’ within the communities (Mayena, 2006). Following a 
socio-ecological definition of resilience, communities have the inherent structures 
and coping mechanisms that will make them less vulnerable to natural calamities 
(Mileti, 1999; Bhatt & Reynolds, 2012). Disasters only happen because there are 
“failures [in the] social system” (Aldrich, 2012, p. 2). 
Ultimately, this has prompted a new way of conceptualising disaster 
management wherein human institutions and their capacities are viewed both as a 
resource and a liability (Onstad et al., 2012; Luna, 2007; Wilson, 2012). In this 
paradigm, vulnerability is a function of human behaviour (Greene & Greene, 2009). 
The community is vulnerable when its exposure to natural hazards is greater than 
their pre-event, inherent characteristics or qualities of social systems (Haque & 
Etkin, 2012).  
In other words, allowing the system to absorb the impacts of disasters will 
develop a community’s resilience over time, as this will naturally strengthen the 
inherent structures of a community and its ability to re-organise, change, and learn 
in response to a threat (Dynes, 2005; Cutter et al., 2008). Linking this to the 
condition of the environment and the way the community treats its resources 
determines the community’s sustainability. This “ability to tolerate – and overcome 
– damage, diminished productivity, and reduced quality of life from an extreme 
event without significant outside assistance” (Mileti, 1999, p.4) is what we now call 
disaster resilience. 
2.1.3 The primacy of community in disaster resilience  
Central to most models of resilience is the strengths-based approach, which 
highlights the pre-existing abilities and resources of the recipients and takes into 
account their social and cultural sense of resilience and tenacity (Manyena, 2006). 
It assumes a community’s inherent resilience by using its “protective factors,” which 
include attitudes, skills, assets, history, and culture (Wang et al., 2013; Greene & 
Greene, 2009). The key elements to make these factors work are social order, its 
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everyday relations to the habitat, and larger historical conditions that shape society 
(Haque & Etkin, 2012).  
Using the strengths perspective, Wang, Chen and Chen (2013) studied the 
Jialan village after Typhoon Morakot struck Taiwan in 2008. They observed that 
although Jialan was worst hit, the reconstruction work was carried out more quickly 
and effectively compared to other villages. After several in-depth interviews with 
policymakers, social workers, resource coordinators, and leaders of the indigenous 
communities, they found out that the village’s recovery was due to the effective use 
and coordination of community resources. 
Moreover, there was an availability of social assets such as community self-
help groups, religious beliefs, mutual assistance and the character strengths of the 
indigenous people (such as optimism, flexibility, and sense of humour). It helped 
that the central government directly supervised the local government, which 
minimised the red tape in delivering rehabilitation efforts. Moreover, the NGOs 
worked from within the community itself, which made recovery assistance directly 
felt by the people.  
As with most studies on disaster resilience, Wang et al. (2013) confirmed that 
most of the problems in Jialan Village resulted from human causes. Unequal 
distribution of resources hindered community unity. The failure to include local 
views in the remediation of river banks increased discontent and other risk factors.  
Clearly, the community is an integral part of resilience. Cutter et al. (2008) 
defines community as “the totality of social system interactions within a defined 
geographic space such as a neighbourhood, census tract, city or country” (p.599). 
However, a defined geographical space and sub-populations may have different 
levels of vulnerability and resilience that could result in disparity in the speed and 
quality of recovery. 
This is where community-based strategies are held to be more appropriate 
and sustainable since it comes from the community. While the role of the outsiders 
is also supported and facilitated, anything that is innately present within the society, 
such as indigenous knowledge and capabilities, will most likely be sustained over a 
longer period of time (Bhatt & Reynolds, 2012). Moreover, because resources and 
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knowledge are readily available, community-based strategies are cost-efficient and 
are easy to replicate. Indeed, it is even more significant to train people how to 
manage their household resources and make it adaptable to hazards rather than 
seeking external assistance. 
However ideal, community-based approaches are also deemed limited in 
their effectiveness. Oftentimes, these are done in isolation to other communities and 
lacks national recognition. There is also a tension between natural community 
processes and development project designed by “support” agencies, such as dealing 
with inappropriate mandate or timetable or controlling personnel. Pressures also 
arise among members of the community themselves (e.g. assigning of leaders and 
priorities) (Bhatt & Reynolds, 2012). 
Meanwhile, Geoff Wilson (2012) conceptualised a framework for 
understanding community resilience by emphasising that a community has three 
basic capacities: the economic, environmental, and social capitals. Economic capital 
refers to the available financial resources that will be invested in the community for 
business development, civic and social enterprise and wealth accumulation. 
Environmental capital, the most recent type identified in the literature,  refers to the 
natural and biological resources and its relation to the society. Social capital, on the 
other hand, describes how well social, political, and cultural networks are developed 
within a community.  
The “process [of] linking a network of adaptive capacities to adaptation after 
a disturbance or adversity’’ is what constitutes community resilience (Norris et al., 
2008). In fact, most researchers believe that risk reduction and emergency 
management by themselves will not necessarily build disaster resilience in 
communities. It is the complex blend of behaviours and interactions that develop 
the community’s ability to utilise and sustain its available resources in responding 
to, withstanding, and recovering from adverse situations (Dufty, 2012).  
This is what Haque, Khan, Uddin & Chowdhury (2012) discovered in their 
analysis of disaster management and public policies in Bangladesh. While individual 
stakeholders continue to make significant contributions in responding to disasters, 
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interaction among stakeholders could have multiplied single, stand-alone efforts. 
Instead, there were divisive partisan politics and a lack of good governance. 
Hence, the community is not just a sum of its parts, such that a collection of 
resilient individuals does not guarantee a resilient community. Instead, it is a 
“collective interaction within a geographic space rather than simply a group that 
shares a few common characteristics” (Cutter et al., as cited by Onstad et al., 2012, 
p.567). This “glue that holds communities and other social networks together” (Cao, 
Lu, Dong, Tang & Li, 2013, p. 1672) is what the literature refers to as social capital.  
 
2.2 Social Capital: The Value of Networks 
Similar to resilience, social capital is also a highly contested concept 
(Halpern, 2005). It has become a buzzword among political and academic elites, 
though the term remains relatively unfamiliar to the general public. A glance at the 
term denotes ‘community,’ ‘social fabric’ or how people are connected to each other.  
Some critics argue that it is just another sound bite largely devoid of meaning 
(Fine, 2007). Nevertheless, to other researchers, social capital is one of the “most 
important and exciting concepts to emerge out of the social sciences in fifty years” 
(Halpern, 2005, p.1). Further, social capital is unique in its ability to bridge the 
theoretical gap between individual and community that spans from the micro to the 
macro in an interactive and independent manner more effectively than many 
previous socio-economic/-political theories (Dynes, 2005; Hawkins & Maurer, 
2010). 
Broadly speaking, social capital is defined as “the social networks, the 
reciprocities that arise from them and the value of these for achieving mutual goals” 
(Schuller, Baron & Field, 2000, p. 1). The concept has an immediate intuitive appeal 
as it merges two distinct disciplines of sociology and political economy. It describes 
how the networks and resources within the community are available to people 
through their connections to others (Aldrich, 2012). 
There have been various attempts to pinpoint the first use of social capital as 
a term. One approach is to go back to literature that explicitly use the term. Another 
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is by taking key elements, such as trust or networks, and review existing literature 
relating to these elements. A third, but very extensive approach, is to include all 
theories which seem to be related in some way to social capital, even though they 
make no direct reference to the term itself (Schuller et al., 2000). 
Halpern (2005), in his book Social Capital, took the third approach and cited 
the observations of social thinkers as early as the eighteenth century. He started 
with Alexis de Tocqueville who, over a hundred and fifty years ago, wrote what he 
saw was the foundation of American democracy: “intellectual and moral 
associations in America – an association which unites the energies of divergent 
minds and vigorously directs them toward a clearly indicated goal” (de Tocqueville, 
as quoted by Halpern, 2005, p. 5). Next was Emile Durkheim, who undertook the 
now-famous analysis on linking suicide with social bonds (Gunnell, Middleton, 
Whitley, Dorling & Frankel, 2003). Finally, Adam Smith who drew attention to the 
importance of mutual sympathy, networks, and values in sustaining markets (Bruni 
& Sugden, 2000). Most literature, nevertheless, would point to three authors who 
have generally been credited with introducing social capital to the theoretical 
debate: Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam (Schuller et al., 2000). 
2.2.1 Pierre Bourdieu: Social capital as another ‘form of capital’ 
 The birth of mainstream academic interest in social capital can be dated back 
to the late 1980s. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1986) noted that economists 
had neglected the importance of huge areas of social and economic life. This 
worldview has so dominated much contemporary thinking that it affected even 
public policy and the study of social sciences.  
He argued that economic orthodoxy was artificially limiting itself to the study 
of a narrow brand of ‘practices’ that were socially recognised as ‘economic.’ In so 
doing, it was missing the fact that capital presents itself in three fundamental forms: 
namely, economic, cultural and social capitals (Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (1992) offered the following definition of social capital: 
Social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that 
accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a 
durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships 
of mutual acquaintance and recognition. Acknowledging that 
capital can take a variety of forms is indispensable to explain the 
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structure and dynamics of differentiated societies. [emphasis 
added] (p.119) 
 The use of ‘capital’ signals the intention of addressing different resources of 
power, with Bourdieu initially emphasising economic and cultural capitals. In fact, 
Bourdieu’s concept of capital is almost synonymous to power (DeFilippis, 2001). He 
saw one’s own supply of social capital as dependent on one’s location within the 
social order. Hence, social capital rested on economic capital – those who already 
have more continue to dominate while those with little have small chance of 
acquiring more (Aldrich, 2012).  
2.2.2 James Coleman: Social capital as a function in accessing resources 
 Approximately the same time as Bourdieu, the American sociologist James 
Coleman published a paper that attracted much interest in the concept of social 
capital. For Coleman, social capital was significant as a primary way of 
understanding the relationship between educational achievement and social 
inequality. Using a series of longitudinal studies of sophomores in US state and 
Catholic high schools in 1980 and 1982, Coleman noted a markedly higher levels of 
attainment in most subjects among pupils in Catholic high schools (Hoffer, Greeley, 
and Coleman, 1985). He suggested that certain norms (such as the higher 
expectations of teachers in schools), obligation and social networks were 
particularly beneficial for pupils coming from the less advantaged background 
(Joshi & Aoki, 2014; Schuller et al., 2000). 
Coleman then defined social capital as a function, the way a person acts 
within a social structure to make the most of one’s resources (Halpern, 2005). He 
offered further refinement by viewing social capital as intellectual currency to 
understand the relative strength of families and communities. He explained that 
social capital is a composite of direct and indirect resources that are a by-product of 
social networks and social support systems amongst family, friends or community 
members (Hawkins & Maurer, 2010).  
By using this linkage, Coleman somewhat confirmed Bourdieu’s conception: 
the powerful remained powerful by virtue of their contacts with other powerful 
people. Social capital is neither a mechanism, a thing, nor an outcome – it is anything 
that allows people or institutions to act so they can have access to resources 
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(DeFilippis, 2001). By exploring how the resources of social capital might 
counterbalance low levels of human and cultural capital, Coleman was able to 
demonstrate ways in which social capital appeared to interact with other aspects of 
stratification – at least in the area of education (Schuller et al., 2000).  
2.2.3 Robert Putnam: Social capital as a means towards common good 
Perhaps the widely quoted definition of social capital is by Harvard 
professor, Robert Putnam. In his seminal study called Making Democracy Work, 
Putnam (1993) pointed to the notion of civic community as a variable in explaining 
the difference in the performances of regional governments in Italy. He noted that 
the difference in effectiveness of regional governments – their speed of action, the 
efficiency with which they worked and the way the public perceived them – could 
not be put down to the size of their budget or policy frameworks. Based on a detailed 
compilation of evidence, Putnam’s conclusion instead pointed to the vibrancy of the 
associational life and level of trust between strangers: 
These communities did not become civic simply because they 
were rich. The historical record strongly suggests precisely the 
opposite: They have become rich because they were civic. The 
social capital embodied in norms and networks of civic 
engagement seems to be a precondition for economic 
development, as well as for effective government. Development 
economists take note: Civics matters. (p.37) 
Putnam then analysed this conceptualisation in the context of the United 
States and wrote about the perceived decline of civic engagement in the country. 
The short article entitled “Bowling Alone” caught the attention of many. He used an 
activity as mundane as bowling to argue how activities that used to be highly 
associational and fostered wider social fabric are now diminishing (Putnam, 2001). 
As with any growing trend, Putnam’s conceptualisation of social capital has 
been a target of major criticism. First, Putnam’s scientific foundation of introducing 
the concept of social capital has been found to be misleading. Although he used big 
data sets in proving his idea, it was pointed out that his statistical evidence was 
either overly represented or downplayed (Fischer, 2005).  
Second, as a concept, it tends to expand in all directions. While it allowed 
sociologists to enter the field of economics through this ‘metaphor,’ it is too vague 
 
 
19 
 
and makes itself unnecessary because of its oversimplification (DeFilippis, 2001). It 
can be applied to a huge range of social issues in so many different contexts as to 
lose any distinct meaning (Fine, 2007). 
This prompted questions about what makes up social capital and how it is 
measured. How can one tell that social capital is present and it is growing? What 
activities make up social capital? Is it attending church outings, joining sororities, 
playing bridge, having family dinners, doing good volunteering, voting, or professing 
one’s faith (Fine, 2007; Fischer, 2005)?  
Nevertheless, these criticisms did not deter the growth of interest and 
literature that sprung from this controversial concept (DeFilippis, 2001). 
Economists and development theorists, including the World Bank, utilised social 
capital in suggesting new ways of building and managing wealth (Woolcock & 
Narayan, 2000; Halpern, 2005; Abad, 2005). These discussions were particularly 
hinged on Putnam’s (1993) succinct definition of the concept: 
‘Social capital’ refers to features of social organization such as 
networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit. (p.36) 
 Breaking social capital into three sub-components – networks, norms, and 
trust – has allowed further investigations of the concept. These sub-components are 
recognisable in almost any form of social association. Hence, this made it easier for 
researchers to identify – even quantify – the presence and level of social capital in a 
given social context (Jung, Gray, Lampe & Ellison, 2013; Kwon, D’Angelo & McLeod, 
2013). 
2.2.4 The three components of social capital: Networks, norms, trust 
Networks: This sub-component can be illustrated with reference to one of its 
most familiar forms – the traditionally, locally embedded community or 
‘neighbourhood’ (Halpern, 2005). However, this interconnectedness can also extend 
even to stock market exchanges, European political networks, or street gangs. 
Manuel Castells (1996) described networks as “open structures, able to expand 
without limits, integrating new nodes as long as they share the same communication 
codes (for example, values or performance goals)” (p.470). 
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In most cases, the community and the networks that partly comprise it may 
be defined geographically – especially in rural settings. In other cases, its boundaries 
may be vague (Cutter et al., 2008). Furthermore, the network can be described by 
its density (the proportion of people who know each other) and closure (the 
dominance of intra- versus inter-community links). 
Norms: This sub-component refers to the rules, values, and expectations that 
characterise the members of a network or community. Most of these social norms 
are unwritten. Yet, there is a tacit awareness for one to do something for 
(behavioural component) or feel towards a certain group (affective component) 
(Halpern, 2005). 
Trust: The third sub-component is one of the least topics discussed in the 
field of sociology. It lends itself to many a philosophical and political debate, with a 
puzzling interaction between institutions and individuals. Yet, the importance of 
trust is pervasive in almost every aspect of social life – from marriage to market 
development (Schuller et al., 2000). 
Francis Fukuyama (1995), an influential interpreter of the concept, looks at 
social capital as ‘mutual trust.’ Building on the component of norms, he defined trust 
as the “expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and 
cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of the 
members of the community” (p.26). However, this definition by Fukuyama assumes 
an existing moral consensus among the members of the group. 
Still, this view agrees to an essential feature of all trust relations: it is 
reciprocal and usually self-reinforcing in nature (Jung et al., 2013; Dussaillant & 
Guzman, 2014). “Trust tends to evoke trust, distrust to evoke distrust” (Fox, as cited 
by Schuller et al., 2000). As with conventional capital, those who have social capital 
tend to accumulate more – it is a “resource supply [which] increases rather than 
decreases through use and which (unlike physical capital) becomes depleted if not 
used” (Putnam, 1993, p. 4). 
Putnam (1993) further emphasised trust when he suggested social capital as 
an important ingredient for economic development. He cited the rapidly growing 
economies in East Asia, where there is a dense social network and most of the 
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businesses include extended family or close-knit ethnic communities, like the 
overseas Chinese. He argued that this kind of set-up does not just foster trust, it also 
lowers transaction costs, and speeds up information and innovation. 
This reveals one important characteristic of social capital: it can be converted 
into other kinds of benefits, like financial capital. Using the components of networks, 
norms, and trust, social capital can also describe the benefits individuals can access 
through their social network. These benefits may include emotional support, 
material support, and novel information (Jung et al., 2013).   
However, this view imposes restrictions on those who are not part of the 
network and on those who do not share the same values as the other members of 
the community. Social capital then becomes the value derived from being a member 
who has access to resources within the community that are not available to non-
members (Huysman & Wulf, 2004; DeFilippis, 2001). This is where social capital, as 
“the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively” (Woolcock & 
Narayan, 2000, p.226), can bring intended and unintended negative effects as well 
(Aldrich, 2012). 
2.2.5 Types of social capital: Bonding, bridging, and linking 
 The sub-components of social capital have facilitated the use of the concept 
across different social contexts – from family to communities to the state (Halpern, 
2005). Still, social capital has been criticised for functionalism and for failing to 
address issues of power and conflict. To address this, Putnam introduced the 
different types of social capital: bonding, bridging and linking (Schuller et al., 2000). 
In social capital literature, ‘bonding social capital’ is generally synonymous 
to ‘strong ties’ and it refers to the connections among people who share similar 
demographic characteristics and values such as family members, close friends, 
neighbours, and work colleagues (Abad, 2005). These are links between like-
minded people, or the reinforcement of homogeneity. While it may be strong, it can 
also result in higher walls excluding those who do not qualify (Schuller et al., 2000). 
It also produces the least valuable exchanges of resources and information (Lin, 
2001). 
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‘Bridging social capital’ is associated with ‘weak ties’ as it describes 
relationships amongst people who are more distant and dissimilar in characteristics 
such as age, socio-economic status, race/ethnicity, and education (Cao et al., 2013). 
It thus refers to the building of connections between heterogeneous groups. While 
these are expected to be more fragile, they are more likely to foster social inclusion 
(Schuller et al., 2000; Lin, 2001). 
The third type of social capital, ‘linking social capital,’ recognises that while 
social capital has been conceptually defined as “social good,” (Putnam, 1993) many 
forms of networks are not equally accessible to anyone (Halpern, 2005). Although 
this is the result of weakest relationships, linking social capital generates the most 
valuable outcome, as it connects individuals with institutions who have relative 
power over them (e.g. to provide access to services, jobs, or resources) (Hawkins & 
Maurer, 2010; Lin, 2001).  
Unlike bonding, it is bridging and linking that are characterised by exposure 
to and development of new ideas, values and perspectives (Szreter, 2000; Gannon, 
2013). Social capital then allows investigation into the quality of the set of 
relationships of a social group to pursue its shared goals more effectively than 
would otherwise be possible (Szreter, 2000). This value of social capital is what the 
literature on disaster resilience focuses its attention on. 
 
2.3 Social Capital in Building Disaster-Resilient Communities 
Several studies have considered the importance of social capital during 
disasters (Munasinghe, 2007; Cox & Perry, 2011; Islam & Walkerden, 2014; 
Dussaillant & Guzman, 2014). These studies all recognised that social capital is the 
basis of community response. When physical infrastructure, technology, and 
information channels fail during disasters, social capital is the only resource that 
remains intact (Dynes, 2005). In situations where speed, coordination, efficiency 
and cohesion spell the difference between life and death, “social capital is a lifeline” 
(Ranada, 2014). 
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Social capital is also suggested to better predict disaster recovery (Aldrich, 
2012). Most rehabilitation efforts are focused only on the restoration of the 
economy and physical infrastructures (Dynes, 2005). The concept of social capital 
recognises the importance of resources and challenges at the local level that are 
often overlooked during disaster recovery, such as post-disaster mental health 
(Wind, Fordham & Komproe, 2011) or pre-disaster leadership and collective 
practices (Joshi & Aoki, 2014; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004). 
Tierney (2013) adds that rehabilitation becomes more manageable by 
analysing recovery and resilience from the individual to the societal level. However, 
most studies on social capital fail to take into account the complexities of recovery 
and resilience process. Families recover differently based on various dimensions, 
such as their psychological well-being, household relations and well-being, 
infrastructure repair, and most especially, their economic capacity. 
This is where social capital becomes a double-edged resource during disaster 
(Aldrich, 2012). Social capital can overcome barriers to collective action and allow 
a speedier mobilisation of physical, informational, and financial resources. On the 
other hand, it may also be utilised to limit and oppress disadvantaged sectors of the 
community (Jennings, 2007). 
One of the most published examples of this case is Hurricane Katrina, which 
showed how race and class significantly shaped disaster response (Henderson & 
Hildreth, 2011; Reininger et al., 2013). Messias, Barrington and Lacy (2012) noted 
how Latinos struggled with language issues in understanding the dangers of 
Hurricane Katrina. Consequently, he observed how these communities were heavily 
reliant on their close networks for timely information, evacuation plans, and key 
resources (such as cash and transportation). However, these existing social 
networks were disrupted and strained by overwhelming needs, limited financial 
capacity, lack of transportation, and the actual threat of deportation. 
To sustain themselves, the Latinos formed new networks, albeit still within 
their own Spanish-speaking circles. This is consistent with the findings of Hawkins 
and Maurer (2010) among African American residents in New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina. They relied on, built upon, and collapsed all levels of social 
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capital for individual, family, and community survival. Similarly, they exhausted 
their bonding social capital because they had difficulties utilising their bridging and 
linking social capitals, which could have provided longer term survival and wider 
community revitalisation. 
In Bangladesh, Islam and Walkerden (2014) noted how bridging 
relationships can become less active and sometimes break down due to poverty, 
disaster impact, competition and conflict over access to external support. In 
response to this, it was remarkable how communities have sustained their bonding 
relationships. Families and relatives agreed to reduce their food intake, find 
alternative income (like selling family assets), and engage in other livelihood 
options through temporary migration. 
Munasinghe (2007) suggests that the poor are relatively more resilient than 
the wealthy. Describing the 2004 Asian Tsunami, he observed that the poor are able 
to fall back on traditional, informal mutual-help networks, whereas the rich are 
dependent on mechanical devices and services of domestic aides. He then compared 
this to Hurricane Katrina, where geographical scale of damage was much smaller 
and wherein technological resources and warnings were readily available, yet the 
affected communities suffered social breakdown, which included violent armed 
robbery and looting. 
However, this deduction offers an oversimplified approach to complex 
broader structural issues of poverty and inequality. Most poor families living in 
vulnerable areas wish to independently solve their problems but are limited by their 
lack of assets and income (Islam & Walkerden, 2014). This is further complicated 
when their relationship to the state is considered. 
A recent theme in the disaster literature now looks into the potential of social 
capital to tap not only into the informal, local networks but also the more formal 
channels of planning and policy, such as the state and its related agencies (Lalone, 
2012). Some of this literature suggests that the government has a key role to play in 
disaster recovery (Berke, Chuenpagdee, Juntarashote & Chang, 2008; Aldrich, 2011; 
van Voorst, 2014). When communities are slow to recover after disaster, the 
government’s responsibility is to facilitate community members to effectively 
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access both bonding and bridging social capital and leverage their shared histories 
and perspectives (Grube & Storr, 2014). 
This is what Gannon (2013) pointed out regarding the practical challenges 
and pressures in implementing social capital. He noted his personal experience in 
the communities along Japan’s north-eastern coastline of Kamaishi City. He argued 
that while Kamaishi has high levels of bonding and considerable levels of bridging 
social capital, it has differed because it has strong linking social capitals. He 
attributed this partly to several and distinct decades-long efforts to bring local 
government, business, and non-profit leaders together with leading national and 
international experts to recalibrate and revitalise a local economy that had been 
declining well before the disaster struck. 
Alternatively, the presence of high bonding social capital is eroded when 
politics influence disaster recovery programs. Berke et al. (2008) studied six villages 
in Thailand to determine how social capital and external aid delivery influence 
community performance in the conservation of mangrove ecosystems. Their 
findings indicate that social capital represents a potential for collective action but 
the design of aid programmes, which are often politically-driven, may prevent such 
action. Attaining external support from politicians even caused suspicion and 
mistrust among closely-knit communities and the distribution of goods eventually 
became a competition among families and relatives. 
The study of van Voorst (2014) however criticised this dualistic idea of state 
and society and instead focused on the ways in which society, particularly the poor, 
engage with the state. Looking into the most flood-prone neighbourhoods in Jakarta, 
it highlighted that in a country, such as Indonesia, with a history of corruption and 
outright neglect for the people, networks are considered access to social justice. 
Since this sense of social justice is not achieved through formal agencies of 
government, people join informal social networks that promise financial and social 
security. It is interesting to note, however, that the dichotomy between the state and 
the non-state diminishes as the actors simultaneously interact with both society and 
the state. 
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While it is useful to see how social networks cut across the formal and 
informal spheres, van Voorst (2014) nevertheless pinpointed how this has 
reproduced – instead of altering or contesting – the larger unequal structures. 
Rather than demanding a solution to the flood problem from the Jakarta 
government, selected residents participate in a flood-management system in 
exchange for personal benefits. Worse, others got involved in civil militia 
organisations which, although cooperate with the government to assist victims to 
gain access to justice, are also known to participate in classic extortion and stand-
over tactics. 
On a related note, Ganapati (2012) pointed out how women in Turkey were 
additionally oppressed because of their networks after the earthquake. Most 
community-based networks perpetuate gender-based assumptions, which limit 
their participation in search-and-rescue operations and in negotiations regarding 
the amount of aid their families should be getting. Meanwhile, civic networks 
inadvertently placed them in conflict with state authorities by encouraging them to 
actively participate in civil affairs. 
Furthermore, Aldrich (2012) discovered that the large amounts of financial 
assistance can break down existing social relationships. After the 2004 Asian 
Tsunami, young female orphans in villages in India received huge compensation 
packages from NGOs and the government. This makes them more attractive to the 
“marriage market” and thus pushed many uneducated girls to marry early. 
These case studies likewise point to the importance of place and identity as 
one looks into the role of social capital in community disaster recovery. Cox and 
Perry (2011) underscored that the psychology of place to community and individual 
resilience is critical, especially when place is disrupted not only through 
displacement but as a result of myriad economic, material and symbolic losses and 
changes associated with disaster events. This is particularly important for 
economically and socially vulnerable segments of society, which are often neglected 
in the goal towards ‘normalcy’ – a highly contested benchmark after disaster.  
One case in point is the study of Aldrich (2011) on Tamil Nadu, India – a 
region that practices social caste system – after the 2004 Asian Tsunami. Villages 
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with institutionalised social capital in the form of tribal councils effectively 
connected to outside aid, which resulted in speedy recovery. However, it also 
simultaneously slowed down the assistance for the minorities, outcastes, and non-
members by excluding them (often systematically) from the recovery process. 
In a way, the current literature on the inclusion of social capital to the field 
of disaster resilience has pointed towards the quality, accessibility, and flexibility of 
social systems in the face of natural calamities (Aldrich, 2012). It indicates the need 
to investigate ways in which all capitals – human, financial, technological, 
environmental – can be shared and utilised by most members of society during 
crisis. There is also an emphasis on the importance of better access to bridging and 
linking social capitals, preferably through more formal networks. 
  
2.4 The Rise of Social Media as an Important Technology during Disasters 
The necessity to connect especially during disasters is further accentuated 
by the people’s actual behaviour in and attitude towards social media. This was seen 
in major disasters such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Muralidharan et al., 2011), the 
2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami (Hjorth & Kim, 2011), the 2010 Canterbury 
earthquake in New Zealand (Dabner, 2012), the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami 
(Murthy, 2013), and the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China (Cao et al., 2013). All 
of these have shown the potential of social media not only in saving lives 
(Wiederhold, 2013) but in facilitating a better and more democratic recovery 
process (Alexander, 2014). 
2.4.1 Social media: From social to informational network 
Social media refers to internet-based applications that enable people to 
communicate and share resources and information (Lindsay, 2011). The term is 
often interchangeably used with ‘social networking sites,’ which are web-based 
services that allow individuals to construct a public profile so they can connect with 
other users within the system (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). While both are online 
platforms that serve to build social relations, social media is said to have been a 
concept developed from social networking sites (Veerasamy, 2013). 
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This can be observed by looking at the earlier forms of social networking 
sites such as Friendster, MySpace, and Facebook. Slogans of these sites describe 
their services as an online community that connects people through their existing 
(and growing) networks of friends. Implicitly, these sites were originally intended 
to address the networking or communication needs during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century (Veerasamy, 2013). 
In order to do that, these sites developed features that allow various media 
content to be generated, shared, and modified by the users themselves. Whereas 
traditionally, consumers used the Internet to simply expend content, they are now 
utilising these online platforms not only to initiate social interaction, but also to 
gather information and discuss public opinion. This represents the social media 
phenomenon (Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy & Silvestre, 2011). 
There currently exists a rich and diverse form of social media sites, which 
vary in terms of their scope and functionality (Alexander, 2014). Wikis are web-
based platforms in which co-authors collectively build textual and visual websites. 
YouTube and Flickr are video and photo-sharing websites. Facebook caters to the 
general masses and LinkedIn for the professional network. Weblogs (or blogs) is a 
discussion or informative site published on the web. Twitter is a microblogging site 
that enables users to send and read 140-character messages called “tweets” and 
asserts on its ability to offer real-time updates. 
Perhaps the most recognised role of social media in a disaster context is its 
support to traditional channels of communication. Conventional broadcast media 
can be limited in terms of the information and the type of message it sends out 
during disasters. Social media, on the other hand, fills in the gap for accurate, 
reliable, and timely information that is otherwise hard to obtain before, during, and 
after a crisis (Lindsay, 2011; Yates & Paquette, 2011). 
In fact, social media is now seen as an integral channel through which 
information about disastrous events have come to ‘break’ or ‘circulate’ within the 
public (McCosker, 2013). It has also become a platform for action and reaction in 
relation to these events. This is because social media allows for user-generated and 
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user-directed information – details that come from and actually matter to the people 
during the time of crisis (Sutton et al., 2008; Bakshy, 2012; Alexander, 2014).  
Moreover, information gathered from social media (termed as 
‘crowdsourcing’) is fed to traditional media to provide real-time accounts of 
disasters – another phenomenon called “new media.” While most people turn on 
their television sets to get details, many are simultaneously using their tablet or 
smartphone to get a “clear image of nationwide awareness at the time of crisis” 
(Wiederhold, 2013, p.781). Additionally, there is a growing number of people who 
now prefer turning to social media over the traditional media for information during 
disasters (Murthy & Longwell, 2013).  
In light of this, the literature have looked at how social media is 
systematically and scientifically utilised in various disaster response and recovery 
activities. These include disseminating information (Dabner, 2012), conducting 
emergency communications and issuing warnings (Crowe, 2013), receiving and 
responding to victim requests for assistance (Kirac, Milburn & Warden III, 2013), 
monitoring user activities to establish situational awareness (Vieweg, Hughes, 
Starbird & Palen, 2010) and uploading images to assist in damage estimates (Guan 
& Chen, 2014). Moreover, related technologies are now being developed to assess 
and analyse the large data sets available in social media (Travis & Sykes, 2012). 
2.4.2 Social media: From informational to resource network 
Another notable development in social media use has been the growing role 
of individuals, non-profit aid groups, and other NGOs in raising funds and delivering 
services for disaster responses. Hundreds of millions of dollars were raised online 
within weeks following major disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and 
2011 Japan earthquake (Gannon, 2013). Significantly, whereas traditional media 
employ negative themes of crisis and conflict, non-profit groups use positive themes 
of morality and responsibility to encourage streams of visitors to increase donations 
channelled through their social networking sites (Briones, Kuch, Liu & Jin, 2011; 
Muralidharan et al., 2013). 
Since social media is a self-organising, voluntary, and open participation 
system, it encourages collaboration and cooperation between members of groups 
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for their mutual benefit (Cao et al., 2013). It also reduces transaction costs of 
maintaining a larger and potentially more diverse social network (Jung et al., 2013). 
Owing to its accessibility and economy, it has been referred to as “a tool of 
grassroots crisis communication” (McWilliam, 2013, p. 92).  
More importantly, a sense of community is fostered in social media. Its 
multiple functions allow access to information and resources and address 
psychological damage and feelings of affectedness and pain during disasters 
(Taylor, Wells, Howell & Raphael, 2012; McCosker, 2013; Hjorth & Kim, 2011). Users 
do not only get information but also ask favours from other users because they 
believe that they can actually turn to several people in their network (Jung et al., 
2013; Warschauer, 2003).  This is one prime example of social capital in action. 
 
2.5 The Role of Social Media in Enhancing Social Capital during Disasters 
Ressa (2013) defines social media as one’s “physical social network on 
steroids.” At the most fundamental level, social media functions using the natural 
connections between people (Crowe, 2013). Social media tools can support how 
people build, maintain, and benefit from social relationships on a larger scale (Jung 
et al., 2013). 
According to Kietzmann et al. (2011), there are seven functional blocks of 
social media: identity, conversations, sharing, presence, relationships, reputations 
and groups. Generally, these blocks refer to the extent which users reveal or make 
themselves available, communicate, exchange or distribute content, form 
relationships or groups, and influence social media. Each of these functions have 
corresponding implications such as issues on privacy, appropriateness of content 
(offensive versus acceptable, personal versus copyrighted material), intimacy (or 
selective presence, where one can be visible to some while hidden to others), and 
other membership rules or protocols.  
Using this framework, they further argued that social media sites tend to 
concentrate on three or four blocks. Facebook puts top priority on the relationships 
block, followed by conversations, presence, identity, and reputation. Given the strong 
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connection to real-world contacts and the scale of usage (Bakshy 2011), Facebook 
is an ideal platform to test how social capital is utilised. 
2.5.1 Facebook as an instrument in building social capital 
 Facebook started out as a niche private network for Harvard University 
students (Christakis & Fowler, 2011). Now, with over 1.2 billion active users, 
Facebook is considered to be the world’s most popular social network (Sedghi, 
2014). While the majority of its users are students and young adults, its fastest 
growing demographic are individuals aged 55 and older, with women 
outnumbering men 2:1 (Keitzmann et al., 2011). 
Users join Facebook by creating a homepage that typically provides overt 
details about the user’s identity (e.g. sex, religion, political affiliation) as well as likes 
and dislikes. When creating a homepage, the new user is asked a series of standard 
questions as a means of composing the homepage. After creating a homepage, the 
user can add friends by searching for them by name or email address across the 
Facebook member database.  
Friends can “talk” to one another via Facebook’s instant messaging function, 
via its email function, by writing on the wall of the friend’s homepage or simply by 
posting a current status update. They can share photos and videos through which 
their friends will react or comment. They can also browse through an aggregated 
history of their friends’ recent activity called the “News Feed.”  
According to Facebook, the average user has 200 friends (Sedghi, 2014). 
“Facebook friends” mutually acknowledge their friendship and display each other 
as friends on their homepages. These friendships can form online or, as is more often 
the case, function as an acknowledgement of and supplement to offline relationships 
(Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe, 2007). In effect, Facebook relationships can represent 
and function as strong ties (family and close friends) or weak ties (acquaintances) 
(Boyd & Ellison, 2008). One feature that has probably helped Facebook succeed, 
compared to other social networking sites, is that it only allows people to see direct 
friends and occasionally friends of friends. This reduces the number of links 
between total strangers and makes people feel that their online life is relevant to 
their real-world social networks (Christakis & Fowler, 2011). 
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Facebook is thus useful in building networks very much akin to building 
social capital. Information-seeking behaviours, among specific uses of Facebook, 
most positively contribute to bonding social capital (Kwon et al., 2013; Ellison et al., 
2011). Meanwhile, the intensity of Facebook use, particularly posting a status or 
joining groups, are positive predictors of bridging social capital (Lee, Kim & Ahn, 
2014). 
However, as a mediated form of communication, Facebook has its limitations. 
Burke, Kraut and Marlow (2011) found that direct, person-to-person exchanges 
were still shown to be associated with increases in bridging social capital. They add 
that communications shared on Facebook are not strong enough to create the kind 
of close bonds that are characteristic of one’s closest friends and family. People still 
communicate with those they are closest to in a variety of ways – from email to SMS 
to, most importantly, face-to-face. 
Moreover, it is important to mention that in social media, relationships 
determine the what-and-how of the information exchange. Reputation is a matter of 
trust even in social media (Kietzmann et al., 2011). It is still the value of identity – 
not the scope – of users that determine the value of relationships and exchange of 
resources (Ellison et al., 2011).  
Theoretically, growing a network as large as possible likely reduces the 
degree of separation of individuals. The more connections a user has and the more 
central their position is in their network of relationships, the more likely that user 
is influential (Kietzmann et al., 2011). However, reputation not only refers to people 
but to content. Trust still determines the quality of resources involved in individual 
relationships and how these resources are used, exchanged, or transformed (Cao et 
al., 2013). 
2.5.2 The use of Facebook in building social capital during disasters 
Notwithstanding these limitations, Facebook has been proven to help build 
social capital even in the face of disasters. This was documented during the 2011 
Queensland floods, wherein the increased status updates from friends encouraged 
one resident to seek information about a missing relative on her Facebook Wall. Due 
to the scope of its network and its time-specific features, Facebook was effective in 
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the timely sharing of complex yet correct information rapidly with a large audience 
(McWilliam, 2013). 
Another successful case is the University of Canterbury’s (UC) Earthquake 
Recovery Site Facebook page, which was established a few hours after the 2010 
Christchurch earthquake. The analysis of Dabner (2012) showed how the site 
served both as an informative and supportive platform not only among the students 
of UC but also among the parents of students, students from other tertiary 
institutions, and worldwide, community-based workers. Having a specific purpose 
and an affective feature were both attributed to the success of this effort. 
While there may be some potential advantages to using social media in 
building social capital, there are also some possible issues and drawbacks associated 
with its use especially during disasters and emergencies. The first refers to the 
accuracy and validity of information. Although information gleaned from social 
media is generally accurate, some of these are likewise generally exaggerated 
(Kietzmann et al., 2011). Related to this are out-dated information, which can be 
maliciously used by organisations who intentionally aim to confuse, disrupt or 
otherwise thwart response efforts. These include mischievous pranks to outright 
acts of terrorism (Dufty, 2012). 
The second pertains to administrative issues such as privacy and costs. 
Although some users claimed to understand privacy issues, they were reported to 
upload large amounts of personal information on social networking sites (Noor Al-
Deen & Hendricks, 2012). This makes the maintenance of social networking sites 
costly. The number of personnel required to launch, maintain and manage social 
media program for emergencies and disasters remains unclear (Lindsay, 2012). 
The third refers to technological limitations. The University of Canterbury 
was fortunate because, although power was out in the entire region, the university 
had its own supply of electricity and its technology infrastructure was still 
operational (Dabner, 2012). Nevertheless, this poses the boundaries of social media 
in addressing community disaster resilience as it moves across the “online” and 
“offline” worlds within the geo-social terrain (Hjorth & Kim, 2011).  
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Also, communities may adopt different patterns of communicative behaviour 
and social control. There is now a new reality of sociocultural diversity and mobility, 
a changing balance between public and private sectors, fluidity of social ties and 
identities, and new inequalities based on uneven distribution of technological 
improvements (Resnyansky, 2014). Nevertheless, as more people gain access to 
communication technology, it is probable that social media can offer potential for 
new partnerships as groups that previously worked in isolation can be connected to 
new networks that they once had limited access to (Crowe, 2013; Ressa, 2013). 
 
2.6 Research Gap: Facebook use in the Philippines during Disasters 
Coleman (1988) emphasised that the forms of social capital are activity-
specific. This research adds that these are also context-specific, an important 
consideration in assessing and interpreting the role and influence of social capital 
among diverse groups in disaster situations. In light of the literature presented, the 
contextualisation of the role of social media in building social capital during 
disasters is very applicable to the Philippine setting. 
The Philippines is reported to have the biggest number of Facebook users in 
relation to its actual population (Universal McCann, 2008). As of December 2011, 
the Philippines has 33,600,000 Internet users or equivalent to 32.4% penetration. 
Meanwhile, there are 29,890,900 Facebook users in the Philippines as of December 
31, 2012 equivalent to 28.8 penetration rate (Marcial, 2013). 
Interestingly, these rates are growing amidst wider societal issues of 
intractable poverty and fragile peace-and-order situation in the country. Socially, 
there is a general attitude of mistrust among people who are not part of their 
immediate personal connections (Abad, 2005; Ranada, 2014) – including the state. 
The studies of Abinales and Amoroso (2005) and Brower and Magno (2011) both 
pointed to a history of a state captured by sectoral interests, which results in a 
recurring dilemma of state-society relations that diminishes the ability of the state 
to provide basic services and economic development to its people. This is further 
reflected in the way the state addresses the nation’s social, economic and political 
issues interacting with and acting upon environmental and natural phenomena 
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(Bankoff, 2007). Disasters have become simply a fact of life that Filipinos have had 
to learn to live with and deal on their own over the centuries (Luna, 2007).  
This is not to mention that there is also the present “politics of risk” between 
the government and the NGOs’ disaster management efforts (Bankoff & Hilhorst, 
2009). The Philippines has a well-established institutional and legal framework for 
disaster management, including built-in mechanisms for participation of the people 
and NGOs in decision-making and programme implementation (Luna, 2001). Yet, 
the importance of political and social goals shared by NGOs and civic societies are 
often overshadowed by the economics and ownership models hold in some Western 
concepts of voluntary organisation (Brower & Magno, 2011). 
Despite these conditions, Filipinos are known for their admirable resilience, 
especially during disasters. David (2001) noted how a typical Filipino wage earner 
relies on the pool resources of a kinship group, and to a certain extent, the 
neighbourhood community for survival. It is in the interest of this research to 
discover how social media can utilise and strengthen these existing social practices 
in the face of disaster. 
Moreover, while there are several studies on the use of Facebook in utilising 
and strengthening social capital after disasters, most of them are focused on a 
certain community within a given physical geographical space. The Philippines has 
over two million of its population living in other countries (National Statistics Office, 
2013). Using Facebook, Filipinos have pushed the physical boundaries of social 
capital and extended it through their networks in other parts of the world. It is in 
this juncture of the geography of power, risks, and relationships during a disaster in 
the Philippines that this case study is placing itself. 
Finally, this thesis concentrated on the city of Tacloban as it faced one of the 
most powerful typhoons that hit the planet in recorded history. The literature 
showed the possibilities and limitations of social media in utilising the social capital 
of communities in the face of disaster. With the intensity of Super Typhoon Haiyan 
and the remarkable mix of social capital in Tacloban, to what extent can social media 
contribute to a social resource that is assumed to make the Taclobanons resilient in 
these difficult times? 
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CHAPTER 3: TACLOBAN CITY 
“Pay attention to local geography.” 
                                                              – Melba P. Maggay, Filipino writer and social anthropologist 
 
Tacloban City is the capital city of Leyte, a province in the Eastern Visayas 
region in the Philippines. Its east coast directly faces the Cancabato Bay in the San 
Juanico Strait, which divides the two main islands of Leyte and Samar. Owing to its 
geography and location, Tacloban has developed into one of the most important 
cities in the country, acting as the gateway for trade, education, and health services 
for the Eastern Visayas region (National Statistical Coordination Board – Eastern 
Visayas, 2013). 
 
3.1 From a fishing village to a highly urbanised city 
Tacloban started as a small fishing village under the parochial administration 
of Bassey in Samar. When it was discovered by the Augustinian missionaries in the 
eighteenth century, the place was referred to as tarakluban or literally translated as 
“the place where the ‘taklub’ is.” Taklub is a basket-like contraption made of bamboo 
that is used to catch fish, crabs, and shrimps (National Statistical Coordination Board 
- Eastern Visayas, 2013). It later evolved to its present name, Tacloban. 
During this period, Tacloban was one of those villages or barangays3 
throughout lowland Visayas that were coerced to settle into towns organised 
around a newly built church with a resident friar. This was done to subjugate the 
locals into a Christian community so they could be easily used for forced labour and 
collection of tribute, which was a major source of revenue for the early colonial state 
(Constantino, 1975). This long and brutal process, called reduccion, remapped the 
Philippine settlement patterns into today’s cabaceras (district capitals), poblaciones 
(towns), barrios or barangays (villages) and sitios (hamlets) (Abinales & Amoroso, 
2005). 
                                                          
3 Barangay is a Tagalog word which originally meant “boat,” referring to a boatload of related people, 
their dependents and slaves. These kinship groups were led by a datu; hence, barangay also meant the 
following of a datu, a political community defined by personal attachment, not territorial location 
(Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). 
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Over the course of time, there was a significant lack of civilian and military 
officials who would oversee a colony comprising of 7,107 islands. This compelled 
Spain to establish encomienda across the archipelago despite its disastrous effects 
when it was enacted in Spanish America. This system instituted administrative 
provinces by further clustering the settlements into a defined geographical area 
headed by an alcalde mayor or provincial governor (Cruz, 2014). As part of this 
restructuring, Tacloban was officially proclaimed as a municipality and became a 
major trading town between Leyte and Samar in 1770 (National Statistical 
Coordination Board - Eastern Visayas, 2013). 
Towards the late 18th century, during an age of increasing growth in global 
commerce and advances in economic organisations, Spain had to reconsider the way 
it ruled the Philippines. Extensive trading brought by the British Empire, through 
English East India Company, opened the Philippines to world trade (Abinales & 
Amoroso, 2005). This made port cities into commercial, managerial, and 
professional centres. On 26 February 1830, owing to the ideal location of its port, 
which was well-sheltered and had adequate facilities, Tacloban became the capital 
of the province of Leyte (National Statistical Coordination Board - Eastern Visayas, 
2013). 
However, it was not until the American occupation that Tacloban was opened 
to world trade. This was the first act of Colonel Murray, the first military governor 
of Leyte, in 1901 to gain the confidence and friendship of the locals who were 
doubtful of the intentions of their new colonisers (“History,” n.d., para. 4). Tacloban 
eventually became the centre of commerce, educational, cultural and social 
activities of Leyte. Educational institutions such as Leyte Normal School (now Leyte 
Normal University), Leyte High School (now Leyte National High School), and Leyte 
Trade School (now Eastern Visayas State College) were later established in the 
capital. 
On 25 May 1942, the Japanese Imperial forces landed in Tacloban, which 
signalled the beginning of their three-year occupation in Leyte. They were 
particularly interested in the province because of its diverse agriculture of rice and 
corn that could replenish their depleted larder (Ara, 2008). Like most residents of 
municipalities occupied by the Japanese, Taclobanons suffered from civilian 
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beatings and torture. Lear (1952) recounted how the kempeitai (Japanese military 
police) headquarters in Tacloban was fitted with detention chambers on the ground 
floor and torture chambers upstairs. 
On 20 October 1945, combined Filipino and American troops headed by US 
General Douglas McArthur landed in Palo, some fourteen kilometres away from 
Tacloban, making Leyte the first province to be liberated from the Japanese forces 
(Official Gazette, 2014). As it is centrally located in the heart of the Philippine 
archipelago, Leyte was a strategically important island. It was already earmarked as 
an important staging and operating base of the Americans as they launched their 
amphibious assaults against the Japanese, which is now known as the Battle of Leyte 
Gulf, the largest naval battle in history (Yenne, 2009). Three days later, on 23 
October, Tacloban temporarily became the capital of the Philippines until the 
complete liberation of the country on 27 February 1945 (Amascual III, 2010). 
On June 20, 1952, Tacloban was created into a chartered city by virtue of 
Republic Act No. 760 signed by the then President Elpidio Quirino (National 
Statistical Coordination Board - Eastern Visayas, 2013). On December 18, 2008, 
Tacloban was converted into a Highly Urbanised City (HUC), making it the first HUC 
in Eastern Visayas and 34th in the Philippines (Gabieta, 2008). Consequently, this 
separated Tacloban from the administrative control of the province of Leyte.             
 
3.2 The land of the powerful Romualdez Clan 
In the last decade, Tacloban had a high administrative standing as one of the 
top ten performing and competitive cities in the Philippines, receiving numerous 
local and international awards for governance (SunStar Tacloban, 2012). Despite 
these, Lange (2010) argued that the economic structure of Leyte remained primarily 
dependent on natural resources, without any significant modern industries. He 
attributed this to the control of local elites, who did not actively pursue structural 
change during the significant development periods of the province. 
Indeed, the present-day Tacloban still characterises the typical cabacera: 
with its centuries-old Sto. Niño Church, the schools and universities, the market or 
businesses, and the city government halls surrounding the public square called 
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plaza. Notably, this form of town planning during the 1700s also reinforced a social 
class of affluent families, who lived near the plaza mayor. These prominent 
individuals were entrusted with local rule during the Spanish occupation owing to 
the lack of military and civil authorities that would oversee the islands. 
These “the elite of the locality” (Constantino, 1969, p.3) were called 
principalia. They were the former datus and their descendants who were rewarded 
with positions after they brought their people voluntarily into the cabecera. Now 
adjuncts of Spanish power, they used their position to further accumulate wealth by 
demanding excess payment and reviving debt slavery (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). 
They also took advantage of their colonisers’ unfamiliarity with land ownership by 
claiming vast landholdings, which formerly belonged to the barangays (Constantino, 
1975). These land-grabbing activities were often led by or done in partnership with 
the clergy (Iyer & Maurer, 2009). 
Before the 19th century, families who lived in rural towns used to till family 
farms and grew rice and vegetables for their own consumption. However, in a 
modernised economy where the clergy charged numerous fees and taxes from birth 
to marriage or illness to death, everything suddenly required money. When the 
peasants ran out of money, they would offer their lands in exchange for loan from 
the principalia and the clergy. Since the mode under which they acquired the loan 
was designed to profit the elites and the clergy, most peasants would eventually 
dispossess their lands (Cruz, 2014). 
These new land tenure and property relations created a society of peasants 
integrated into an exploitative political and social system for the benefit of the few 
(Sicat, 1994). This would go on for centuries, where uncertain land reforms 
discourage investments in agriculture leading to broader societal problems such as 
food insecurity, rural-to-urban migration, urban informal settling, poverty traps for 
farmers, and widespread existence of spurious and fake land titles (Cruz, 2014). In 
Leyte, this was aggravated by the decision of the local landed elite to carry on with 
resource production because of the high world market prices for raw materials and 
the province’s favourable agricultural conditions (Lange, 2010). 
When the United States took control of the Philippines in 1898, there was an 
introduction of reforms regarding land and property rights. Iyer and Maurer (2009) 
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noted three: the redistribution of large estates to their tenants, the creation of a 
system of land titling, and a homestead program to encourage cultivation of public 
lands. However, they added that these reforms were slowly implemented because 
of their high costs (having to negotiate prices in purchasing land from the friars) and 
political constraints, particularly on those who were reluctant to evict informal 
cultivators especially on public lands. 
The American colonisers suddenly found themselves having to go through 
several legal battles only to have their cases dismissed because the landlords always 
had powerful linkages with the municipal councils. The local landed elites either 
worked for or controlled the municipal councils (Sodusta, 1981). Rent-seeking, or 
the manipulation of economic and political conditions to increase one’s share of 
existing wealth without creating wealth, became possible to lower the costs of 
colonisation (Lange, 2010). 
In Leyte, the monopoly of ruling elites impeded the control of the utilisation 
of rent. Don Miguel Lopez Romualdez, who was described as “successful in 
combining public office and private business” since 1873 (Lange, 2010, p.61), 
established the Romualdez clan as Leyte’s most powerful family. Don Romualdez 
once served as an assemblyman for Leyte and mayor of the city of Manila during 
World War II. His political reach advanced with the election of his son, Daniel 
Romualdez, as representative of then Leyte’s fourth district in 1949 and later as 
Speaker of the House of Representatives from 1957 to 1962 (Arinto, 2013). 
The marriage of Imelda Romualdez, first cousin of Daniel Romualdez, to 
Ferdinand Marcos, who became the president of the Philippines in 1965, gave the 
absolute political control in Leyte to the Romualdez family. However, while it 
strengthened the ties between the local and national elites, Lange (2010) argued 
that this did not benefit Leyte economically. Due to the outstanding power of the 
Romualdez clan and the absence of any competing families in the province, there 
was no need to legitimise the utilisation of rent. The local elites did not prioritise 
technological and industrial investment, rendering the province unprepared for the 
opportunities brought about by the import substitution phase in the 1950s and 
1960s. As a result, unrestrained rent-seeking was rampant, benefitting only a small 
family circle. 
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Cruz (2014) claimed that these extractive institutions were the roots of 
Philippine underdevelopment, particularly widespread corruption, inadequate 
protection of property rights, and lack of effective constraints on the elite. Notably, 
in the disaster-affected areas of Leyte and Eastern Samar, approximately 32 percent 
of the total population were informal settlers. This made the security of land tenure 
as one of the fundamental challenges in post-Haiyan recovery (Fitzpatrick & 
Compton, 2014). 
More significantly, these difficulties are further complicated with the 
expressed rivalries of political families. Alfred Romualdez, the incumbent mayor of 
Tacloban City, is the son of Alfredo Romualdez, who was also the mayor of Tacloban 
from 1998 until 2007. The older Romualdez is Imelda’s younger brother (Arinto, 
2013). On the other hand, the incumbent president of the Philippines is Benigno S. 
Aquino III, the son of the late Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. who was assassinated 
under the Marcos dictatorship. This friction between the central government and 
the local authorities of Tacloban was said to have greatly influenced the entire 
disaster response following Super Typhoon Haiyan (Tran, 2014). 
 
3.3 A population dispersed geographically and socio-politically 
3.3.1 Separate islands, separate societies 
 These fragmented pockets of power across the Philippines may be attributed 
both to the archipelagic characteristic of the country, which local autonomy 
developed ahead of a central authority. Doronila (1994) described the formation of 
the Philippine state as commencing from the local barangay units, which were later 
consolidated into a pyramidal structure under the Spanish colonial government in 
Manila. However, while Spain claimed formal possession of the archipelago, the 
forests and hills were home to many peoples and tribes joined together. Over time, 
these mixed barangays resisted the impositions of Spanish religious, economic, and 
social stratification by retaining a social structure led by a datu (Abinales & 
Amoroso, 2005).  
Spain’s mercantilist policies likewise reinforced the formation of a 
disintegrated young Philippine state. Again, Doronila (1994) indicated that when 
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the Philippines was opened to foreign trade in the middle of the 19th century, 
European businesses and financial houses bypassed Manila by directly transacting 
with provincial agricultural export producers, particularly the sugar planters in 
various provinces. These producers created their fortunes by associating with 
European capitalism, instead of contributing to the economic development of major 
cities in the Philippines. 
This resulted in an archipelago characterised by “a series of separate 
societies that entered the world economic systems at different times, under 
different terms of trade, and with different systems of production” (McCoy, as cited 
in Abinales & Amoroso, 2005, p. 83). It prevented communities from finding unity 
based on a shared exposure to the global capitalist market. Instead, regional or 
language group consciousness persisted, along with increasing social class tension 
between growing rural poor and emerging rural elites (Cruz, 2014). 
3.3.2 Colonial clientelism, collective cynicism 
When the Americans came the elites, who were without any significant 
experience in national-level democratic institutions, were given “representation” in 
the Philippine Assembly, a political norm at the core of American constitutional 
politics (Corpuz, 1998). Proclaimed under the efforts of “political tutelage” to teach 
Filipinos the virtue of democracy, the American colonial authorities instead 
introduced indirect election of Philippine provincial governors only to local 
influential families because “the masses are ignorant, credulous, and childlike” 
(Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 263). This created an elite electorate process 
marked by factional rivalries and personality issues (Teehankee, 2002). 
Thus, the Philippine Assembly consisted of provincial politicians who had to 
look for support from municipal politicians. These provincial factions became a 
major building-block in the political manoeuvring of national elections (Hutchcroft 
& Rocamora, 2003). Instead of focusing on institutional concerns laid out in the 
Malolos Congress (or the First Republic of the Philippines), state-building shifted to 
“politics” or the battle to capture the machinery of representation (Abinales & 
Amoroso, 2005). 
The first generation of Filipino leaders under the American regime were the 
established elites who turned away from the revolution, organised under Partido 
 
 
43 
 
Federal (Federalist Party) in 1900 (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). The Federalistas 
were publicly committed to Philippine autonomy under the American colonial 
mantle, although most of its leaders privately hoped for the annexation of the 
Philippines to the US. They believed that the only practical route was collaboration 
with the new colonizers and tutelage training. This political pragmatism became the 
foundation of conservative Filipino nationalism (Corpuz, 1998). 
The Federalistas were openly supported by the Taft administration, which 
did not only give them a privileged position in the Philippine Commission (the small, 
American-dominated body that advised the governor-general) but also ample 
opportunities to expand their thin elite Manila political base throughout the 
provinces. Taft wanted to ensure that the whole of the Philippines would embrace 
American democracy, so the Federalistas were likewise given a powerful role in 
making appointments to key provincial offices (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003). 
However, when the Federalistas failed to extend its influence across the islands, this 
support shifted to the younger, provincial-based political leaders of the 
Nacionalistas (Teehankee, 2002). 
The Nacionalistas were composed of revolutionary veterans, intellectuals, 
and members of the urban middle classes and “lower class” who re-entered political 
life (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003). At a time when the Americans imposed an anti-
sedition law declaring advocacy of independence a crime punishable by death, they 
perfected a political alternative to revolution and resistance (Abinales & Amoroso, 
2005). They can be described as patronage-oriented and internally mobilised, as 
they consistently worked to consolidate their power at the national level yet 
maintained the same responsiveness to their allies in the provinces who desired a 
degree of autonomy from colonial supervision (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003).  
However, with the Filipinisation of the colonial bureaucracy in 1916, leaders 
from relatively humble background began using their control of the colonial state to 
engage in “primitive accumulation,” which turned them into a powerful political-
economic class that has power over the distribution of resources centred on the 
family or political clan (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003). As these representative 
institutions emerged before the creation of strong bureaucratic institutions, 
politicians took advantage of ideological divisions and distributed amongst 
themselves the “spoils” of American colonialism by demanding reforms to enlarge 
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their access to resources. As a result, “combining corruption and competence would 
become a pattern among state leaders” (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005, p.142).  
Socially, these politicians likewise asserted themselves by consciously 
forming a ruling class that shaped what is said to be the “national elite” of the 
present-day Philippines. Abinales and Amoroso (2005) noted how legislators went 
to the same receptions, attended the same churches, lived in the same residential 
areas, shopped in the same fashionable streets, had affairs with each other’s wives, 
and arranged marriages between each other’s children. For the first time, there was 
a deliberate effort from the national elites to disconnect and isolate themselves from 
the masses. 
Meanwhile, the introduction of public education, the teaching of English, the 
establishment of a Manila-centred mass media, and industrialisation profoundly 
altered social life (Corpuz, 1998; Iyer & Maurer, 2009). Rich mestizo families 
continued to prosper under American rule, their properties untouched and their 
children entering occupations (such as medicine and law) aimed at enhancing status 
(Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). American values of individual achievement, 
commercialism, and populism spread at the expense of an already marginalised 
Spanish cultural matrix (Banlaoi, 2004). 
During the Japanese occupation, the pretence of democracy became even 
shallower. Most Filipino leaders who collaborated with the Japanese did so for 
pragmatic reasons – some because the Americans abandoned them; others, in 
compliance with Quezon’s directive to work with the invaders to prevent political 
and social breakdown (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). Indeed, the determination of 
who among the politicians collaborated with the Japanese became one of the 
pressing issues during post-war politics. 
An important new political formation, the creation of the HUKBALAHAP 
(Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon or The Nation’s Army against the Japanese) in 
1942, dealt with both the new colonisers and their landlord collaborators. However, 
members of HUKBALAHAP later found themselves enemies of the state, which was 
then being re-established by Gen. Douglas MacArthur. The American general instead 
protected his friends and business associates from prosecution (Hutchcroft & 
Rocamora, 2003). 
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This caused a huge division among the members of the Nacionalista party, 
which monopoly on political power was destroyed after the war. It led to the 
formation of a new political party called the Liberals, a breakaway faction of new 
elites whose Commonwealth-era education facilitated their rise out of lower-class 
origins (Teehankee, 2002). With the backing of the United States, the Liberal Party 
dominated the Philippine Republic after 1946, which remained dependent on a 
network of relationships that were established on patronage, especially in the local 
landed elites.  
As the local authorities continued to undermine the capacity and authority 
of the central state, post-war presidents were unsuccessful in carrying out various 
economic reform agenda (Doronila, 1994). In effect, American authorities 
effectively diverted the revolutionary quest for self-government into a simultaneous 
quest for increased local autonomy, expanded national legislative authority, and 
more extensive opportunities for patronage (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003). The 
fusion of wealth and power brought about by political connections and backing, 
instead of productivity, has undermined the post-colonial state’s capacity to realise 
broad national goals for lasting social and economic development (Quimpo, 2007). 
Subsequently, with the formal dropping of literacy requirement, political 
elites now had to convince non-elite groups to vote for them (Teehankee, 2002). At 
first, patron-client ties and deeply embedded traditions of social deference were 
sufficient. Later, local landowning elites used a variety of means – kinship, personal 
ties, offering of jobs, services and other favours – to build a large vote bank from 
lower social classes (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003). 
This “predatory state” has further degenerated the Philippine parties from a 
clientelist to partrimonialist nature (Quimpo, 2007). It determines the fate of an 
elected administration that could not afford to alienate the local clans that 
controlled political factions (and often private armies) in the countryside. By the 
mid-1960s, there was too much party switching, yielding a high level of public 
cynicism toward the state (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). 
3.3.3 Neopatrimonial oligarchy, politically distant majority 
While political parties were formed to train Filipinos as it established a 
constitutional democracy, these were actually “the cancer in Filipino politics” 
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(Corpuz, 1998). The system was almost destitute of nationalism when it began in 
1907 and void of social ethics since 1946 (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003). Political 
parties have no real members, party funds, stable meetings, or party newspapers. 
They are only active during the elections. Moreover, loyalty is not to the party nor 
to its principles, but to particular persons who lead the party at a given moment. 
Money flows from the candidates’ coffers to the local political clans to ensure 
patronage and delivery of votes (David, 2001; Quimpo, 2007). 
Prior to Ferdinand Marcos’ authoritarian rule in 1972, a number of scholars 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s observed that traditional patron-client 
relationships were slowly diminishing, giving way to a less personality-based 
political organisation: the ‘political machine’ (Quimpo, 2007). Marcos knew that the 
people were already becoming restless with the increasing irregularities of 
Philippine elections. Since the patron-client fails to give adequate attention to the 
role of violence and local monopolies in both Philippine politics and social relations, 
Marcos steadily pushed the limits of private armies, electoral and patronage 
alliances with older elites until he broke it entirely in 1972 with the declaration of 
Martial Law (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003).  
Marcos’ monopoly of political power left pre-martial law political parties 
severely weakened. Instead, the dictator set up his own political party, the Kilusang 
Bagong Lipunan (KBL or New Society Movement), which consisted of members from 
the Nacionalista Party, Liberal Party, and other political personalities who were 
supportive of his ‘new society’ (Teehankee, 2002). Through KBL, Marcos attempted 
to centralise authority through dictatorship. He did not, however, succeed because 
of crony capitalism (Doronila, 1994). 
Instead, under Marcos’ rule, political clientelism turned into what David 
Wurfel (1988) termed as neopatrimonial authoritarianism. Although Marcos could 
not undermine local power, he was able to restructure the influence of clan-based 
factions in the provinces. To a degree unprecedented in Philippine history, the ruling 
family lorded over all formal political institutions, including the ruling party 
(Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003). Making full use of his dictatorial power Marcos, 
along with his wife Imelda, exploited the resources of the state for their personal 
aggrandisement (Quimpo, 2007). 
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However, with the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., Marcos’ 
staunch critic, the traditional elite increasingly abandoned Marcos and organised 
effective efforts under the mantle of the popular widow, Corazon Aquino. The peak 
of distrust and ultimate discontent of the public towards its government was 
expressed ironically through one of the best and shining moments in Philippine 
history: the People Power Revolution (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). Abueva and 
Roman (1993) noted how the “outwardly, non-traditional, if not revolutionary 
origins of the Aquino Government […] created a political climate in which the 
language of ‘people empowerment,’ ‘democratisation,’ ‘social justice and human 
rights,’ and non-governmental organisations/people’s organisations suddenly 
became mainstream” (p.29). 
Democracy was restored in the Philippines with the passage of Republic Act 
7160 or An Act Providing for a Local Government Code 1991 (Teehankee, 2002). As 
it was implemented over the next decade, it would devolve some of the powers of 
the national government to local and provincial governments, increase their share 
of revenue allotments, and give them the right to impose property taxes on state-
owned or state-controlled corporations in their localities (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 
2003). Nevertheless, many scholars described the country’s democracy under 
Aquino as “elitist” or “a weak state captured by an oligarchic elite” (Quimpo, 2007, 
p.282). 
The widowed Aquino herself hailed from the landed local elites, the 
Cojuangcos of Tarlac. Refusing to form her own political party, Aquino instead 
facilitated a neopatrimonial oligarchic state, wherein different factions of elites take 
advantage of, extract privilege from, and prey upon a largely incoherent 
bureaucracy, both through political violence and rent-seeking (Hutchcroft & 
Rocamora, 2003). Regrettably, this simply returned the power to clans and warlords 
that once dominated pre-Martial Law politics and even welcomed back the Marcos 
family (Abinales & Amoroso, 2006). Significantly, the Comprehensive Agrarian Land 
Reform Program, an important policy that could have drastically changed Philippine 
societies, was very slowly implemented due to high compensation costs and the 
unwillingness of ‘landlord-dominated’ Congress (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). 
The Philippines under ex-military general Fidel Ramos propelled the country 
to economic gains. Many poor Filipinos felt that they were ignored by the 
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straightforward policies of Ramos, who focused more on economy than on ‘politics’ 
(Abinales & Amoroso, 2006). Hence, when former actor Joseph Estrada ran for 
presidency in 1998, he was backed by a very popular support from the masses. 
However, only a few months in the office, the Estrada administration was already 
plagued by scandals and controversies, which involved his family members, 
mistresses, illegitimate children, friends in show business, gambling partners and 
late night drinking buddies meddling with the state affairs and public money 
(Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). 
This resulted in an erosion of public confidence leading to another popular 
revolution known as ‘People Power 2,’ making then Vice-President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo the head of the state in January 2001 (Teehankee, 2002). Estrada, 
on the other hand, used his poor supporters’ struggle against poverty to highlight 
the class divide and obtain public backing that will question the legitimacy of 
Arroyo’s administration (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003). Arroyo initially promised 
to build a strong republic above competing societal interests but instead, she 
combined the old order (patronage politics, the spoils system, and a politicised 
military) and the new practices (democracy, civil society, and popular participation) 
to retain in the office and preserve her own power (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). 
 Meanwhile, because of too much ‘opposition politics,’ the people have grown 
restless and hopeless. Lower class residents in search of employment continue to 
migrate from rural areas to cities, causing further complications brought about by 
overcrowded urban areas (David, 2001).  During the height of Arroyo’s electoral 
fraud scandal in 2005, the number of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) reached a 
high of 1.6 million (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2007), which steadily increases 
up to the present. Abinales and Amoroso (2006) succinctly wrote: 
Most citizens have distanced themselves from politics and redirected their 
energy to finding jobs, preferably outside the country. As one Filipino 
sociologist and government critic lamented: ‘Our people are worried for 
their families. That is why a considerable number have voted with their feet, 
by the thousands every day. They fail to see any hope of redemption for the 
country under the existing political leadership’ (p.291). 
 
Correspondingly, the Eastern Visayas Region, where Tacloban is, has 
recorded a total of 16,000 of its residents who went overseas for work in 2013 
(Philippine Statistics Authority, 2014). In Tacloban City, most families have at least 
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one relative or immediate family member who works either in Cebu, Manila, or 
other countries. This is the presently common pattern of social relationships in most 
provinces within the Central Philippines as shaped by the political conditions of the 
country. 
 
3.4 A population accustomed to typhoons 
Tacloban has a total population of more than 200,000 and a land area of 
201.72 km2 (“City Profile,” n.d., para. 1). It has a tropical rainforest climate, typically 
hot and wet throughout the year and rainfall is both heavy and frequent. The 
Philippines averages more than 20 typhoons a year, often passing along the central 
part, where Tacloban is. 
The city is divided into 138 barangays, each with its own local government. 
Figure 3 shows how most of these barangays were located near the coastal areas, 
making them highly susceptible to natural calamities. Figure 4 provides a detailed 
view of the city centre. The encircled areas are the locations of this study. 
Several powerful typhoons in Leyte were recorded as early as 19 October 
1897, when a powerful typhoon ravaged through the municipalities of Tanauan, 
Palo, and Tacloban. Like Super Typhoon Haiyan, this resulted into a storm surge as 
high as seven metres. It destroyed the façade of churches, school houses, and bridges 
up to some areas in Eastern Samar (Lotilla, 2013). The said typhoon was considered 
the most violent that traversed the Philippine archipelago, as reported in an 
Australian broadsheet dated 12 January 1898. It described a typhoon and tidal wave 
which claimed around 7,000 lives, composed of 400 Europeans and 6000 natives 
(Luces, 2013). 
Another newspaper, the now-defunct Washington Herald, reported an 
extreme weather event on 26 November 1912 which headline was “15,000 die in 
Philippine storm.” It recounted a typhoon that practically destroyed Tacloban City 
and had wrought damage and loss of lives in Capiz (Diola, 2013). Tacloban at that 
time reportedly had a population of 12,000, while Capiz had over 20,000 (Luces, 
2013). 
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The most recent and the one being referred to by the Super Typhoon Haiyan 
survivors was Typhoon Agnes (local name: ‘Undang’) that hit the country in 1984. 
This brought a storm surge in Basey, Samar and killed a total of 895 people (Luces, 
2013). This was the benchmark of the Taclobanons’ resilience when their city was 
hit by Super Typhoon Haiyan on 08 November 2013. 
Remarkably, although Tacloban City is a fast developing coastal city and is 
familiar with typhoons, it was said to be ill-prepared for Super Typhoon Haiyan’s 
intensity (Marshall, 2013). Indeed, the resulting catastrophe was unprecedented. 
Still, the political tension between the local and national government had made the 
disaster an even more daunting ordeal for this neopatrimonial, oligarchic city.  
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CHAPTER 4: INVESTIGATING TACLOBAN CITY  
AFTER SUPER TYPHOON HAIYAN 
 
“Suddenly, all of them wanted to study Tacloban. It has turned into a giant laboratory.” 
                                                – Consultant for Tacloban City’s urban and environmental planning4 
 
The previous chapters have illustrated the conceptual, socio-political, and 
geographical context surrounding this research. This chapter will now describe how 
this study was carried out within those premises and the rationale behind it. As a 
disciplined inquiry, this aims to present a reliable and systematic plan in answering 
the research question. 
This chapter commences with a discussion on the intent of qualitative 
research, the design used in this study. This is followed by an exposition of the 
researcher’s ‘personal context’ – her position in the study, including her 
philosophical assumptions, backgrounds, and biases that informed her choice of 
research approach. Research methods including data collection and analysis based 
on the case context are then explored. Other important issues such as site selection, 
recruitment of respondents, ethical and safety considerations are also discussed. 
 
4.1 An approach towards understanding a typhoon-stricken Tacloban City 
This thesis relied on qualitative methods, specifically a case study approach 
that employed one-on-one interviews and focus group discussions. Qualitative 
research derived its roots from German thinkers who applied the term Verstehen – 
loosely translated as “to understand” or “to interpret” – in doing sociological 
research (Lapan, Quartaroli & Riemer, 2012). This design advocates the systematic 
gathering of information on a particular phenomenon from the perspective of 
insiders, rather than interpreting it from the outsider’s view (Merriam, 2009). 
This choice of research design was drawn out from an epistemology of social 
constructivism, which argues that social reality is created out of human knowledge, 
beliefs, and meanings based on social traditions and cultural conventions of one’s 
                                                          
4 Phone communication, 11 June 2014. 
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everyday experiences (Social constructivism, 2007). It suggests that ideas, which 
might appear as inherently rational or natural, are actually artefacts of particular 
traditions or cultures. As such, social and political practices are not the result of 
natural or social laws; they are the product of choices informed by contingent 
meanings and beliefs (Social constructivism, 2007).  
This thesis examined social behaviours in a context of amplified political 
tension brought about by a competitive access for resources after a massive 
disaster. Hence, it involves assumptions about why people do what they do or think 
what they think as a matter of intentions or motivations (Gerring, 2007). In view of 
that, “while rationalists see people making decisions using strategic logic that will 
maximise their individual interests, constructivists see people making decisions 
using social logic based on social norms and the expectations of others” (Barkin, 
2010, p.50). 
 Specifically, this research adheres to linguistic social constructivism which 
implies that knowledge formation takes place in communication, hence social 
contact. The creation of knowledge cannot be separated from the social 
environment in which it is formed. This makes the research participants as active 
co-constructors of meaning and knowledge, where the researcher simply initiates 
and facilitates an active process of uncovering and acknowledging shared 
understanding (Adams, 2006).  
 Finally, social constructivism recognises that due to the mediatory features 
of languages and other forms of communication, knowledge constructs are first 
formed between or among people’s psyche, or inter-psychologically, before it is 
internalised or existed intra-psychologically (Social constructivism, 2007). This 
makes ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ as a result of consensus among individuals of a social group. 
This is also the rationale for choosing interviews and focus group discussions as 
methods of inquiry and for using a thematic discourse analysis in examining the data 
gathered for this research. 
Patton and Cochran (2002) suggested that “in situations where little is 
known, it is often better to start with qualitative methods” (p.2). Qualitative 
research looks for a situated or contextual understanding of a phenomenon and not 
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a generalised truth (Willis, 2007). As shown in Chapter 2, there are a few studies on 
the role of social media in building social capital during disasters yet none has been 
done within the Philippine context, specifically on what was dubbed as the “most 
powerful typhoon that made landfall in written human history” (Sedghi, 2013). 
Looking into how survivors see themselves and understand their own experiences 
are then the best place to start. 
Furthermore, qualitative research allows for a holistic understanding of the 
issue being considered as it compiles different perspectives and dimensions that 
represent complex realities and processes (Creswell, 2014). It holds to an 
interpretive perspective that reality is constructed through the meanings 
individuals give to the phenomenon; hence, it has to represent various perceptions 
on a collective reality (Lapan et al., 2012). Since this study heavily relied on the 
concept of ‘social capital,’ it was essential that the multiplicity of perspectives was 
emphasised in the analysis. Likewise, the literature on the use of social media has 
suggested the empowerment of voices of different groups, especially the most 
vulnerable to disasters and risks (Crowe, 2013; Murthy, 2013). This design provided 
that ideal opportunity. 
Relatedly, qualitative research employs multiple sources of data rather than 
relying on a single data source (Willis, 2007). This attribute advances the views of 
those underrepresented in the society (Merriam, 2009). Bearing in mind the social 
structure of Tacloban City, a critical perspective that recognises the ways in which 
power is embedded in society proved to be valuable, especially in choosing a 
suitable approach for collecting data within a given sector of society. 
Moreover, qualitative research gives value to the natural setting of the study 
(Creswell, 2014). It views meanings as more context- and time-specific (Lapan et al., 
2012). This is very important in investigating behaviours in the face of disasters, as 
communities respond to or recover in different ways and rates (Cutter et al., 2008). 
More importantly, qualitative research allows an emergent process for research 
design, which takes a foundational rather than a technique perspective. Qualitative 
researchers may proceed with some idea of what they will do, although a detailed 
set of procedures is not yet formed prior to data collection (Willis, 2007). This was 
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useful in a post-disaster setting wherein the usual pathways of getting information 
may not be as stable and readily available. 
Qualitative research also allows for an iterative process of inductive and 
deductive data analysis, or that of working back and forth between themes and 
database until the researcher has established a comprehensive set of themes (Willis, 
2007). Rather than determining cause and effect, predicting or describing the 
distribution of some attribute among a population, qualitative research focuses on 
understanding how people interpret and give meaning to their experiences 
(Merriam, 2009). This is valuable in studies within the context of disasters, wherein 
there is a need to translate existing knowledge into actions and vice versa (Gaillard 
& Mercer, 2012). 
Lastly, qualitative research appreciates the researcher as a key instrument of 
the study (Stewart-Withers, Banks, McGregor & Meo-Sweabbu, 2014). It 
acknowledges that the researcher has an effect on the research itself (Lapan et al., 
2012). Clough and Nutbrown (2012) argue that “all social research sets out with 
specific purposes from a particular position, and aims to persuade readers of the 
significance of its claims. These claims are always broadly political” (p.4). Hence, the 
following section will now discuss the researcher’s paradigm. 
 
4.2 A personal perspective towards probing a political Tacloban City  
The researcher agrees with other Filipino thinkers who believe that the value 
of social inquiry is to sensitise one’s self to data and to organise one’s observations 
so it can help rebuild social institutions (David, 2001). This form of constructivism 
allows for sociological imagination that permits a person to see her commonality 
between her personal circumstances and those of her fellow human beings (Mills, 
1959). Consequently, this encouraged her to search for collective solutions to 
shared problems. 
In particular, the researcher herself relied on Facebook to get updates from 
her family and relatives during the Super Typhoon Haiyan. She was based in 
Wellington, New Zealand as a postgraduate student at the time. While her 
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immediate family is based in Manila, the capital city of the Philippines, her relatives 
are from a village in Palompon, a municipality that is approximately 120 kilometres 
away from Tacloban City. 
It was through Facebook that the researcher first heard about her relatives, 
following a five-day news blackout. After the super typhoon, a number of village 
residents went to Cebu, another major city in the Central Philippines, to seek help 
from their families and kin. With power and internet connection available in that 
city, some of them took the opportunity to post photos on their Facebook accounts, 
which showed the aftermath of the super typhoon in the village. 
The photos received many ‘likes’ and comments, thanking the Facebook user 
for the update. Calls for action and assistance then became the topic of the comments 
thread. It helped that the village had an existing Facebook page, which members are 
now mostly based in different parts of the world. It was used as a platform to 
organise their own aid and relief program – from the actual fundraising to the 
sending of the physical goods to their respective families. Their efforts were deemed 
successful compared to the delayed and inadequate response of the local 
government during the early, critical period after the super typhoon. 
This has led the researcher to investigate whether this can be also applicable 
to a locality that is relatively bigger in terms of geography, politics, economy and 
trade, and population. Although the damage caused by Super Typhoon Haiyan was 
far greater in Tacloban than the researcher’s hometown in Palompon, the former 
has the advantage of technology and wider access to resources. It was the intent of 
this research to describe the manner and the extent in which these capitals were 
utilised. 
 One could say that this form of constructivism also leans towards a 
transformative paradigm. The researcher believes that understanding the multiple 
meanings of a phenomenon through social and historical construction also brings to 
the fore the values held by the community as it operates in the form of rules, norms, 
and attitudes (Desai & Potter, 2006). In turn, these rules define the roles that 
individuals play in society.  
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When these roles come in clusters, they become institutions. Institutions act 
“as the primary sub-systems of society through which society fulfils the requirement 
of survival” (David, 2001, p.31). Hence, to inquire of meanings from people is to also 
know the logic of its social and structural order. This is especially valuable in times 
of disasters. 
 This need to highlight social order is influenced by the researcher’s 
undergraduate training at the University of the Philippines, the nation’s premiere 
state university known for its culture of cultivating critical thinking and active 
nationalism. She spent four years in an academic environment wherein to fight 
poverty and injustice is the raison d’etre of higher learning. This constant awareness 
of an oppressive social order has then guided most of her work in the government 
and with the communities. 
The researcher then considered this thesis as an opportunity to conduct 
studies that may show how some segments of society are systematically excluded 
or how their access to social goods are blocked by existing delivery and 
administrative systems. When approached from the vantage point of justice and 
equity, such access studies become in themselves detailed investigation into the 
structure of power in society (David, 2001).  
To an extent, this case study described a political framework, which certain 
values may inadvertently proliferated repressive practices. On one hand, however, 
critical perspectives may likewise uncover pathways wherein individuals become 
empowered to transform themselves and the society as a whole (Lapan et al., 2012). 
Hence, another purpose of this study was to identify and understand how people 
are able to effectively organise themselves in order to gain some control over their 
lives, or simply to successfully insulate themselves from the instabilities of daily life. 
In the process, they will be able to conceptualise a vision for alternative structure 
that conform with their desire for a just life (David, 2001). 
Significantly, the researcher acknowledges that a constructivist paradigm is 
a two-way process of interaction (Desai & Potter, 2006). It allows for a collaborative 
partnership with the communities and institutions, such as the government and 
NGOs, involved in the study. It was the utmost intention of the researcher to 
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contribute to a better understanding of Tacloban City as it rebuild itself after Super 
Typhoon Haiyan in the next five to ten years. 
Finally, the researcher is a student from a developing country supervised by 
a university in a developed country. This alone posed several layers of complexities 
and options. Like most students, the researcher aimed to bring about change and 
foster better understanding of her own social context in the conduct of her research 
(Clough & Nutbrown, 2012).  
However, her postgraduate training had also made her aware of her position 
in a scholarly setting, which preserves the presence, concerns and experience of the 
researcher as a “knower and discoverer” (Miller & Glassner, 2004). This lent the 
researcher to become an ‘outsider’ in her own home. As Sultana (2007) succinctly 
puts it: 
Doing research at ‘home’ also brings in different dynamics, in terms of 
concerns of insider-outsider and politics of representation, across 
other axes of social differentiation beyond commonality in nationality 
or ethnicity. People placed me in certain categories, exerted 
authority/subservience, ‘othered’ me and negotiated the relationship 
on a continual basis. (p.378) 
 These dynamics definitely influenced the research methods employed in this 
study. Furthermore, the researcher’s experiences highlighted that most research 
protocols, which are generally based upon Western culture, may not hold true in 
non-Western settings (Narag & Maxwell, 2014). The next section discusses in details 
the specific methods employed in this thesis in relation to that observation. 
 
4.3 Case Study: Examining the Facebook use and social capital of a typhoon-
stricken Tacloban City 
The first two sections presented the research methodology or the set of 
decisions that governed this study. Now, this section defines the research methods 
or the tools used in investigating the research topic and how these helped in 
constructing an argument based on the methodology (Lapan et al., 2012). In 
bounding the presentation of this qualitative study, the suggestion of Creswell 
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(2014) was followed: setting, actors, ethical and safety considerations, data collection 
strategies, data analysis, and verification. 
Also, most qualitative research methods use face-to-face situations wherein 
the researcher relates to the respondents or to the setting or to both (Lapan et al., 
2012). This study was one such case. To reduce the researcher bias, this 
presentation is also constantly reflective of how the researcher may have influenced 
the research setting and conversations by her identity, knowledge of the culture and 
language, customs and etiquette, and perceived power or access to resources 
desired by the respondents (Creswell, 2014). 
A case study is “an examination of a specific phenomenon such as a program, 
an event, a person, a process, an institution, or a social group” (Merriam, 1988, p.9). 
Although this is one of the most used and most criticised forms of social science 
research (Willis, 2007), this method was employed because “the product of a good 
case study is insight” (Gerring, 2007, p.7). The goal of this research is to increase an 
understanding of the use of Facebook in utilising and strengthening the social 
capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan. 
4.3.1 Setting: ‘Downtown’ Tacloban, gated subdivisions, and coastal 
communities 
This study had three settings: the central business district of Tacloban City, 
the gated subdivisions that housed the two local NGOs working in the area, and the 
coastal communities which suffered the most during Super Typhoon Haiyan (see 
Figures 3 and 4). These were symbolic of the social classes in the city. These settings 
were the preferred sites for one-on-one interviews and focus group discussions by 
the research participants themselves. 
‘Downtown,’ as what most locals would call the city centre of Tacloban, 
reflects the influences of Spanish and American colonial rule. It is characteristic of a 
typical centralised town wherein the market, the church, the government buildings 
and the schools surround the city square. Its streets bore the names of legislative 
and judiciary administrators during the colonial periods – with one of its main roads 
named after Justice Romualdez, relating to the predecessor of the current city 
mayor. 
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The city mayor was among the target interviewees of this research. Two 
weeks before the actual fieldwork, the researcher went to the executive assistant of 
the mayor to secure an interview appointment. Considering the government 
protocols and gatekeeping mechanisms, it would take longer if the researcher would 
go through the usual process of presenting a letter to the Office of the Mayor and 
wait for their response. It was then fortunate that prior to going to Tacloban, a 
common friend introduced (via Facebook) the researcher to the executive assistant, 
who asked to be met at the Tacloban City Hall. 
The City Hall stands on top of a hill facing the bay leading to the Leyte Gulf. 
Outside, there were still tents occupied by various NGOs and government services, 
like the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the local police. 
Inside, however, was surprisingly clean and relatively empty. The researcher 
expected it to be bustling with people who need assistance from the local 
government. Yet she only saw city hall employees, a few residents, and some street 
vendors. 
It was there that the researcher waited for three hours because the executive 
assistant kept changing the meeting time. During the meeting, it was very evident 
how busy the executive assistant was. On the walls of her office were various maps 
of Tacloban which indicated hazard-prone areas and the new residential and 
business zoning plans of the city. The office was managing Tacloban’s physical 
rehabilitation, one of the pressing and biggest tasks after the super typhoon. 
It was no wonder that the executive assistant was receiving and signing 
memos, texting, and had to excuse herself once to answer her mobile phone while 
talking to the researcher. When she was able to give her full attention, she 
apologised and then asked the researcher to explain very briefly what the research 
study was all about. The researcher explained the study and quickly asked if the 
mayor would be available for an interview.  
The executive assistant politely declined, saying that six months after the 
Super Typhoon Haiyan, they had to reduce the time given by the Office of the Mayor 
for any media or scholarly interviews. She then referred the researcher to the urban 
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and environmental planning consultant, who also managed the media affairs under 
the Office of the City Administrator. 
When the city consultant was asked where he wanted to be interviewed, he 
suggested to meet at a coffee shop. Coffee shops with free access to wireless internet 
had been a burgeoning enterprise in downtown Tacloban, especially after the super 
typhoon. This Western lifestyle of sitting down over coffee was reinforced by 
patrons who were mostly foreigners, middle class and upper class Filipinos and 
international NGO workers. 
Another growing business after the super typhoon were hotels and 
accommodation. One of the interviewees, the city councillor, owned one and asked 
to be interviewed in the hotel’s restaurant. The hotel, which was among the first 
businesses that re-opened after the typhoon, stood amidst small and medium 
enterprises such as automobile repair shops, parlours and salons, and grocery 
stores which were still struggling to recover. 
Meanwhile, twenty minutes away from downtown Tacloban were the gated 
subdivisions, in which a few residential units were turned into offices by two local 
NGOs that participated in this study. Interestingly, international NGOs occupied 
most office spaces in downtown Tacloban. The local NGOs told the researcher that, 
aside from the competitive office space rents, they preferred holding offices away 
from the city proper because of the high saturation of post-disaster efforts there. 
Both NGOs had been channelling most of their rehabilitation program in 
communities that are miles away from Tacloban but were also severely affected by 
Super Typhoon Haiyan. 
Ironically, the two coastal communities that were invited for two separate 
focus group discussions were not that far from downtown Tacloban. In fact, one 
community was just a few minutes’ walk from the city hall. Yet, both were still 
complaining of inadequate aid. The abandoned houses, poorly constructed toilets, 
makeshift houses, and the still-wrecked community hall spoke for themselves. Six 
months after the Super Typhoon Haiyan, most residents were still living in tents 
provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
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4.3.2 Actors: Local government, local NGOs, and the barangays 
The actors for this thesis were also categorised into three: the local 
government, the local NGOs working in Tacloban, and the barangay, which is the 
smallest administrative division in the Philippines. These were scheduled to provide 
multiple representations of the city, with three selected members of the local 
government on top of the societal structure and two barangays at the bottom. The 
two local NGOs were assumed to be the middle agency between the State and the 
people. 
Members of the local government included the city vice mayor, one city 
councillor, and the city consultant. The two local NGOs were named Operation 
Blessing and Community and Family Services International (CFSI). The two 
barangays were called Barangay 89 (San Jose) and Barangay 48-B (Magallanes). 
Except for the vice mayor and CFSI, all participants were sought out and invited 
through referrals by contacts that were established before and during the field 
work.  
The city consultant was the first interviewee of this thesis. He and the 
researcher went to the same university for their undergraduate degrees. Hence, 
there was a good level of enthusiasm from both ends, which resulted in the 
consultant suggesting favourable participants for the study. One was the city 
councillor, who was known to be active on Facebook especially after Super Typhoon 
Haiyan. Second was the councillor of Barangay 89, one of the worst hit communities 
in Tacloban. 
This sense of university affiliation was also present when the researcher 
randomly met a worker of CFSI in a computer shop. The local NGO worker saw the 
printed interview schedule from the researcher and asked about the study. They 
both eventually learned that they came from the same university. The researcher 
later got the permission from the head of the CSFI Tacloban team to hold a focus 
group discussion among its workers. 
The decision to choose local NGOs was to highlight the role of a middle 
agency that allow Taclobanons or those from other provinces in the Central 
Philippines to provide assistance to their fellow citizens. This was the prime reason 
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why Operation Blessing was also contacted for the study. This NGO was referred to 
the researcher by a common friend in Manila. 
Meanwhile, it was also through another common friend in Manila that the 
researcher was introduced to a Baptist pastor who used to be a resident of Barangay 
48-B. This community shared common characteristics with Barangay 89: both were 
coastal communities, had almost the same intensity of damage from the super 
typhoon Haiyan, and had residents from the upper middle-class to the lowest. The 
only difference was that Barangay 48-B was more proximate to the political centre 
of Tacloban City (see Figures 3 & 4). 
The recruitment for participants in the two barangay focus group discussions 
were both facilitated by their respective barangay leaders. This gesture reflected the 
trust of the researcher in the local knowledge of the community to identify the 
appropriate resource persons for a given task. Both barangay leaders asked three 
days from the initial meeting as an ample time to gather people for the discussion. 
The councillor of Barangay 89 recruited six participants; Barangay 48-B, seven 
participants.  
Notable, however, was the difference in the characteristics of participants 
gathered by the two barangay leaders. Both were told that, as much as possible, the 
study aimed to give equal representation to different levels of society. Yet, Barangay 
89 came up with participants who were more articulate, had leadership roles in the 
purok (political sub-division of a barangay), and were mostly female owners of small 
businesses. Nevertheless, the researcher saw a deeper appreciation of the research 
process when the barangay councillor pointed out that he included a fisherman 
along with his 17-year old daughter. 
Narag and Maxwell (2014) talked about how being introduced by a person 
of higher respectability, Filipino residents would consciously present the researcher 
only to other residents whom they considered to be of higher status in their 
community. The researcher, although just introduced by the city consultant through 
a phone call, was received by the barangay councillor very cordially at his own 
home. He even showed the researcher around the entire barangay, leading to the 
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barangay hall where they paid courtesy to the barangay captain who gave a rather 
cold response.  
The barangay councillor later disclosed that there was a political rift between 
him and the barangay captain. Carley and Bautista (2001) observed that, “in general, 
those who have been elected to barangay leadership have usually come from the 
ranks of retirees or local personalities close to the municipal or city leaders under 
whose wings the barangay council serves” (p.118). The political rivalry between the 
national government under President Aquino and the local government of Tacloban 
City under Mayor Romualdez had trickled down to the community leadership as 
well. The barangay councillor ran under the political support of Mayor Romualdez. 
This provided him more involvement in post-Haiyan forums, making him more 
visible over the barangay captain to the city consultant. 
This was different with Barangay 48-B, which was introduced to the 
researcher by a former resident. The researcher met the barangay captain at the 
barangay hall and was received just like any local resident. After putting the agreed 
focus group discussion schedule on the information sheet given by the researcher, 
the barangay captain forwarded the task of finding the research participants to the 
barangay secretary. After which, he said that he will not be available for the focus 
group discussion. 
On the day of the discussion, the researcher was surprised to find no one in 
the barangay hall. The barangay captain had committed the place to be the venue 
for the focus group discussion. The researcher then turned to a small store across 
the barangay hall and asked for any barangay officer present. One of the women 
there introduced herself as the barangay treasurer, who was having an afternoon 
break. The researcher asked if she knew about the focus group discussion. The 
barangay treasurer reasoned that since it was a Thursday afternoon, most people 
were unavailable. 
Fortunately, the barangay secretary came not long after. When she saw the 
researcher, she immediately and assertively asked the barangay treasurer to just 
call on anyone who might be interested to join the discussion. They came up with 
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four men, who were socialising in the middle of the streets on a lazy afternoon, and 
three mothers. 
This indifference from the leadership of Barangay 48-B can be attributed to 
the poor general perception and low remuneration of those who are working in the 
barangay (Carley & Bautista, 2001). This was worsened by a disaster situation 
wherein their proximity from the city proper made them more accessible to the 
media, the development workers, and the academe who suddenly became 
interested in them. They could had been suffering from “interview fatigue” (M. dela 
Cruz, personal communication, June 21, 2014). 
It was thus encouraging when the Office of the Vice Mayor immediately 
granted the researcher an interview on the same day a request was formally given. 
During the pre-interview, the vice mayor told the researcher that he just recently 
talked with another Filipino student who was also doing a postgraduate degree in a 
foreign country. He said he would appreciate it if he could receive the summary of 
results of these studies. 
This perceived privileged access of the researcher to information and 
economic resources were most pronounced in the barangays. Although the 
researcher was very transparent regarding her intention and capacity as a student-
researcher from a foreign country every time she introduced herself to the 
communities, indirect expressions of help can still be heard. One barangay leader 
even remarked that the research could raise awareness among an international 
audience that would eventually result into tangible assistance for their barangay. 
4.3.3 Ethical and Safety Considerations 
 Since this study dealt with human participants, it sought the approval of the 
Human Ethics Committee of Victoria University of Wellington prior to the actual 
conduct of field work. The said formal ethics review helped determine the protocols 
of this research process before allowing the researcher to proceed. It also ensured 
that the study and its location were chosen without vested interests in its outcome. 
Before an interview or focus group discussion, the participants were given a 
brief background of the research and what their participation entailed. They were 
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handed out with a research information sheet and a consent form (see Appendices 
Two and Three), which were both written in English and in Filipino, the national 
language of the Philippines. The participants, however, were not forced to sign the 
consent forms if they decided not to. 
In some cases, the researcher had to go through the items listed in the 
consent form with some participants to facilitate proper understanding. Armed with 
better awareness of the research process, most participants indicated that they 
wanted a copy of the summary of the transcribed interviews and findings. They even 
verified the contact details of the researcher and asked if they could contact her at 
any time. This level of participant involvement in the research process had never 
been experienced by the researcher in any of her previous field work. 
The participants were also informed that the entire interview or discussion 
would be recorded. However, they were ensured that these materials will not be 
used for any other purposes except this study. In fact, the researcher is the only one 
who can access the recordings and transcriptions. Importantly, interviews and focus 
group discussions were all confidential. The identity of the participants were 
protected both in the collection and analysis of the data. 
This confidentiality issue had been most valuable when, in one of the 
barangay focus group discussions, one participant had been giving out unfavourable 
remarks against the government. Afterwards, the said participant asked if the study 
was indeed strictly confidential and that her name would not appear in any part of 
the thesis. The researcher’s identity in relation to the government was even 
questioned and clarified. 
These inquiries were positive signs that both the researcher and the 
participants were aware of their positionality in the entire research process. As a 
Filipino who is also aware of the non-confrontational manner of her own people, the 
researcher made it a point to repeatedly encourage the participants to ask any 
questions before and after the interview or discussion proper. The researcher found 
this truly helpful, especially as a post-debriefing activity for the participants who 
were, first and foremost, typhoon survivors. 
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Understandably, the researcher heard so many complaints from the 
participants about how they had been interviewed by so many people since the 
super typhoon. Some even promised to give them money or help repair their homes 
as an exchange. Yet, no one had come back ever since. They related how they felt 
used and thus appreciated the effort of the researcher to make sure that they indeed 
understood what their participation in the discussion truly meant.  
Lastly, this study also respected the norms of the communities by going 
through the proper offices or channels, especially in the communities. A token was 
also given to those who participated in the barangay and NGO focus group 
discussions as a recognition of their contribution to the study. Meanwhile, the 
researcher offered to pay for the coffee of the government officials she interviewed 
outside of their offices. 
Due to the extent and magnitude of the devastation brought about by 
Typhoon Haiyan to Tacloban City, several health and safety issues were likewise 
considered. As the super typhoon just happened six months ago, most families were 
still homeless or under very poor living conditions. Psychological stress was also 
rampant among the people.  
As such, the research information sheet also indicated the local social welfare 
service in Tacloban as a provisional service if any participant might experience 
stress from sharing her experiences during the super typhoon. Otherwise, the 
researcher decided to briefly stop whenever sensitive information such as death of 
a family member was brought up in the discussion and wait for the participant to 
either tell more or change the topic of the conversation. 
The researcher was also kindly advised by some barangay participants to go 
back to her accommodation in downtown while there was still daylight because of 
incidences of theft and other violent activities that may put the researcher at risk. 
The researcher initially felt confident moving around the city on her own since she 
was a local. However, she later realised that some people had now viewed her 
differently, especially when the barangay focus group participants remarked how 
brave she was for going alone and how she “looked like them [the foreigners] who 
go around town, in their backpacks, asking questions from the people.” As Narag and 
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Maxwell (2014) noted in their experience of doing qualitative research in the 
Philippines: “Researchers, for example, are usually viewed to come from the elite 
class: they are typically richer, more educated, and by their physical appearance, 
more Westernised than the participants of the research” (p. 313). 
4.3.4 Data Collection Strategies: Interviews and focus group discussions 
This research employed two collection data strategies: one-on-one semi-
structured interviews and focus group discussions (see Appendix One for the 
schedule). The researcher interviewed the city vice mayor, a city councillor, and the 
consultant on urban and environmental planning. Meanwhile, the two NGOs and the 
two barangays were invited for four separate focus group discussions. These two 
different strategies were chosen for its practicality within the context of Tacloban 
after super typhoon Haiyan.  
First, local government officials were doubly busy managing the post-
disaster rehabilitation program of the city. Hence, finding a common time for a sit-
down discussion with other city leaders or other members of the communities was 
impractical, if not impossible. Second, in the Philippines, which has a history of 
several centuries under colonial rule, there is a vertical social relationship that 
privileges one social class over the other and it permeates in every aspect of 
Philippine society (Narag & Maxwell, 2014). The presence of local government 
officials may hinder participation from other members in the group discussion, 
especially those from the communities. As such, separate interviews were used to 
collect data from the local government officials.  
Moreover, Miller and Glassner (2004) argued that qualitative interviews 
make use of social differences, instead of denying it, by giving opportunities for 
individuals to articulate their feelings about their life experiences. This chance to 
reflect on and speak about one’s life is not often available, most especially for 
individuals who have been stereotyped and devalued in a larger society. Thus, 
interviews are a promising approach to collect and rigorously examine narratives 
about the social world. 
This was true for the local government officials of Tacloban – particularly the 
elected ones, or the usual “politicians.” When asked to describe their experiences 
 
 
68 
 
during Super Typhoon Haiyan, the vice mayor and the city councillor first answered 
with a surprised yet mild interjection. The researcher perceived that the officials 
had expected a more critical question regarding the post-Haiyan efforts. There was 
a general atmosphere of cynicism in the city during that time, which was further 
amplified by researchers from the local and international media and academe. 
Thus, to an extent, this interview approach was used by the researcher to 
build rapport with her interviewees. Considering the emotional climate of the city, 
it was very important to establish trust and familiarity with the interviewees so that 
they would feel comfortable enough to “talk back.” This is because “when 
respondents talk back, they provide insights into the narratives they use to describe 
the meanings of their social worlds” (Miller & Glassner, 2004, p.134).  
On the other hand, focus groups were employed for NGOs and barangays as 
this method has always been favoured as a means of generating information on 
public perceptions and viewpoint (Lloyd-Evans, 2006). In a collective culture such 
as the Philippines, a phenomenon can be best understood by accessing group beliefs 
that will give insight into community relations, identities, and group feelings about 
a particular topic (Narag & Maxwell, 2014). Moreover, focus group discussions were 
a useful tool in exploring differences in the use of language and vernacular terms 
within the communities (Lloyd-Evans, 2006). 
All interviews and focus group discussions were recorded. Additionally, the 
researcher took notes while talking with the participants to highlight significant 
points that came up during the conversations. She also recorded her general 
observations and feelings about and towards the place, the participants, and the 
entire data collection process in a separate journal in-between interview schedules 
or transcribing.  
4.3.5 Data Analysis 
In qualitative research, the researcher as the central instrument in the 
research process is both its strength and weakness (Stewart-Withers et al., 2014). 
On one hand, the researcher’s identity, age, gender, class and race influence the way 
participants respond to questions. The processing of the ideas and narratives 
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collected can only be as analytical as the ability, discipline and creativity of the 
researcher in possessing new ways of seeing the world.  
Miller and Glassner (2004) argued that researchers “need to be cautious of 
the ‘romantic’ impulse which identified ‘experience’ with ‘authenticity’” (p.138). 
They further suggested that it is possible to find realities within interviews that are 
ultimately contradictory to the accounts and stories given by the participants. To 
address this, this study used broad and open-ended questions that changed and 
developed over time. This is to “fill in a ‘jigsaw’ of differing accounts of ‘reality,’ 
unravelling which may be said to be generally ‘true’ and which are specific and 
subjective” (Mayoux, 2006, p. 118).  
Then again, although there are ‘pollutants’ in the interviews and focus group 
discussions, this research chose to study what was actually said by the participants. 
Significantly, investigating what were articulated had given this study an indication 
of what topics make sense and nonsense, or what is relevant and otherwise to the 
participants (Miller & Glassner, 2004). It was based on their narratives that 
descriptions and themes from the data were developed and reported as results of 
this study (Creswell, 2014). 
Moreover, this research recognised that, in comparison to other methods, 
focus groups can be particularly difficult to analyse. This is because the focus of the 
analyses is not the individual but the group (Lloyd-Evans, 2006). This study made 
sure that the statements made in a specific discussion was true to the various 
‘voices’ represented in a given focus group.  
First, participants were given category names and a corresponding number. 
Then, each interview and focus group discussions were transcribed by the 
researcher herself. Statements that were initially found useful were highlighted 
while transcribing. Thornberg and Charmaz (2012) noted how coding begins 
directly as the first data starts to emerge in the study. As a result, data collection and 
data coding go hand in hand throughout the research project. 
Second, the researcher went through each transcribed interview and 
discussion again. This time, she paid closer attention to the texts – the statements 
along with its underlying meaning. Since the amount of data was not particularly 
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large, the researcher manually labelled the texts and plotted these against the key 
ideas of this research: (1) social capital (such as bonding/bridging/linking social 
capital, trust, reciprocity, and politics), (2) Facebook use, and (3) experiences during 
the Super Typhoon Haiyan.  
The labelled texts were clustered together, resulting into themes. Once 
themes were identified, the researcher plotted these clusters against the data 
(Creswell, 2014) taking note of any agreements or contradictions within. These key 
ideas were divided into categories, after which appropriate and descriptive 
wordings were sought as sub-headings for the next two chapters. There, statements 
were assembled and further analysed. 
It is important to note that transcribed statements by the respondents were 
directly quoted in and comprised the majority of the analysis. Following a linguistic 
social constructivist paradigm, this research argues that discourses produce 
concepts (Social constructivism, 2007). As such, the bases of interaction among 
people is clearly an important aspect of social life (Enriquez, 1986). To study the 
social interaction in the Philippine environment as codified in the language reveals 
a lot about its worldview and character. 
Finally, Gerring (2007) emphasised that “a case study may be understood as 
the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in 
part – to shed light on a larger class of cases” (p.20). The analysis employed in this 
case study is a function of the number of comparable observations available within 
a unit. From there, it sought to reconstruct realities by providing alternative 
explanations, examining the connections between the data and other relevant 
literature and attempting to describe an emerging theory (Creswell, 2014). 
4.3.6 Verification 
 Stewart-Withers et al. (2014) suggested a criteria for judging rigour in 
qualitative research: credibility, which asks if the findings are believable; 
transferability, which asks if the findings are relevant to similar settings; 
dependability, which asks if the findings are likely to be relevant to a different time 
than the one in which it was conducted, and; confirmability, or the extent to which 
the researcher had not allowed personal values to intrude in the research process 
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to an excessive degree. It asks, ‘could another researcher from a different 
background come to the same conclusions?’ 
 To satisfy these, the researcher employed triangulation or use of multiple 
sources of data that were true from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant 
and even the readers of the account. She likewise provided a thick description of the 
setting and the participants, including negative or discrepant information that arose 
from analysing the data (Creswell, 2014). 
 Overall, these incongruences were expected and considered by the 
researcher when she investigated a typhoon-stricken and politically tensed society 
such as Tacloban City. She equally recognised that the entire thesis process was 
guided by her personal experience, existing knowledge, and epistemological 
background. Accordingly, these also influenced the presentation of results and 
analyses of data, which will be shown in the next three chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL CAPITAL OF TACLOBAN CITY  
AFTER SUPER TYPHOON HAIYAN 
 
“Whenever anyone has a story to tell, they tell their barber.’”  
            – Alan Alcantara, a barber from Guiuan, Samar5  
 
 Disasters disrupt social order. Yet it is also during these times that social 
capital is most utilised and put to the test. This chapter describes how networks and 
resources were made available to people within Tacloban City after it was hit by 
Super Typhoon Haiyan, as expressed by its selected local leaders, residents and NGO 
workers during the interviews and focus group discussions. The aim of this chapter 
is to explore the choices available to the residents, identify the choices they made 
and the reasons behind them, and examine the consequences of their choices. 
To identify the presence and level of social capital in Tacloban City, the three 
sub-components were used: networks, norms, and trust (Jung et al., 2013; Kwon et 
al., 2013). This study defined networks as the sphere of connections among 
individuals. Norms are shared values and expectations within the network. Lastly, 
trust is the reciprocity of norms within a network. 
In describing the social networks in Tacloban City, this study referred to the 
respondent’s ties to family and friends, then to the larger community through the 
NGOs, and the local government. As mentioned in the second chapter, these ties may 
be strong or weak, as characterised by high levels of emotional intensity and 
intimacy. Bonding social capital is synonymous to strong ties with similar 
demographic characteristics such as family members, close friends, neighbours and 
work colleagues (Abad, 2005). Meanwhile, bridging social capital refers to weaker 
ties and it “occurs when members of one group connect with other members of 
other groups to seek access or support” (Larsen et al., 2004, p.66). Finally, 
recognising the significance of vertical networks in Tacloban City, linking social 
capital describes the ties with people in positions of authority and influence, such 
as representatives of public institutions (Abad, 2005). 
                                                          
5 Alan was seen cutting the hair of his fellow survivors in his makeshift barbershop a few months after 
Super Typhoon Haiyan. (http://www.rappler.com/move-ph/social-good-summit/2014/barber-guiuan-
yolanda-haiyan) 
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The examination of the trust embedded in these networks was heavily based 
on the values and expectations communicated by the respondents as distinguished 
by the researcher’s knowledge of the Filipino social norms. For purposes of brevity, 
all of the quoted statements by the respondents are direct English translations from 
Filipino. However, the researcher endeavoured to remain true to the syntax of the 
statements to preserve the cultural and symbolic meanings that are vital in the 
presentation of this chapter. 
 
5.1 Bonding Social Capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan  
5.1.1 The family: An extended resource supply 
Most respondents, when asked who they turned to for help during Super 
Typhoon Haiyan, replied with an attitude of self-reliance. This choice was however 
based on a circumstance wherein there was practically no one to ask help from 
during the time of crisis. This was reflected in their statements, which expressed 
their full awareness and acceptance of everyone’s vulnerability during and after the 
super typhoon. However, it is notable that their reference to the “self” included their 
respective immediate families. 
“Just ourselves. All were already in panic. So, we just made do with what 
we had to survive during that time.” – Community resident #8, 
barangay councillor and father 
“There was no one to ask for help. It was very impossible because 
everyone was asking for help.” – NGO worker #8 
“Your family. During that time, you only had yourself to rely on. You 
could not get help from others. You had to stand on your own – there’s 
no one to ask for help even the city government. I went to our office that 
time, there was no one there. Everyone left. So, it was just our family 
helping each other.” – NGO worker #4, ex-government employee 
 
Meanwhile, for one city councillor, being self-reliant meant helping other 
members of the family, including that of his sister-in-law. 
“I did not seek help, instead I was the one who sought to help during that 
time. Since I was on the fourth floor of my residence, I was relatively 
safe. I only started seeking help when I heard of the casualties among 
the family of my sister-in-law. I was led to the police station where I 
could access the phone.” – City councillor, business owner 
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Clearly, the family was a major source of social capital in Tacloban City after 
Super Typhoon Haiyan. It acted as an extended supply of resources when one is left 
with nothing. Family members, including the children, were considered as 
additional and helpful assets. 
“Yes. It was my family. And my relatives there. We lost everything so we 
ran to them.”– Community resident #9, a mother and barangay 
councillor 
“Yes, because I do not have a husband anymore. I am a widow. So, it was 
my child and those two children I adopted. My children from Imelda 
Village brought me food. They came here for us. I have children there [in 
other village].” – Community resident #1, mother and purok official 
 
David (2001) noted that, in an impoverished and dependent economy such 
as the Philippines, the family assumes the responsibility of providing economic 
security when the outside society fails to do so. The family even “formulates 
strategies to guarantee the long term survival of the entire family, for the social 
goods are limited and are accessible only to those who have the capacity to pay” 
(p.120). This makes the family as the only valid network wherein one can demand 
expectations from. 
“So, you could not ask help from anyone except your relatives. It was 
just the two of us. There was no one to help us but ourselves – my 
husband and I. Yes, we have friends. Thankfully, there were friends.” – 
Community resident #10, mother and housewife 
 
5.1.2 Friends and neighbours: The geographically proximate ‘relative’ 
 Friends, neighbours, and close relatives acted as the next most important 
source of social capital for those who had lost their family members to Super 
Typhoon Haiyan. One respondent, whose brother and accommodation business 
were taken by the typhoon, expressed this position: 
“For me, it was my friends. My nephew needed to be brought to the 
hospital. I was looking for my brother that time. I was with them 
[friends]. There were so many dead there. They were doing that to the 
dead. They were looking at their faces and checking if they knew the 
body or not.” – Community resident # 12, ex-business owner 
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More significantly, it was the aspect of physical proximity that led the 
respondents to turn to or be sought by their neighbours as the most immediate and 
available network during the super typhoon. 
“This was because all of us, even some of our relatives, had evacuated to 
our house. Then, we panicked because our neighbours started to come 
to our place as well.” – NGO worker #8 
“At the downtown. We evacuated the night before the typhoon. My 
family and I evacuated then we brought our neighbours along. They told 
us, ‘wherever you go, we will go with you.’ Then our neighbours, they 
were three families, they all went together. Three families. I asked them 
to come with us because they were asking me. They knew I used to work 
for the city government, so I was the one telling them that they should 
not take the coming typhoon lightly. So they said, ‘wherever you’ll go, 
we’ll also go there.’” – NGO worker #4, ex-government employee 
 
However, examining subsequent statements of other respondents, 
geographical proximity alone was not a sufficient motivation to seek help from their 
neighbours. When asked why she chose a particular neighbour to run to for help, 
one respondent answered: 
“They were the only ones I am [relationally] close with ever since. [After 
Haiyan], we stayed with them for three months.” – Community resident 
#10, mother and housewife 
 
Even with an established relational closeness, a sense of reluctance to seek 
help from neighbours was observed. The same respondent instead pointed to the 
risky physical condition of her daughter and the nature of her relationship with a 
nearby neighbour (who is also her god-brother) in finally identifying her decision to 
reach out at a time of prevalent vulnerability. 
“During that time, my six-year old daughter was not feeling well. So, I 
did not have any choice. I went to my god-brother [who lives across the 
street] to seek help and refuge.” – Community resident #10, mother 
and housewife 
 
This hesitation was also observed in an NGO worker who, despite having a 
good understanding of the intensity of the super typhoon, dismissed the idea of 
seeking shelter from comparatively sturdier apartments across their street. It was 
only until her house was totally destroyed that she sought help from her neighbours. 
Her statements indicated relational remoteness despite living nearby them. 
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“While it was still only the winds, we snuggled into one corner of the 
house where there was concrete floor. Until our house came down. Good 
thing we were able to still come out. There were actually apartments 
where we can seek shelter in. At least we were allowed to get in. But 
once we were there, their roof was also blown by the wind. At one point, 
even the owners themselves were already wet inside their own 
apartment. Nevertheless, after the typhoon, we stayed there. I think for 
around one week.”– NGO worker #10, Tacloban-born university 
graduate 
 
Hence, two things defined the bonding social capital of Tacloban City after 
Super Typhoon Haiyan: relational and geographical proximity. These values 
provided both immediate physical and emotional support that served as a lifeline 
during the disaster. Still, as Larsen et al. (2004) noted, while communities with low 
to moderate income possess high levels of bonding social capital, their social assets 
are constantly challenged because of their limited physical resources. This is true in 
the case of Tacloban City after the typhoon. 
“Yes. [Relatives are] number one. There were some who supported me. 
However, the help was limited. Because he also has his own family.”  
Community resident #10, mother and housewife 
 
This made it difficult for Tacloban City to convert their bonding social capital 
into a more politically important bridging social capital which could have resulted 
in greater collective action after the super typhoon (Leonard & Onyx, 2004). This 
was expressed by another NGO worker who described the challenges of trusting and 
seeking help from close networks in an atmosphere of insecurity due to depleting 
food, water, and other basic resources. Undeniably, external networks affect social 
relations within and outside the family and neighbourhood (Larsen et al., 2004).  
“This was because, in the minds of some people, you have like some 
groceries there, it was like, and there was no sharing anymore. They 
were probably thinking of their own welfare too; they might ran out of 
groceries as well. They were told: ‘You couldn’t buy anything from 
Tacloban anymore since most goods were already stolen.’ Something 
like that. Then, our friend from Dulag who had like a big grocery store, 
decided not to open it anymore because there were rumours that 
looting had already reached their place. So, the tendency is to go to 
Sugod, Baybay. So, if you go to Sugod, there was hoarding. If you go to 
Baybay, there was hoarding as well. So what we did, we went to Cebu 
just to get our groceries. We made sure there was enough for a month.” 
– NGO worker #7, mother 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
5.2 Bridging Social Capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan 
5.2.1 The opportunistic others  
 There were very few statements culled from interviews and focus group 
discussions which suggested that the respondents sought help from individuals, 
communities, or organisations other than their families and neighbours. This is an 
indication of low bridging social capital in Tacloban City after Super Typhoon 
Haiyan. There was, however, an acknowledgement from the respondents with 
regards to help extended by the outsiders.  
“The NGOs. It was really the NGOs. The foreign NGOs. If it weren’t for 
them. They were the ones who first responded to us. They gave food, 
help, shelter, medicine. One week after Yolanda [Haiyan].” – Community 
resident #3, mother, small business owner and purok secretary 
 
In his review of a national survey on social relations, Abad (2005) clarified 
the common perceptions regarding Filipinos as not highly trusting of other people. 
While the survey revealed that Filipinos trust only a few people lest others would 
take advantage of them, it also indicated that they believe that others want what is 
good for themselves. For a people of indirect communication such as the Filipinos 
(Narag & Maxwell, 2014), a closer examination of the overall correspondence would 
reveal that the respondents from Tacloban were actually looking for help even 
though the psychological impact of the disaster caused them to be unclear of their 
needs and expectations. 
“Actually, we were looking for like where we could, what, for food, 
water.”– Community resident #10, mother and housewife 
“Outcast.” – Community resident #8, barangay councillor 
“We were like zombies.” – Community resident #12, ex-business 
owner 
“We were completely destitute that time, but your hunger, it seemed 
that you didn’t feel any hunger. You will not notice it. We were like 
zombies walking.” – Community resident #6, barangay councillor 
“It was like you were completely blank.” – Community resident #3, 
purok secretary, small business owner and housewife 
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Citing the sociological theory of Sztompka, Abad (2005) maintained that 
‘distrust’ and ‘mistrust’ are two different concepts. The former implies negative 
expectations about the actions of others which manifests in avoidance, escape, or 
distancing oneself. The latter refers to a “neutral position when both trust and 
distrust are suspended” (p.44). This results in unclear expectations and hesitations 
about committing oneself. For the respondents, these uncertainties were further 
heightened by unmet expectations, such as unfulfilled promises and rampant 
ransacking. 
“You know, there had been so many people who interviewed me. There 
was one who told me, I don’t know what country she is from. She looks 
like from Spain. A foreigner. But she also looks like someone from the 
Middle East. She asked me how much money I need to be able to 
completely rebuild my house. She told me not to worry, just tell her the 
amount. I told her we do not have CR (comfort room, or the toilet). We 
still do not have walls for the CR. But that’s the truth. Then she wrote 
50,000 [pesos] in a paper. She said, ‘Do not worry. The money is already 
here. There is already a budget for this. Tell me how much do you need.’ 
Until now, I haven’t heard from her. It has been several interviews, yet 
for nothing.” – Community resident #10, mother and housewife 
“Then you will see, you will never have imagined that this would even 
happen. Then there’s this one freak who said there is a tsunami. There 
was someone from here, there was someone who said [it]. Yet the 
purpose was to loot.” – Community resident #6, barangay councillor 
“It [the news about tsunami] just spread around like that.” – 
Community resident #4, fisherman and father 
 
 The looting particularly highlighted how resources and properties are deeply 
embedded in social networks such that property does not just refer to any tangible 
or material possession. Instead, it is a type of social relationship where there is a 
shared understanding or expectation about what can or cannot be done with the 
resources with respect to the members of a community (Dynes, 2005). During 
emergencies, there is a very powerful social pressure to temporarily suspend the 
use of goods for personal use while the needs of the affected community still exist 
or what Leonard and Onyx (2004) call as “norms of distributive justice” (p.104). The 
negative emotions expressed by the respondents, predominantly their frustration 
over their inability to access aid during disaster, may suggest perceived failed 
expectations from privileged others to make their resources available; hence, the 
occurrence of widespread lootings (Dussaillant & Guzman, 2014).  
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5.2.2 The privileged outsiders 
Meanwhile, a unique manifestation of bridging social capital in Tacloban City 
after Super Typhoon Haiyan was displayed by those who were not originally from 
the city but were there during the disaster. The city consultant on urban and 
environmental planning had been living in Tacloban City for only three months 
when the super typhoon came. He narrated how he and his housemates, who are 
also migrants, drew strength from each other.  
“Then I told my housemates, ‘We will survive this.’ Although I myself was 
already thinking of how we will be able to survive. Then, I tried to calm 
them down because they were all crying. ‘We can do this ah.’ I am 
mustering up all the courage that I had. So, the non-Taclobanons, we 
really had a strong fellowship because we were all not from here. We 
needed to support and draw strength from each other.” – Tacloban city 
consultant for urban and environmental planning 
 
Lin (2001) argued that resources embedded in social networks enhance the 
outcome of one’s actions because social relations reinforce one’s worthiness as an 
individual. Social capital does not only provide emotional support but also public 
acknowledgement of one’s claim to certain resources. The city consultant positioned 
himself as an outsider with ‘connections’ (specifically to a big commercial television 
network where he used to work) to provide resilience to his immediate community 
after Super Typhoon Haiyan. 
“All of my housemates, whether they were male or female, they kept on 
crying because they felt they needed to tell their parents that they were 
safe. So I told them I will go back to GMA 7 so I could relay to them that 
I was safe and I also had to look for my brod [fraternity brother]. I know 
that the media is such a big help in relaying the message. I just knew 
that everyone was so down at that time. And I was used to situations 
like that, I know there’s always an emergency IT broadcast.” – Tacloban 
city consultant for urban and environmental planning 
 
However, the city consultant failed to get help from his connections in the 
said television network. His former colleagues, who were actually physically present 
in Tacloban for news coverage on the disaster, were very busy. Alternatively, he 
turned to his girlfriend and another close friend who were both working in the same 
television network and were based in Manila during the disaster. 
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“Actually, I saw them but they were also mobile. They needed to go to 
other areas. I couldn’t disturb them so I went to the city hall just in case 
there are other media organisations. Then I saw the IT setup of the 
DSWD. I sent a Facebook message to my girlfriend working for GMA7 
and Sweenie, both media people and Manila-based. I know they’re both 
efficient. When I have my senior moments, when I forgot to book my 
tickets, those things, they were my lifeline.” – Tacloban city consultant 
for urban and environmental planning 
 
Leonard and Onyx (2004) noted how bridging social capital, which is built on 
weak ties, requires an exploration of norms to ascertain if they are sufficiently 
similar with the purposes of those who are involved in the network. Since the social 
distance is wider, there is a greater likelihood of clash of norms. Thus, the terms of 
reciprocity need to be more obvious, more immediate and more explicit than for 
bonding social capital. These requisites are difficult to obtain in the face of disasters. 
The experience of the city consultant and the expressed frustration of other 
respondents revealed that the low bridging social capital of Tacloban City after 
Super Typhoon Haiyan was characterised by a loose sense of geographical proximity 
due to the absence of relational proximity. This hindered the access to a more 
instrumental form of social capital. However, this does not only mean that 
communities are disconnected; instead, communities are products of a complex set 
of power-laden relationships where connections are controlled by those who have 
the resources (DeFilippis, 2001). This conceptualisation becomes more evident with 
the respondents’ relationship to institutions, particularly the government. 
 
5.3 Linking social capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan 
5.3.1 Local and national government: The non-existent State 
There was a strong general feeling of disappointment and discontent over 
the performance of the government in responding to the super typhoon. Of all the 
types of social capital, this network elicited the most number of comments from the 
respondents. These deep-seated statements reveal that the respondents had high 
expectations on the government’s intervention to assist them during calamities. 
“Nothing. No one even bothered to make themselves felt here.  – 
Community resident #7, father 
 
 
81 
 
“Nothing. It was a man after his own self. Everyone has a strategy of 
their own here.” – Community resident #2, housewife and small 
business owner 
“There was no government here.” – Community resident #12, ex-
business owner 
“There was no order.” – Community resident #8, barangay councillor 
“There was no government. Even with the relief, there was none. I don’t 
know. At first, we were angry but now that we had gone down to the 
communities, we saw the houses, those who were able to survive. You 
live on your own, really. There was no such thing as the government or 
protection. Nothing. With all the work that had to be done, with all the 
worries, then you have to think of your own life. There was really no 
concept of bureaucracy. It was wild. Anarchy, anarchy. You must had 
known it, that the DND [Department of National Defense], OCD [Office 
of the Civil Defense], even they were helpless.” – Tacloban city 
consultant for urban and environmental planning 
 
 Nevertheless, the respondents were also quick to justify the inaction of their 
local government officials. They view the people in the government as a distant yet 
powerful entity, who they can only speculate to be vulnerable just like them. There 
was an overall perceived high relational and geographical distance between the 
people and the government. As such, the linking social capital of Tacloban City was 
not fully accessed. 
“It is awkward and embarrassing [to go to the government for help].” – 
Community resident # 7, father 
“I did not think about it. Maybe the mayor is busy.” – Community 
resident #8, barangay councillor 
“Yes. Because everyone’s busy too. It was like during that time, there was 
none, plus it was very different for every person, they were also affected. 
Of course, they were also busy.” – Community resident #7, father 
“No, none. We didn’t, because the mayor himself was also a victim. Our 
higher government officials were also victims.” – Community resident 
#6, barangay councillor 
 
However, contrary to what the people felt, the city vice mayor of Tacloban 
claimed that there was much aid. He described that city administration was simply 
overwhelmed with all the massive attention and assistance that came in all at once 
after the super typhoon. The city consultant attributed this to the unexpected 
intensity and devastation of the disaster. 
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“There’s some department heads there and some employees here. But 
then, what I did was that: ‘No, no, we need somebody to sit there [at the 
reception] so that as soon as the people enter, [we would know] what 
they need, and then how to guide them. Because everyone just came, the 
foreign news media were coming, all of the news organizations were 
coming, and no one was directing them. You cannot do that. So you have 
to have somebody sitting there, telling them, so all the efforts ---For the 
first few days, yes.  Just coordinate them. People wanted to help eh. 
There were heaps of help. People wanting to help but do not know where 
to start. So you have to channel them where to go.” – Tacloban City vice 
mayor 
“Because we’re also overwhelmed. To tell you honestly, well, the quote 
of one congressman was very appropriate: ‘How can you prepare in this 
type of disaster if you yourself was not prepared to see a ship in the 
middle of the road?’” – Tacloban city consultant for urban and 
environmental planning 
 
Yet this could be reflective of the existing social and political order (and 
disorder) of Tacloban City and the national government even before Super Typhoon 
Haiyan. The ‘weak state,’ which is characterised by bloated bureaucracy, was 
overpowered by the enormous interest and capacity-building it had been receiving. 
As a result, its presence was not felt by the people. 
Indeed, the city consultant was contracted by the city administrator who, 
along with the city mayor, all belong to the same college fraternity. As the consultant 
for Urban and Environmental Planning, he was supposed to be in a different division 
but had been working under the office of his ‘brod,’6 which had gotten him into wide-
ranging functions beyond his scope such as human organisational planning, solid 
waste management planning, tourism, and even media or public relations affairs. 
After the super typhoon, his role “became even more confusing” as he presently acts 
as the secretariat of the Tacloban Recovery and Sustainable Development Group 
(TRSDG), which is the multi-sectoral team led by the Tacloban City Hall and UN 
Habitat with other members from different state departments, line agencies, and 
some representation from international organizations and civil societies. He thus 
further noted other conflicting practices on the ground: 
“Well, that was what seemed to be the findings, that the OPAR [Office of 
the Presidential Assistance for Rehabilitation] is not fully capacitated. 
We are not familiar with the humanitarian approach as being abided 
by the other agencies. As long as the OPAR has an order, the OPAR will 
                                                          
6 A slang term for ‘brother’ typically used in fraternities in the Philippines. 
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just abide by it, even the other agencies were confused. So what is the 
rationale for forming the OPAR? Should it be the NEDA [National 
Economic Development Authority] that will take over? But of course, we 
have political dynamics.” 
“There was no representation of LGU in the cluster meetings. There were 
just so many things that they were doing. Workshop fatigue. These were 
all the same faces. But there should be workshops as part of dissertation. 
But sometimes, these overlap. Even the OCHA has shortcomings in 
coordination. The workshops were duplicated. Then again, how crucial 
is this workshop to be given time by this over-fatigued barangay leaders 
and city municipal?” 
 
5.3.2 Local NGOs: The extended State 
 One notable illustration of linking social capital in Tacloban was the presence 
of local NGOs that now hold office in the city after the Super Typhoon Haiyan. Due 
to the unfelt presence of the local government, a third party agency was needed to 
link the people to state services. CFSI, in particular, identifies the lapses in and thus 
monitors the progress of services given to the communities. 
“We go to the field. We hold focus group discussions or key informal 
interviews with the barangay officials, then the community, then we 
refer it to the concerned agencies nearby.” – NGO worker #6 
“Basically we monitor protection issues, access to services, and the like. 
Violation of human rights. Incidences of abuse, such that whenever 
there were attempted rape cases. We refer it immediately.” – NGO 
worker #8 
 
Meanwhile, Operation Blessing - Visayas was “started for Haiyan,” as its field 
supervisor claimed. The super typhoon had given the locals new roles, particularly 
those who respond to disasters. Due to the intensity of the disaster, long-term 
projects particularly aimed at communities that receive less attention compared to 
Tacloban City had been launched. Remarkably, it was also through connections 
within Tacloban that this NGO was formed. 
“So, it was our first time to have infrastructure [projects], almost 
everything, there were so many first times. We mobilised through 
connections. So, we formed the group, because we need this, for 
rehabilitation, we need to position ourselves where it is more strategic. 
Because if we still get people from Manila, it will be more difficult. So we 
want to employ locals because we want to help them. It was just really 
‘connect-connect’.”– NGO worker #5, field supervisor 
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5.3.3 Local and national government: The divided State  
Possibly, what most betrayed the respondents’ general expectation from the 
State was the uncalled for political rift between the national and the local 
government. This theme surprisingly and inevitably came up during interviews and 
focus group discussions despite the relatively ‘neutral’ topic of the use of Facebook 
in accessing help during the super typhoon. It is likewise noteworthy how the 
shortcomings of the national government was strongly felt in the smallest political 
unit. This only emphasises that, in a society run by elites, “the local is national and 
the national is local” (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). 
“There was no help from the national government.” – Community 
resident #9, mother and barangay councillor 
“Maybe the [national] government was not ready.” – Community 
resident #8, barangay councillor and father 
“We do not know what happened to them.” – Community resident 
#10, mother and housewife 
“At that time, if we ask help now, the feud between the national 
government and then the local government, was like, the political feud 
had a big impact.” – Community resident #6, barangay councillor 
“It’s like the coordination between the local and the national 
government. It should be – well, for the strengthening, for the post-
disaster context, strengthening how the efforts from the national would 
trickle down to local like how their interventions could meet halfway. 
Maybe it was because the political landscape of Tacloban was different 
because it has a conflict with the national.” – Tacloban city consultant 
for urban and environmental planning 
 
 This tension had indeed trickled down to the barangays. A barangay official 
expressed helplessness and frustration when he dealt with the state department on 
social welfare after the Super Typhoon Haiyan. Notably, this barangay councillor 
campaigned under the current city mayor, whose family is the incumbent 
president’s political rival. 
“If you want to help, you should not ask for something from them. 
Because, [if you use your] common sense, everything was destroyed. 
How can you ask one barangay official if he has a truck to load the 
relief goods? Imagine, 1,227 households were under me. Where can I 
get the truck?” – Community resident #6, barangay councillor 
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 This overall perceived confusion and disappointment further deepened a 
recurring culture of distrust between the State and society, which diminishes the 
ability of the former to provide basic services to the latter (Brower & Magno, 2011). 
In an almost circular fashion, this political rift appeared to be a major factor in the 
common decision of most respondents to instead seek support from their families 
and close relatives. Otherwise, as they contended, they will not survive. 
“Oh, you will die of hunger. We didn’t expect anymore.” – Community 
resident #1, mother and purok official 
“It didn’t cross our mind to, what, [rely on] the government in order for 
you to survive.” – Community resident #6, barangay councillor 
 
5.4 Social Capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan: An Overview 
As an overview, the social capital of Tacloban City in the face of Super 
Typhoon Haiyan can be seen as below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘R’ stands for the respondent, whose sphere of resources was limited as 
suggested by its small circle. It has a neutral colour, indicating that its capacities 
were dependent and embedded on its social connections during the disaster. The 
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Figure 1. Social Capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan 
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respondent was also the point of reference in determining the access to resources 
and the intensity of networks in Tacloban City after the super typhoon. 
The second circle represents the bonding social capital, which was the most 
geographically proximate network during the disaster. It has the darkest shade, 
demonstrating that there was a strong relational connection between the 
respondent and the members that comprise this network. Moreover, its size 
indicates the amount of resources it can and had generated during the disaster. The 
solid thick arrow from the respondents suggests that this social capital was fully 
accessed and utilised. 
The third circle represents the bridging social capital, which depicted the 
respondents’ average sense of geographical proximity with the outsiders. It has a 
lighter shade compared to bonding social capital as there was a felt relational 
distance resulting in reluctance to seek help from selected neighbours. This could 
had provided the respondents with bigger resources as indicated by a larger size of 
the circle in the diagram. The slightly broken arrow from the respondents suggests 
that this social capital was partially accessed and utilised. 
Lastly, the outermost circle represents the linking social capital. This shows 
that the government, which was the expected source of linking social capital during 
the disaster, was the physically farthest network among others. It has the lightest 
shade which depicts the least trust exhibited after the super typhoon. The linking 
social capital contained the largest resources. Unfortunately, as the broken and thin 
arrow suggests, this was not accessed and utilised by the respondents for survival 
and resilience.  
Table 1. Social Capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan indicating 
the presence of relational and geographical proximity of networks 
 
Type of Social Capital Relational 
Proximity 
Geographical 
Proximity 
Bonding Social Capital 
(family members, 
neighbours and friends) 
Yes Yes 
Bridging Social Capital 
(NGOs and members of 
other barangays) 
No Yes 
Linking Social Capital 
(local government) 
No No 
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As the table above illustrates, this study highlighted the importance of 
geography and social relationships in shaping the social capital of the city after a 
disaster. Still, this study also recognised that one defining characteristic of Tacloban 
City in the face of Super Typhoon Haiyan was the prevalent use of social media, 
particularly Facebook. Hence, the next chapter will discuss how this technology 
further influenced the dynamics and development of the city’s social capital amidst 
disaster. 
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CHAPTER 6: FACEBOOOK USE AND SOCIAL CAPITAL OF 
TACLOBAN CITY AFTER SUPER TYPHOON HAIYAN 
 
“Dear President Aquino, I am a Filipino. I am a Taclobanon. My family name is not Romualdez 
though. What do you have against me too that you refuse to sincerely help my city? 
#DearMrPresident”  
         – Facebook post one year after Typhoon Haiyan7 
 
Social capital is a useful framework for elucidating the value of our social 
networks and recently, the value of socio-technical tools, such as Facebook, that 
enable people to maintain these connections. As a mediated form of communication, 
Facebook has been suggested as a method of enhancing the social capital of a locality 
beyond the boundaries of time and space (Kwon et al., 2013; Ellison et al., 2011; Lee 
et al., 2014; McWilliam, 2013; Dabner, 2012). However, the extent to which it can 
influence the avenues for requesting aid and preferences of disaster survivors in 
view of complex socio-political realities has not been fully examined. 
This chapter describes the extent to which Facebook utilised and 
strengthened the social capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan. As 
presented in the previous chapter, there was a presence of rich bonding social 
capital yet weak bridging and linking social capitals in the disaster-stricken city. The 
examined capitals were used as benchmarks in identifying any new development in 
the formation of social capital with the inclusion of Facebook use. 
To analyse the above concepts, the researcher used the top five functional 
blocks of Facebook as identified by Kietzmann et al. (2011). These are relationships, 
conversations, presence, identity, and reputation. These functional blocks were used 
as complementary themes to the three foundational components of social capital 
(networks, norms, and trust). 
Relationships is the extent to which users have some form of association that 
leads them to converse or share media in an online platform. Consequently, 
connections between users of a social media platform often determine the what-
                                                          
7 A conversation with a struggling tricycle driver pushed a Taclobanon to take to social media her 
frustration at the politics that she believes has hampered aid to Tacloban City. 
(http://www.rappler.com/move-ph/71953-aquino-tacloban-typhoon-yolanda) 
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and-how of information and resource exchange. Moreover, as Boyd and Ellison 
(2008) suggested, Facebook relationships can represent and function as either 
strong or weak ties. Hence, this functional block described the bonding, bridging, and 
linking social capitals.  
To further study the norms and expectations in a social media setting, the 
functional blocks of conversations, presence, and identity were used. According to 
Keitzmann et al. (2011), the block conversations refers to the extent to which users 
communicate with other users in a social media setting and the various reasons that 
motivate them to do so. Presence represents the extent to which users can determine 
whether other users are accessible. It includes knowing where others are 
(physically, relationally and virtually) and whether they are available. Identity refers 
to the extent to which users reveal their identities and portray themselves in a social 
media setting. As a general rule, social media communities that do not value identity 
highly, hold relationships to a similar value.  
Finally, to determine the levels of trust on Facebook, the functional block 
reputation was utilised. Reputation outlines the extent to which users can identify 
the standing of others, including themselves, in a social media setting. As Kietzmann 
et al. (2011) noted, this is primarily based on trust even in an online environment. 
As with the previous chapter, the statements of the respondents were 
comprehensively employed in examining the social phenomena of Facebook in 
utilising and strengthening the social capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon 
Haiyan. Again, all quoted statements of the respondents are direct English 
translations by the researcher. 
 
6.1 Facebook relationships of selected residents of Tacloban City after Super 
Typhoon Haiyan: ‘Personal is online, online is personal’  
 One outstanding characteristic of relationships on Facebook, as described by 
the respondents, is the strong association between the personal and the online, such 
that the personal is acknowledged online and the online supplements the personal 
(Ellison et al., 2007). Although many were not regular users of said social media 
platform, the respondents acknowledged the potential of Facebook to link them 
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with their families and friends who were outside Tacloban City. They recognised 
their loved ones’ presence in social media as though the latter were physically 
nearby, only waiting for them to ‘check in.’ 
“What I understood is this: Facebook is a form of communication for 
those outside and in other places. Of course, you have friends. I am not 
a user, but if you have friends and they were asking how you are and 
what happened. Because this was nationwide. So to calm them, they will 
have a peace of mind if they know that their relatives and friends are 
okay.”  - Community resident #10, housewife and mother 
 
Indeed, most of them deliberately used Facebook to communicate with their 
strong ties outside Tacloban. While some reported contacting those who were in 
other parts of the Philippines, the majority of the correspondence was directed 
towards those who were located in other countries. Nevertheless, the choice of who 
to connect with on Facebook after the Super Typhoon was based on the 
respondents’ physical immediate social network. 
“It [Facebook] was just for our family members who are in other 
countries.” – Community resident #7, father 
“There were many of us there who were communicating with those in 
other countries. If you have a relative abroad, you will queue there so 
you can contact them.” – Community resident #4, fisherman and 
father 
“Asking for help. Giving out news. Friends. Peers. My schoolmates, 
elementary and high school.” – Community resident #12, ex-business 
owner 
 
Distance plays a significant factor why respondents would use and not use 
Facebook. For those whose family and relatives were nearby, cell phone remained 
to be a preferred tool for communication. For one respondent, being with her loved 
ones was still the best option.  
“My relatives were far away. It would be better if we say to them, ‘Hello, 
nothing happened to us. No one died. There are still among us here who 
are alive.’”  - Community resident #4, fisherman and father 
“Just cell phone. Make calls. We just stayed in Palo [nearby town]. Then 
we went home to Samar [nearby province]. My child didn’t have food 
already.” – Community resident #11, mother 
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This implies that respondents ideally prefer to be physically present with 
families and relatives in the face of disasters. However, in a less-than-ideal context, 
when the desired means of communication such as face-to-face or cell phone 
communication were unavailable, Facebook was a very helpful alternative to 
connect with existing strong networks. Moreover, the ease of access and availability 
of Facebook immediately after Super Typhoon Haiyan made it the more logical 
option for the respondents. 
The earliest period in which a respondent was able to access Facebook was 
the day after the super typhoon; the latest was two months after. Although some 
used their smart phones (mobile phones with Internet capability), most of the 
respondents were able to open their Facebook accounts through the emergency 
internet equipment of the Department of Social and Welfare (DSWD), which was 
positioned at the City Hall. Each person was allowed a maximum of three minutes 
to access the social media account. Interestingly, Facebook was the default and only 
website available in the said set-up. 
“Most cell phones were washed out or broken because it got wet from 
the rains. Just like what happened to us. Which is why we used 
Facebook.” – Community resident #10, mother and housewife 
“Yeah, I lost it. My contacts were in my old cell phone that was washed 
out.” – Community resident #7, father 
“There was no [cell phone] signal.” – NGO worker #8 
“It is free. There was no available ‘load’ or credits since stores were 
closed. This is the most cost-efficient way to reach families and loved 
ones after the typhoon. There were phone charging sites and free Wi-Fi 
at the city hall – that was where most people went to exchange 
information and seek help.” – City councillor and businessman 
“Facebook was made available first. Yes. On Saturday, I was already 
able to use Facebook and send. On the following night, I was able to send 
another update.” – Tacloban City vice mayor 
“Then those who were abroad. If you use cell phone, you need to have a 
pretty huge credit so that you can call internationally.” – Community 
resident #9, mother and barangay councillor 
 
When the respondents were asked if they considered communicating with 
other networks aside from their families and relatives, particularly the government, 
the responses from barangays were divided. While some took it in levity, others 
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indicated their intention to know more about their leaders. For most of them, 
however, becoming friends with people in ‘high position’ was just inconceivable.  
“I will probably add [them as Facebook friends]. There’s nothing really 
wrong about it. It’s also one way of adding more friends on Facebook.” 
– Community resident #7, father 
“Oh yes. So that we could know what is on their accounts.” – Community 
resident #10, housewife and mother 
“The only problem is that, when you check the Facebook of Mayor or 
other [government officials], we are not friends. You have to be accepted 
as friend first. High position, we’re poor. They’re up there. High profile 
official.” – Community resident #6, barangay councillor 
“Of course [not], oh my God! Would you expect us to be friends with 
Mayor? Of course [not], he’s a high-ranking official.” – Community 
resident #3, mother and purok secretary 
 
Again, the conflicting political climate of the disaster-stricken city appeared 
in the statements of the respondents, who expressed that it made a huge impact on 
their decision to seek help from government officials on Facebook. Indeed, the 
increasing political tension between the national and the local government bred 
suspicion among the members of the local government, which trickled down to the 
general populace. These weak institutional relationships inhibited the city from 
enhancing its social relations despite the utility of Facebook. 
“We’re scared.” – Community resident #6, barangay councillor 
“We’re shy. We think it’s inappropriate.” – Community resident #3, 
mother and purok secretary 
“Also, it seems that their, what [Facebook], is confidential. We are just 
ordinary constituents.” – Community resident #1, mother and purok 
official 
“None. There was not even a single communication or anything. If you’re 
talking about relief, it took days before we received any, how much more 
if you expect us to communicate with them.” – Community resident 
#10, mother and housewife 
“I don’t approve FB requests of those from the other political party. I 
don’t have anything to do with them and that they might ‘spy’ on my 
Facebook account, so to speak. Look at these posts shared on my public 
page [on Facebook, which was set-up for the 2013 national elections], 
and see how they badly portrayed the present national administration 
(to which he is politically affiliated to). These matter because ‘what you 
see is what you get.’ Your Facebook page is a reflection, an extension of 
who you are.” – City councillor and businessman 
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The relationships of respondents on Facebook thus maintains, if not 
emphasises, the existing socio-political realities of Tacloban City before and after 
Super Typhoon Haiyan. Respondents still chose to connect with people whom they 
had personal connections. Consequently, the quality of these relationships (Szreter, 
2000) also determined the extent to which Facebook facilitated the flow of 
resources embedded in these networks at a crucial time such as after a natural 
disaster. 
 
6.2 Facebook conversations and presence of selected residents of Tacloban 
City after Super Typhoon Haiyan:  ‘We’re safe and we need help’ 
 The main reason respondents used Facebook was to inform their families 
and friends that they were alive and safe. This was the top recurring theme that 
surfaced in the interviews and focus group discussions. A good number of them even 
provided information about the condition of Tacloban City. 
“We contacted our relatives abroad through Facebook. And those in 
other places as well. We informed them of our condition here so they 
will not worry. Just so they would not worry. And be calm instead. We’re 
all okay.” – Community resident #8, barangay councillor and father 
“Because if there is no communication, nothing. They could not do 
anything. They just cry and cry.” – Community resident #2, housewife 
and small business owner 
 
As noted in the literature, information-seeking behaviours most positively 
contribute to bonding social capital (Kwon et al., 2013; Ellison et al., 2011). The need 
to send information was deemed vital in providing emotional support after the 
disaster – not just for the survivors but for their family and friends who were not in 
Tacloban. It was likewise remarkable how those outside of Tacloban turned to 
Facebook for seeking information about their loved ones, convinced that they can 
get feedback from the social media platform. 
“My sibling had been crying and crying. But when they learned, through 
Facebook, that we are all alive, that’s the time they felt relieved. That’s 
why Facebook was a huge help.” – Community resident #6, barangay 
councillor 
“It was on Facebook that I learned that many were already worried.” – 
Community resident #2, housewife and small business owner 
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“When I logged in to my Facebook, there were already a lot of 
messages.” – NGO worker #2 
 
Hawkins and Maurer (2010) suggested that people display a connection to 
their place of residence that transcends mere geography and represents a peace of 
mind that is centred within the people and communities. While literature usually 
refers to “place” in a physical sense, neighbourhoods and communities as physical 
locations are becoming less geographically bound. In her ethnographic study of 
social relations in New Zealand, Stephens (2007) discovered that despite using 
neighbourhoods or local communities to structure the study, the primary day-to-
day enactment of social capital observed amongst participants (e.g., connections, 
associations) were located across several different fields of practice such as family, 
schooling, work, and recreational activities beyond the neighbourhood.  
From this perspective, place is both the material and social site for the 
development of social capital – anchoring a sense of self and one’s relationships 
through memory and the meanings invested in that site through repeated 
interactions (Cox & Perry, 2011). In this case study, Facebook has become one such 
site. As posited earlier, it has become very much part of one’s social presence that 
the respondents asked their families or friends to post on Facebook on their behalf. 
“My family were brought to Cebu. So my wife was the one who posted 
our pictures and re-posted them in my network. Just to post the pictures 
that we took because the people need to know the situation here in 
Tacloban.” – Tacloban City vice mayor 
“So I emailed my friend from Manila, using the email add of NBC news. 
My friend was the one who posted on Facebook for me to inform my 
friends on Facebook that I am still alive and that I emailed. When I was 
able to finally access Facebook, there were so many messages and Wall 
posts asking if I am still alive and all.” – NGO worker #10 
“I already had cell phone signal three days after the typhoon. That’s 
when I learned from my son, who was in Manila, that there had been so 
much posts on my Facebook page already. My son told me that a lot 
were asking how I was and some were seeking help and assistance as 
well.” – City councillor and businessman 
 
Significantly, most were able to get physical and financial help from their 
families and relatives through Facebook. One respondent attributed the cash she 
received from her niece, who was based in Brunei, to her neighbour’s Facebook use. 
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Bonding social capital, although physically dispersed, was successfully accessed by 
the respondents. The online nature of Facebook extended the geography of 
Tacloban City. 
“Actually, it was not me [who accessed Facebook]. It was the family I 
sought shelter in. Because they are friends with my niece. According to 
them, they walked, I think that was three days after, to the city hall. 
That’s where they were able to use the internet. That’s where they were 
able to chat. Because they informed their mother who was abroad. So 
at the same time, they also thought of me. When they came back, they 
said that my niece was asking about me. Then after one or two weeks, 
my brother from Talalora (a nearby town) came and gave me cash. He 
said our niece from Brunei sent P4,000. There, we divided it amongst me 
and my siblings.” – Community resident #10, housewife and mother 
 “From the nieces and nephews of my mama. In another country. They 
sent help. One month after the typhoon.’” – Community resident #7, 
father 
“Because my siblings from outside [the country], when they learned 
what happened, that’s when they started to send help. They contributed 
just to send something here. They sent money to our relatives from 
Manila, Cebu. Then these relatives were the ones who sent food and 
clothes to us. That’s what arrived here. That was such a huge help to us 
because there was nothing to buy that time.” – Community resident #6, 
barangay councillor 
“The thing is that, later on, I got to check it. People just mobilised 
themselves, especially my family. One of them, my cousin in Singapore, 
friends in other parts of the country. They just mobilised themselves to 
help us and to send relief goods to us.” – Tacloban City vice mayor 
 
More importantly, respondents highlighted the importance of social 
relationships in determining the response time of those they sought for help. Other 
statements suggest that the respondents perceive aid as more than just helping. 
Personal interests, personal relationships, and emotions were very influential to 
cause people to act in desperate times. 
“Of course. They were very worried. So they sent help immediately.” – 
Community resident #3, mother and purok secretary 
 “Also, we have our [Facebook] page for the Cruz8 clan, were I posted an 
update. Yes. They responded. From America, they sent money to 
Mindanao [one of the Philippines’ main islands]. Then they used that 
to buy what they sent to us here. It was a good thing that some of them 
                                                          
8 Not real family name 
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were online. So I was able to go on chat with them to tell them what we 
specifically need.” – NGO worker #8 
 
Jung et al. (2013) argued that the number of actual Facebook friends or the 
signals of relational investment do not have anything to do with receiving more 
favourable responses from their Facebook network, although the frequency of 
asking for help does generate higher responses from one’s Facebook network. This 
supports the two-fold goal expressed by the respondents in both informing and 
seeking help from their networks. Facebook was the most suitable tool in achieving 
these dual objectives. 
“The most important thing really is to inform that we are okay. At least, 
we’re alive. So that’s really the purpose. Then next to that, honestly, 
financial assistance from them.” – NGO worker #7 
“Because I want my relatives to know that, I mean, despite of what 
happened, we all survived. And also others, my friends, because 
Facebook is worldwide. I want them to see the extent of the damages so 
that they will perceive the need to extend help to us. Because we really, 
really need help. That is why I uploaded all the photos.” – NGO worker 
#8 
“It was easier on Facebook. Just post, for example, pictures or messages 
or something similar, just one click and all your friends will see it. Plus, 
the friends of your friends will see it as well. So it’s easier compared to 
text messages, which you have to do individually.” – Community 
resident #8, barangay councillor and father 
“I don’t know, it’s probably popular. Rather than sending individual 
emails. At least on Facebook, you’ll just post one shout out, and it’s 
automatic. All your friends can read it. That’s where I post because 
that’s where most people often log in compared to emails. Then you can 
even monitor if the message you sent was ‘seen.’” – Tacloban city 
consultant for urban and environmental planning 
 
The respondents recognised that the public element of a social media 
platform allows unintended recipients to view their messages as well. The most 
convenient option of sending out an emergency message on Facebook is also the 
most publicly accessed and shared. Still, these features of social media as a free, 
open, and mainstream platform encouraged most respondents to utilise it in the face 
of disasters. For public officials like the city vice mayor, this was most beneficial as 
“networks” were not just limited to family and friends. 
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“It was the outside world. The outside world. To let the people know the 
situation here. Because there is no other way to communicate. So that 
was the message I sent out: that we survived and that the situation here 
is grave and that we need help. Because I have a lot of followers. And at 
the same time, I have people who are connected to me through 
Facebook. Yes, the scope that we have. And we knew that if we just put 
it out, people will just re-post it and share and they will know the 
situation here in Tacloban.” – Tacloban City vice mayor 
 
Then again, this technology also has its limitations. The city consultant and 
city vice mayor noted how the volume of demand lessens the effectiveness of the 
message-relaying process. Keitzmann et al. (2011) stressed that the importance of 
different relationship traits in an online social platform can be explained using two 
properties: structure and flow. The structural property refers to how many 
connections a user has and their position in their network of relationships. The 
denser and larger a user’s portfolio of relationships is and the more central his or 
her position in the portfolio, the more likely that the user is to be an influential 
member in their network. The flow property refers to the types of resources 
involved in individual relationships and how these resources are used, exchanged, 
or transformed. It also describes the strength of a relationship. 
It is thus significant to emphasise the difference in the scope of relationships 
and the amount of resources generated by the city vice mayor and councillor as 
compared to the barangays and NGOs. To begin with, the size and density of the city 
government officials’ networks were bigger. However, more important was the 
resources that these networks connect the individuals to (Halpern, 2005). 
“Mobilised from networks. People got to know us and some of them just 
responded. There’s so many people, people helping us. Yes, yes. That’s 
why they’re sharing [on Facebook]. People were just coming to us, 
contacting us as well and then offering their help already.” – Tacloban 
City vice mayor 
 “Most of those who sought help on Facebook were from Manila and 
abroad as well – not those from within the city. They were asking for 
certain people and updates. I also used Facebook in personally 
connecting or reaching out to businesspeople who left after the typhoon 
to come back and invest in the city again. The second to third week after 
Haiyan marked the massive emigration of people, with business and 
economy struggling and still no electricity.” – City councillor and 
businessman 
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Hawkins and Maurer (2010) suggested an example of linking social capital in 
which those in power not only helped but used their connections and relative 
advantage to assist others, sometimes in unexpected ways. Leonard and Onyx 
(2004) noted that people who are recognised in terms of their professional identity 
can be used as bridging links without the relatively slow process of repeated 
interaction involved in developing trust that occurs with strong ties. This was 
revealed by the two city government officials in describing their Facebook use after 
the super typhoon.  
“In fact, I get to know the situation better because of Facebook. Because 
they tell me. For example, “Sir, in our barangay, there’s no relief yet.” 
Because at that time, the government was bringing relief goods. And we 
had our own network too. So we, our job until now, was to fill in the 
gaps. So, I can know which area has still not received any help from the 
government. So we went there. Through Facebook. ‘Ah in this barangay, 
there was none, they still haven’t. So whatever relief that was given to 
us, we channel it to them [barangay]. We just fill in the gaps.” – 
Tacloban City vice mayor 
“Within the week after the storm, I was able to use the pocket Wi-Fi in 
responding to the messages in Facebook. Some were from people I didn’t 
even know but asked for my help in locating and verifying the condition 
of residents in Tacloban. I asked my staff to look for these people and 
give me the data so I can give a feedback.” – City councillor and 
businessman 
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the city vice mayor and city councillor were 
both known to have strong presence on Facebook. This perceived availability may 
have contributed to why people sought their help on the social media site. 
Nonetheless, online presence was insufficient for an exchange to ensue. Exchange, 
as a central concept in sociological analysis, has two central components: 
relationships and transaction. It requires a relationship between actors that will 
lead to a transaction (Lin, 2001).   
“For us, by having our own network and letting them know the situation 
here, we were able to get, and in fact, since a week after I was able to 
receive my first container van of relief goods. People just spread the 
word around and our contacts from the churches in Cebu, where I 
pastored twenty years ago, they started sending for container --- With 
the first commercial ship from the Gothong, and the Gothong, the owner 
of the Gothong, happens to be the members of the church. So it was free. 
The freight was free.” – Tacloban City vice mayor 
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This supports the overall manner in which Facebook utilised and 
strengthened the social capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan. Most 
exchanges still took place within strong ties; only this time, it included those who 
were geographically far away. However, despite its mediated form, Facebook did 
not facilitate the formation of new networks, particularly those from outside their 
close circles. 
Notably, aside from the city councillor who encouraged fellow 
businesspeople to consider reinvesting in Tacloban after the super typhoon, there 
was no further statement from other respondents indicating that bridging social 
capital was used. Nevertheless, Facebook amplified the collective interaction among 
the respondents and their close circles, extending it to outside linkages that 
contributed in the mobilisation of aid. People were more willing to take risks in 
bridging to other networks in search of information and resources when they could 
work through trusted intermediaries (Leonard & Onyx, 2004). Finally, linking social 
capital was described by the city vice mayor and city councillor as providing help to 
Facebook users who recognised their identity as public officials. 
 
6.3 Facebook identity and reputation of selected residents of Tacloban City 
after Super Typhoon Haiyan: ‘Propaganda, accountability, and privilege in a 
political social media’  
 
Another significant observation that emerged from the conversations with 
the respondents was the enduring reference to politics even in social media use. 
Interestingly, this attribution to inequalities in power and structure did not only 
prevent the residents from seeking help from government officials through 
Facebook; it also regulated the Facebook use of local government officials after 
Super Typhoon Haiyan. For one, the city councillor was critical of other local leaders’ 
Facebook use, calling it a ‘propaganda.’ 
“They just probably knew that I am the city councillor so they tried to 
use Facebook to reach me. People were thanking me afterwards on 
Facebook. And I can see that this has created a positive image for myself 
– although this was not my intention. The typhoon is an opportunity to 
help, not for grandstanding.”  - City councillor and businessman 
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 The city councillor mentioned the photos on the personal Facebook page of 
other local government officials, which showed them distributing relief goods, 
driving trucks, and talking with the people during disaster response. He commented 
how he finds this as “epal” – a Filipino slang which is derived from flipping the letters 
of the word “papel” or ‘paper.’ When one is referred to as epal, it means that one is 
inappropriately representing himself in a situation or joins a conversation, activity, 
or event without being asked9 (Arriola, 2012). 
Lin (2001) reasoned that recognition is an important social process if people 
who are higher in social position and richer in resources would engage in repeated 
exchanges with someone lower in social position and poorer resources. He 
suggested that unequal transactions in exchanges can and do occur because there 
are payoffs for the actors who give more resources than they receive. For the vice 
mayor, however, this is called ‘accountability.’ 
“For me, it’s a responsibility. I have number one, people were asking: 
‘Why do you post these pictures about Yolanda – just for propaganda’ 
No. It’s for accountability purposes. Because I have donors. I have 
donors. They have to know how their money was spent. So I have to post 
it… it’s not just those from outside. Because I cannot go to every 
barangay here every day. So I will be surprised, I would go to a barangay 
and they would tell me: ‘You know, I learned of what you’re doing from 
Facebook.’ People are, for example, I have one based in Cebu, they 
helped me also. They helped me in providing fibre glass boats, around 
52. ‘You know, how come you don’t update so much on Facebook?’ 
Because they see updates. And they’re happy because every time they 
see what we’re doing for the city, it also provides them hope that what 
they’re doing is not in vain. They look for news from me. They want to 
know.” – Tacloban City vice mayor 
 
As a mediated form of communication, Facebook indeed has limitations in 
addressing the issues of trust, security, and credibility needed to establish 
relationships and encourage exchange of resources. For the city vice mayor, one way 
to address the limitations of a mediated online tool is by regularly posting a status, 
which is a positive predictor of bridging social capital (Lee et al., 2014). However, 
the local official also recognised that the task is not simple. 
                                                          
9 This colloquial term may come from the context of entertainment. When one seeks a more prominent 
attention than what is given on the script, which is written on paper, then the person is “puma-papel” 
(Arriola, 2012). 
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“Even now, they’re asking me about the donations they’ve made. 
Because I haven’t posted for a while. I have to post it now. So I am still 
having it prepared. So I have people who help me edit before I post it. 
And that’s the other thing. Sometimes, if I have time, I do it myself. If I 
don’t have time, I have to ask people to segregate it. ‘Cause sometimes 
my schedule is really very full.” – Tacloban City vice mayor 
 
In a virtual platform where identity is created through continuous exchange 
of media, reputation refers not only to the people as themselves but also the content 
of their social media pages (Kietzmann et al., 2011). The two local leaders 
underscored how a public official should represent himself even in an online 
environment. Both of them regularly post updates on the administrative and 
legislative plans of the city, including ordinances and resolutions passed during 
their weekly sessions. They believe that Facebook can help them in their goal of 
reaching their intended audience on Facebook. They likewise consider that 
Facebook can render them more vulnerable to the public, including their 
‘unintended audience.’ 
“I just check my Facebook in the evening, after work. While I recognise 
the potential of Facebook, my struggle is consistency. I just post 
whenever I feel like posting. This is because as a public official, I cannot 
just post and post. I need to consider the language/grammar, review if 
the data is accurate and this takes work.” – City councillor and 
businessman 
 
“Ah. There is no delineation anymore. That’s the price we pay as public 
officials. Yes. So there is no more delineation for family, friends or 
everyone. So for public consumption. At first, I get to post a lot with the 
family. I try to balance it out. But you will be surprised also. I posted a 
photo with my family, I get more hits also, more likes. There are times 
that I post, only to let them know that even as public officials, you still 
have a family of your own. So I try to balance it. ” – Tacloban City vice 
mayor 
 
The need to be represented well can also be seen even among the NGOs. NGO 
workers cannot just post about their ‘operations’ without the approval of the head 
office. Indeed, the two NGOs which participated in this study even have dedicated 
teams for their official Facebook pages, which are usually under their corporate 
communications department. 
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“It’s because we are also taking care of Operation Blessing. We have 
standard for the photos. Not that, because we want to show hope. This 
is because for some, the angle for this [media] is bloody or what. So, we 
prefer to post those that portray hope, joy. So that the people will see, 
‘Ah there is hope.’” – NGO worker #5 
 
This reinforcement of hope and positive emotions were underscored by the 
city vice mayor when he stated his preference to use his personal Facebook page 
and personally answer the queries and comments posted by his followers. The 
leader believes that Facebook is one way of ‘getting the pulse’ of the people. It acted 
as a good feedback tool after the super typhoon. 
“Ah we get, we get for example, I posted a picture of the Sto. Nino church, 
with lights, parol [lantern] because it was in December. We got a lot of 
shares and hits. People were happy to see that the church was finally 
lightened. It shows that they were looking for signs of hope eh. The pulse. 
Yes. And I, we got to post a view of the Christmas tree and the parol. 
We’ve got a lot of hits. It shows that they like to know, that even the 
recovery was slow, at least there’s some signs. And that’s what we 
wanted. Somehow, it inspires them, it comforts them that things are 
going.” – Tacloban City vice mayor 
 
However, the intention of creating stronger networks through the quality 
and amount of media shared and the intensity of Facebook use was restricted when 
the reality of limited internet access and technology proficiency are considered 
(McKay, 2010). Most respondents, especially from the barangays, stated that they 
had very limited opportunity to access their Facebook accounts – whether out of 
scarcity in time and resources or lack of interest. Some statements even indicated 
Facebook as the ‘tool of the privileged.’ 
“Not everyone knows how to use Facebook.” – Community resident 
#6, barangay councillor 
“I didn’t because I don’t have photos to post.” – Community resident 
#8, barangay councillor and father 
“I don’t use internet most of the time since we don’t have Wi-Fi. It’s 
quite hard.” – Community resident #5, student 
“It was them. My children were teaching me. If they were 
communicating with those --- I was just looking. I do not know how to 
use it.” – Community resident #4, fisherman and father 
“Good thing before the typhoon hit, I was given by my brother who has 
a cell phone business, a pocket Wi-Fi, which we topped up with a huge 
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amount of credits. Within the week after the storm, I was able to use 
the pocket Wi-Fi in responding to messages on Facebook.” – City 
councillor and businessman 
“Yes, because I was on a [telecom network] plan. So I was able to 
connect to Facebook.” – NGO worker #8 
 
Facebook was even considered as an additional cost. It is just for those who 
have the time and money for it. Although most of the respondents were aware of the 
benefits of Facebook, they chose to not invest in it. While the social media platform 
is free, Internet costs time and money – two things that most respondents (and 
residents) of Tacloban City cannot afford to give up, especially after the super 
typhoon. 
“I don’t have time for that, ma’am. Even my husband doesn’t have time. 
I already lack time for my kids. That’s why when my husband comes 
home, I would get his cell phone. It was easier to use Facebook using 
his cell phone.” – Community resident #10, mother and housewife 
“If you access it at an internet café, you have to pay as well.” – 
Community resident #7, father 
“For now, it’s a good project for communication because that’s the 
fastest method of communication to other country. It’s good. But for 
now, in our situation, it’s still not appropriate because we haven’t fully 
recovered yet. Some still don’t even have homes, others are still in 
tents, and others are in temporary shelters only. Then others still, don’t 
have any form of livelihood.” – Community resident #6, barangay 
councillor 
 
To a certain extent, the barangay respondents positioned their identities and 
reputation in the social media platform by creating a gap between those who have 
better internet and Facebook access and those who do not. Those who have more 
access were associated with the rich. Hence Facebook, which started out as a neutral 
tool, becomes a value derived from being a privileged member who has access to 
resources that are not available to other members of the community (Huysman & 
Wolf, 2004). 
However, DeFilippis (2001) argued that connections or ‘bridges’ do not, of 
themselves make the people in any place rich or poor. It is the power relations, not 
the level of connections, which control the terms of any relationships. It is 
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interesting to note that despite the efforts of local government officials in reaching 
out to the public through Facebook, their intended network still feel disconnected.  
In places where corruption is rife, a breach of trust by a professional can have 
far-reaching effects. As a result, people will return to the slower, more cautious 
method of developing strong ties through personal experience (Leonard & Onyx, 
2004). This was stated by one respondent who aimed to ‘expose the realities’ on the 
ground, or his personal experiences with the government’s response after the super 
typhoon, using Facebook. 
“With what’s really happening here. Because there, those who don’t 
have houses still haven’t got any help. Those who have houses, they 
received help. What was that? – Community resident #10, housewife 
and mother 
 
While people with professional status can play a strategic role in facilitating 
connections across groups, this was not enough. In order to be a useful link, the 
professional needs to have demonstrated a commitment to the values of the 
community (Leonard & Onyx, 2004). 
“No, no, no. I went around. I had to walk. I had no car, no vehicle at that 
time. I had to walk. To let people know that I am alive. To let people 
know that there is still a leader here. We stayed with them. We were 
with them through that time. I think that’s something the social media 
cannot substitute. The ministry of presence is so important during that 
time for people to have hope and not to get desperate. And I had to walk 
to tell people that ‘help is coming, don’t panic. There is help here.’ But 
social media enhances your presence when you’re physically bonded 
with the barangays. That is why for some, in my opinion, everything’s 
done for social media. They just post a picture there, thinking that 
people will buy into that. But it doesn’t work. Because people can see 
that it’s fake.”– Tacloban City vice mayor 
 
This validates the observations made in the literature on social capital and 
public policy. Social capital is limited in providing long-term benefits as it becomes 
harder to sustain over an extended period of time beyond the disaster. This was 
expressed by the local leaders, even after considering the assistance of Facebook. As 
such, while the value of social capital needs to be recognised and incorporated into 
early disaster recovery, it is not a substitute for effective public policy (LaLone, 
2012). Instead, social capital is a prerequisite for and, in part a consequence of, real 
forms of formal state support to help people recover (Putnam, 1996). 
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6.4 Facebook Use and Social Capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon 
Haiyan: An Overview  
As an overview, below is the visual representation of the social capital of 
Tacloban City with the inclusion of Facebook use after Super Typhoon Haiyan. This 
is based on the similar figure represented in the earlier chapter, only with few new 
features indicating the extent in which Facebook utilised and strengthened the city’s 
available social capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Facebook fully enhanced the existing strong ties of Tacloban City after the 
super typhoon. Moreover, it extended the geography of the city’s bonding social 
capital, hereafter named distant bonding social capital, which generated more 
resources than the physically proximate bonding social capital. It is represented by 
a larger, dark solid circle floating on the right, which indicates that while this strong 
network is relationally proximate it was geographically distant. The solid blue 
double-arrow that connects it to the respondents suggests that both networks acted 
as initiators in the successful exchange process that took place in social media. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bonding social capital 
 
Linking social capital 
 
Bridging social capital 
 
 
 
Distant Bonding  
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Figure 2. The influence of Facebook use in the Social Capital of Tacloban City  
after Super Typhoon Haiyan 
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On one hand, Facebook only strengthened existing strong networks without 
creating new ones. This is indicated by an absence of a blue arrow between the 
respondents and the bridging social capital. More significantly, this also means that 
Facebook has instead even widened the gap among heterogeneous networks. 
Without this process of activation – a key role in bridging – further access to social 
resources that can be mobilised for gains is prevented (Leonard & Onyx, 2004). As 
a mediated form of communication, Facebook is limited in addressing the issues of 
trust, credibility, and security which are crucial values in relationship building, and 
thus resource exchange. 
Lastly, a fragile form of linking social capital was created when the local 
government officials used their extended networks and resources on Facebook in 
providing assistance to the more vulnerable populace who sought their help. This is 
signified by a broken arrow pointing towards another floating circle, which 
indicates that this capital was slightly utilised and that others (hence, ‘O’), not the 
respondents, were beneficiaries of this. It also suggests that this form of linking 
social capital was not sustainable as it is limited in translating the social value into 
formal state support that will provide long-term recovery for the city, not just for a 
few. 
Table 2. Social Capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan indicating the 
presence of relational and geographical proximity of networks with the inclusion of 
Facebook use 
 
Type of Social Capital Relational 
Proximity 
Geographical 
Proximity 
Bonding Social Capital 
(family members, neighbours and friends) 
Yes Yes 
Bridging Social Capital 
(NGOs and members of other barangays) 
No Yes 
Linking Social Capital 
(local government) 
No No 
Distant Bonding Social Capital 
(geographically dispersed family 
members and selected friends and 
neighbours connected through social 
media) 
Yes No 
 
Nevertheless, the facility of Facebook in enhancing existing strong ties 
beyond time and space reveal another pathway for the benefits of social capital to 
be fully accessed and utilised. As shown in Table 2, the creation of a new form of 
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bonding social capital has allowed the respondents to acquire resources from 
geographically distant strong ties in times of emergency and calamity. In other 
words, it has extended the geography of Tacloban City’s social capital. 
On the other hand, the limitations of Facebook in utilising and strengthening 
weaker ties paradoxically magnified the disparity among other groups of unequal 
power and resources. This could have potentially caused a developmental shift from 
“getting by” (mere survival) to “getting ahead” (moving forwards) (Leonard & Onyx, 
2004) after disasters. These findings thus point us toward an exposition of the 
framework of the Filipino society and social psychology, which can provide deeper 
insights on what relationships and economy actually mean to Taclobanons. 
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CHAPTER 7: FILIPINO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL CAPITAL, 
AND THE FACEBOOK USE OF TACLOBAN CITY  
AFTER SUPER TYPHOON HAIYAN 
 
“Madaling maging tao, mahirap magpakatao.” [It’s easy to be born a human, but it is not easy 
to be one.] 
– Filipino proverb 
 
The results presented in the two previous chapters were typical in most 
societies and agree with what the literature says about social capital during 
disasters (Messias et al., 2012; Hawkins & Maurer, 2010; Islam & Walkerden, 2009; 
LaLone, 2012). However, this study maintains that there are no generic forms of 
social capital which can be transferred from one setting to another. A better 
understanding of the choices made by the residents of Tacloban City after Super 
Typhoon Haiyan can only be achieved if social capital is viewed as “the product of 
values that are embedded in local context” (Jennings, 2007, p. 90). Thus, this chapter 
completes the three-tier discussion on the extent to which Facebook utilised and 
strengthened the social capital of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan as it 
relates to the foundations of Filipino social psychology and political culture. 
 
7.1 Kapwa or the “Shared Self”: The Foundation of Networks in Philippine 
Society 
 The concept of kapwa is the basis of social relationships in Philippine society. 
While its closest English equivalent refers to the word “others,” which denotes an 
opposition to the self, the father of Filipino psychology Virgilio Enriquez (1986) 
argued that kapwa is a recognition of a shared identity. It is “the unity of the ‘self’ 
and ‘others’” (p. 11). 
A person starts having a kapwa not by an implicit understanding of one’s 
status in relation to others in the society but by developing an awareness of a shared 
self, extending the “I” to include the “other” (de Guia, 2013). In its most basic sense, 
having a kapwa means putting first the pagkatao (dignity) and karapatan (rights) of 
a person by accepting and dealing with the other person as equal, regardless of their 
status (Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000). This implies moral and normative 
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aspects that behove a person to treat others as fellow human beings and therefore 
as equals. 
Enriquez (1986) maintained that the original Filipino idea of others was 
inclusive. Yet nowadays, most Filipinos think only of their family, neighbours, or 
immediate circle of friends when they hear the word kapwa (de Guia, 2013). The 
family, which is closely looked into as the basic unit of the society, reinforces 
common values among its members. These networks were therefore recognised for 
having a strong shared understanding of values, which did not need to be negotiated 
during an emergency (Leonard & Onyx, 2004). 
Nevertheless, extreme situations such as the urgency and tragedy of a 
disaster would demand the exploration of other social networks which may or may 
not recognise the other as kapwa. The choices then become complicated given the 
rich theoretical meanings of Filipino interpersonal relations. According to Enriquez 
(1986), probing into the Filipino language provides conceptual distinctions into 
eight levels of Filipino social interactions. These levels further categorise kapwa into 
two: ibang tao or the ‘outsider’ and hindi ibang tao or ‘one of us.’ 
     A person is regarded as ibang tao (outsider) when the interaction only 
involves the accommodating values of civility and conformity. Meanwhile, if one is 
considered as hindi ibang tao (one of us), the inner values of understanding and 
mutual trust are engaged in the relationship. Lastly, pakikipag-kapwa, the eighth 
and highest level, embraces all levels and serves as a guiding value in interacting 
with both the outsider and those the Filipinos consider as one of them. 
While pakikipag-kapwa is expected from complete strangers to one’s most 
intimate social networks, this does not necessarily translate to immediate request 
for help, particularly from the unfamiliar others. This makes sense when one 
acknowledges the distinction between the concepts of kapwa as an ‘outsider’ and 
‘one-of-us.’ While Filipinos still believe that others (outsiders) want what is good for 
them (Abad, 2005), they could not trust the outsiders to provide assistance until 
both parties recognise the presence of a shared value or conviction, which turns the 
‘outsider’ into ‘one of them.’  
Significantly, the assigning of the kapwa as an ‘outsider’ or ibang tao is 
considered a “surface, colonial/accommodative” value, which arose from the need 
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to negotiate the inner core value of kapwa during the Spanish and American rule 
(Enriquez, 1992; San Juan, 2006). To save face (and perhaps lives), the Filipino 
would relate with the colonials and elites for the sake of civility (pakikitungo) or 
pakikisama (being along with/adjusting/conforming). However, if the relationship 
truly has a value, the Filipino would rather insist on their pagkatao (dignity) and 
karapatan (rights) in the social exchange (Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000). 
McKay (2010) claimed that the legal, economic, and social bounding (or 
unbounding) of individual Filipinos is, at least in part, an element of their cultural 
heritage taken on under the colonial rule. As such, this is reflected even in their 
overseas connections. He noted that while reports on friendships of Facebook users 
in the UK and USA appear far more peer-focused and place-limited, Filipino 
Facebook profiles are directed towards extended family and long-distance 
connections. The Filipinos’ “Facebook friend lists” typically include parents, siblings, 
children, uncles, aunts and extended senior or junior kin, including offline friends’ 
parents, many living outside the Philippines. 
This explains the choice of the respondents, who nevertheless turned to their 
families and close relatives despite the opportunity provided by Facebook in 
accessing other networks after Super Typhoon Haiyan. This also accounts for their 
expressed confidence that they will receive better and faster help from their families 
and relatives abroad using Facebook. Meanwhile, aid from foreign NGOs, although 
well-appreciated, was still considered an “outsider” help.  
To a certain extent, the resolution of local NGOs to filter its activities on 
Facebook can be hinged on the need to build and project trustworthiness. Since this 
cannot be seen with the government’s inactivity on the said social media site, the 
government was perceived by the respondents as a network which did not share 
their values. Leonard and Onyx (2004) maintained that where values are different, 
there is reduced trust. Therefore, there was less likelihood that the government will 
be used to access help and resources, even on the social networking site. 
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7.2 Pakiramdam or “Shared Inner Perception”: The Foundation of Norms in 
Philippine Society 
 A related social significance of the ‘shared’ self is that it does not just reside 
in one’s core. Essentially, kapwa is nurtured and manifested by pakiramdam or the 
pivotal interpersonal value that is akin to emotional intelligence (de Guia, 2013). 
Directly translated as ‘feeling’ in the English language, pakiramdam is defined as a 
“shared inner perception” or knowing through feeling (Enriquez, 1992). 
 Pakiramdam indicates an unspoken understanding, feeling for, or assessing 
others in any level of social relationship. This calls for an acute awareness of subtle 
traces, nuances, and gestures as one decides on the ambiguities of daily life (San 
Juan, 2006). This heightened sensitivity, de Guia (2013) suggests, makes a good 
survival tool in events where not all social interactions are carried out with words, 
such as disasters.  
Accordingly, this keen sense of sympathy triggers spontaneous actions of 
volunteering and helping others that comes with the sharing of one’s self. The 
combined sense of sharing and sensitivity to others’ needs and feelings are 
expressed through one’s kagandahang-loob, which is translated as “shared inner 
nobility” (de Guia, 2013, p.183). This guides a person towards dispensing authentic 
acts of goodness and generosity out of their perceived empathy or pakiramdam 
toward the needs of their kapwa. 
 Paradoxically, this cultural trait also accounts for the ‘calculated risks’ 
expressed by some respondents in seeking shelter from their neighbours during the 
onslaught of Super Typhoon Haiyan. Chapter 5 described how some respondents 
waited for the super typhoon to unleash its full strength, thereby putting their own 
lives at risk, before they actually sought help from relationally distant yet 
geographically proximate networks. To some extent, this could be interpreted as the 
respondents’ way of establishing a reasonable sense of empathy from the ‘outsiders’ 
so that it would provide better cues on whether their requests for aid will be met or 
not. 
It has been suggested that communities which have high levels of social 
capital also have strong norms that encourage interaction and cooperative activity 
(DeFilippis, 2001). Social capital, a value constructed through trust, entails a 
willingness to take risks in a social context based on a sense of confidence that 
 
 
112 
 
others will respond as expected and will act in mutually supportive ways (Leonard 
& Onyx, 2004; Bankoff, 2007). However, norms do not simply describe behaviour; 
they prescribe it. Although norms are shared expectations about what is 
appropriate, they vary in importance and generality (Halpern, 2005).  
Moreover, norms and behaviours require a more complex process that 
involves reinforcement by multiple social contacts. According to Christakis and 
Fowler (2011), social networks can have properties and functions that are neither 
controlled nor even perceived by the people within them; instead, they can only be 
understood by studying the whole group and its structure. In this light, social 
networks can have emergent properties or new attributes of a whole that arise from 
the interaction and interconnection of the parts. Specifically, collectivist people may 
become more selective of their norms of friendliness when these are often violated 
(Leonard & Onyx, 2004), as with the expressed experiences of some respondents 
with outside help, particularly the foreign NGOs who interviewed them but never 
came back.  
Further still, as Chapter 3 showed, the Philippine society was developed on 
separate periods and various levels under a colonial hegemony. In these conditions 
of widespread mistrust, groups naturally and conveniently clustered with whom 
they share the same attributes and values. Presumably, highly clustered network 
ties improve information flow and increase reciprocity at a societal level because 
everyone is looking out for everyone else (Putnam, 2001). However, in the 
Philippine setting, stronger family ties created a weaker sense of civic community, 
wherein norms and information simply circulate within groups rather than 
travelling between them (Christakis & Fowler, 2011). This instead generated a 
culture of non-verbalised expectations and unclear terms of commitment, especially 
with members of other networks; hence, the need for pakiramdam. 
This also shows that culture as a tool for survival (David, 2001) can be both 
beneficial and damaging. A shared understanding, which leads to an adaptable 
system of tacit expectations, may be favourable among members of close networks. 
However, this may not be the case with weaker ties, wherein unspoken values and 
expectations may instead turn into ambiguous codes that create more tensions than 
synergy (Lin, 2001). These dynamics become even more perplexing when resources 
that are embedded in the networks are accessed and exchanged. 
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7.3 “Utang na Loob”: Positive and Negative Principles of Reciprocity in 
Philippine Society 
 In a social consciousness where conviction and value are the basis for social 
exchange, Filipinos have a system of contractual obligation where goodwill becomes 
both a social and physical resource. This is called utang na loob, which literally 
means “a debt of the inside” or “a debt stemming from personal volition” (Kaut, 
1961, p.257). It is distinctive from simple utang (debt) because it gives more 
emphasis on kagandahang-loob or the act of goodwill shown rather than the 
physical or tangible favour given. “Utang na loob means that the lender is giving a 
part of himself. He conveys goodwill. Thus, this is what was owed” (Dancel, 2005, 
p.114). 
Since utang na loob is a “debt of goodwill,” it cannot just be repaid in material 
things alone. One has to do another act of benevolence in return, akin to giving one’s 
self, when the opportunity arises (Wong, 2010). While this practice evokes Filipinos’ 
attitude towards expressing gratefulness and reciprocating kindness, utang na loob 
may also distressingly place a person at the mercies of their would-be benefactor. 
Since it hinges on pakiramdam and kagandahang-loob, there are no formal 
agreements as to how much was incurred. This makes utang na loob essentially 
difficult, if not impossible, to pay (Kaut, 1961). 
Dancel (2005) noted how utang na loob can be a humbling, if not humiliating, 
experience which does not sit well with the Filipino’s sense of amor propio, or 
loosely, ‘pride’ or ‘self-esteem.’ He added that “often it is only in dire circumstances 
that a Filipino will entreat another for help. In general, however, it is rather 
uncommon for Filipinos to ask for favours, especially large ones, because it involves 
incurring utang na loob” (p.115). 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in an obligation relationship, a 
person who has an obvious need will not be helped by members of his social group 
unless he solicits that aid. This stems from the condition that he is part of a network 
of mutually reciprocal obligations, wherein recognising the specific rights of others 
is a fundamental rule (Kaut, 1961). In the Filipinos’ case, the act of volunteering help 
will inadvertently place the debtor in a socially vulnerable position which would 
publicly call attention to his needy position, strip him of his “sense of propriety,” and 
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place him in a new utang na loob relationship because of the voluntary aspect of the 
aid (Dancel, 2005). This understanding could further explain the recurrence of the 
themes of self-reliance and self-sufficiency among the respondents when asked 
about their experiences during the Super Typhoon Haiyan. 
Having survived a super typhoon with barely nothing left, the prospect of 
needing to reciprocate any form of kindness or favour shown during the crisis may 
be overwhelming for the respondents. At the start of the interview, when asked 
about their roles in the community, most respondents from the barangay focus 
group discussions positioned themselves lowly. They then articulated a further 
downgrade when asked to describe their condition after Super Typhoon Haiyan. 
“Ahm, purok secretary. Then I have a small business. And I am also a 
plain housewife.” – Community resident #3 [emphasis by the 
researcher] 
“I am just an ordinary fisherman.” – Community resident #4, 
fisherman and father [emphasis by the researcher] 
“Oh, it was really difficult. We were lacking since the first day. Just really 
right after the typhoon, the food, the water. All of these were washed 
out. We lacked even drinking water. That was the day after the storm.” 
– Community resident #1, purok official and mother 
“Back to zero.” – NGO worker #4, ex-government employee 
“I am just a civilian. I don’t have any business anymore because it was 
taken by Yolanda [Haiyan].” – Community resident #12 
 
Citing the experiences of housekeepers, helpers, tenants and those with 
similar occupation or situation, Dancel (2005) noted that being treated with 
goodness by someone of greater power status does not just incur financial 
obligations, but utang na loob as well. While the amount the housekeeper owes may 
be difficult to repay, the utang na loob eventually becomes impossible to reciprocate. 
This results in the indebtedness not just of the housekeeper but of their entire family 
as well.  
In those occasions when utang na loob is reluctantly incurred, sincere efforts 
are made by the beneficiary to not only return the favour, but to do so as soon as 
possible, so as to avoid feeling hiya or the loss of face (Wong, 2010). Failure to abide 
by the contractual obligation is considered extreme ungratefulness for the favour 
shown or walang (“without”) utang na loob. Depending on the closeness of 
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relationship and frequency of interaction, it could also mean that the person cannot 
be trusted since “he has denied responsibility in a system providing social security” 
(Kaut, 1961, p. 259).  
This is because utang na loob is not a system of repayment but of reciprocity 
(Dancel, 2005). As Leonard and Onyx (2004) noted, reciprocity is not a market 
exchange nor a legal contractual obligation. Hence, it is not formally accounted and 
not usually visible in the short term. Similarly, once utang na loob is reciprocated, it 
does not stop there. The donor-turned-benefactor, although not expected, would 
then be returning the favour and the cycle endures (Kaut, 1961). 
Utang na loob is so deeply manifested in the Filipino society that it defines 
the boundaries and, to a certain extent, the nature of relationships among 
individuals. It could thus form the foundation of loyalty, religiosity, and fellowship 
between people and has even become a means of expressing loyalty to one’s 
benefactors (Montiel, 2002; Wong, 2010). It also influences the positive and 
negative behavioural choices one has for status mobility (Kaut, 1961) and is thus 
susceptible to abuse and misuse, especially when one looks into the relationships of 
individuals and groups in a bigger society. 
 
7.4 “Sambahayan to Sambayanan”: Social Capital in a Family-Oriented 
Philippine State 
Covar (1998) suggested a general outline of the Philippine socio-political 
structure wherein the foundation of the society is the family or the sambahayan. 
Beyond kinship, the family is territorially rooted in pamayanan. However, unlike in 
modern societies, Kaelin (2012) argues that the Philippines has no clear delineation 
among the three institutions (family, civil society, and state), with the family 
dominating practically each one of them. He described how majority of the country’s 
top business corporations are family-owned; likewise, political parties are mainly 
associations of powerful families. If there exists any demarcation in the Filipino 
society, it is between kin and non-kin. 
As described in Chapter 3, the Philippines became a state not through the 
development of a cohesive national consciousness but through the actions of its 
former colonial masters. Banlaoi (2004) emphasised that the country’s claim to 
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statehood is widely based on an anti-colonial sentiment which was not even 
anchored on a popularly accepted notion of “nationalism” during the 19th century. 
Instead of forming “natural” bonds through common historical experience, 
consanguinity, and identification with a common language or religion, the Filipino 
nationhood was shaped and promoted by narrow and limited groups of elites, who 
pursued the interests of the colonisers throughout the regions.  
Consequently, this collective formation likewise reflected how resources 
take on values and how the valued resources are distributed in the society. Again, 
Covar (1998) provides the diachronic and synchronic parameters that may be 
utilised in analysing the formation of the Filipino nation – including the distribution 
of power and resources over time. He posited that the allocation of goods and 
services during the early formative period was communalistic in nature, where 
families and bands had free access to natural resources. 
       On the other hand, it could be observed that during the period of struggle and 
national consolidation, the assignment of values to resources was achieved through 
coercion. Lin (2001) argued that in this type of value formation, individual actors do 
not see the intrinsic value of a resource or voluntarily accept its value because they 
simply wish to identify with the group. Instead, they are forced to choose between 
accepting the authoritative assignment of value or suffer undesirable consequences 
such as physical or mental harm. 
David (2001) suggested that distinguishing between the “formative 
contexts” and “formative routines” – concepts of politics posited by Roberto Unger, 
a Brazilian professor of law – is a helpful way to understand the unique sets of 
historical and social circumstances that led to the formation of the Philippine state. 
Formative contexts “comprise all the institutional arrangements and imaginative 
preconceptions that shape routine conflicts over the mastery and use of key 
resources such as economic capital, governmental power, technical expertise, and 
even prestigious ideals.” Formative routines, on the other hand, are “residues of past 
accommodations and compromises among competing groups in society. The result 
looks like necessary institutions obeying sociological laws. But they are just 
conventions that have usually outlived their time” (p.7).  
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Ideally, institutions are devised constraints on human behaviour. They were 
created to minimise uncertainty by establishing a stable, though not necessarily 
efficient, structure for human interaction (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003). However, 
in the case of the Philippines, institutions were created not to define the interactions 
of the locals but to minimise the uncertainties of the foreign colonisers (Banlaoi, 
2004). 
Centuries hence, most Filipinos have remained largely indifferent to the 
content of formal rules. Instead, they perceive constitutions, laws, and ordinances 
as abstract concepts – or formative routines – used by the elite to justify the 
extraction of resources from them (Cruz, 2014). Significantly, Sebastian (2013) 
stated that in Philippine society, there is no discourse on poverty, only a historical 
account of the emergence of the post-colonial elites. Although history shows 
numerous opportunities towards a more democratic distribution of resources and 
power, one dominant segment of capital emerged and remains hegemonic to the 
present: the diversified conglomerates of oligarchic families (Cruz, 2014).  
Beginning in the 1950s, but becoming more obvious in the 1960s, there was 
instead a simultaneous process of diversification and homogenisation. It was 
common for family conglomerates to combine ventures in agriculture, import 
substitution, banking, commerce, and urban real estate under one roof. Up until 
today, key families continue to share a basic homogeneity of interests on major 
issues of economic policy (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003). 
Therefore, Philippine polity was structured more by networks of personal 
relationships, largely involving exchanges of favours between prosperous patrons 
and their poor and dependent clients rather than by organised interest groups such 
as in Western democracies (Quimpo, 2007). Philippine politics is instead “about 
personal relations and networks linked by kinship, friendship, exchange of favours, 
influence and money” (Kerkvliet, 1996, p. 136). This is where social capital, as a 
value derived from networks, becomes confounding in its application to the 
Philippine society – including its use of a mediated online social media such as 
Facebook after disasters. 
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7.5 Online “Padrino System”: Facebook Use in a Politicised and Disaster-
Stricken Tacloban City 
Montiel (2002) noted that politics in strong states usually involve the 
production, allocation, and use of decision-making powers to govern large groups of 
individuals. On the other hand, politics “in unstable and weak states encompasses 
social power issues within and outside the boundaries of the ‘legitimate’ state” (p. 
1). This intricate interaction of social and institutional constructs, which produce 
the often blurred lines between the family and public lives, is evident in a Filipino 
political culture called the padrino system. 
The word padrino is the Spanish word for ‘patron;’ while the system refers to 
a pattern of interpersonal interactions that reconstitute values on how reciprocities 
should be organised (Wong, 2010). Plainly, the padrino system is the application of 
the concept of utang na loob in a patron-client relationship. However, while utang 
na loob may be simply viewed as the cornerstone of Filipino’s interpersonal trust, 
which compels one to return a gift or favour after receipt, utilising this in politics 
demoralises the concept and places both parties in a circulatory cycle of dependency 
(Dancel, 2005). 
Padrinos are politicians who, instead of practicing meritocracy, would grant 
favour, promotion, or political appointment through family affiliation or friendship 
to secure loyalty from the voters. As a political culture, the padrino system is 
structure-embedded. This means that the padrino system operates because there is 
a relatively permanent arrangement of power and wealth, where structure of social 
networks can dramatically reinforce two kinds of inequality in the society.  
First, situational inequality, wherein some are relatively better off socio-
economically. Second, positional inequality, wherein some have the advantage based 
on their locations in the networks (Christakis & Fowler, 2011). Nevertheless, while 
there are two political cultures (those who are at the top and those below), both feed 
on each other’s set of political expectations and practices (Montiel, 2002). 
Thus, it is not surprising that during election season in the Philippines, there 
is a sudden increase in the invitations extended to politicians to become sponsors in 
baptism and weddings (David, 2001). The acceptance of politicians to religious and 
social invitations signify their affiliation with those who invited them, which are 
usually the local leaders. Indeed, Wong (2010) even noted that the Spanish term 
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padrino is equivalent to the Filipino terms ninong (godfather/male sponsor) and 
kumpadre (co-father). Now that both parties are connected by a sense of kinship, 
the local leader's family can expect to be given employment opportunities and other 
special politico-economic favours by this politician. In turn, the politician can expect 
the leader's family to help during the campaign period (Montiel, 2002). 
In a structure-embedded exchange, Lin (2001) explained that the value of 
resources are also time-bound. This means that the value of resources may change 
either due to internal (civil war, revolution, upheaval, disaster, discoveries, changes 
in fashion, etc.) or external (war, trade, invasion, conquest, exchange of ideas) 
circumstances. Nevertheless, it is assumed that in any of these circumstances, all 
actors will promote their own interests by maintaining and gaining valued 
resources, with the former outweighing the latter.  
Moreover, when the community’s survival is challenged, the community 
promotes its self-interest by conferring relatively higher statuses on individual 
actors who possess more valued resource. To a certain extent, the self-interests of 
selected actors are allowed to be pursued as long as it aligns with the collective 
interest (Leonard & Onyx, 2004). The paradox is that while these advantaged ones 
are favoured because of their skills and knowledge, and the expectation that they 
will carry out the rules and procedures that sustain the community, these 
individuals are also given opportunities to act according to their whims – a reliance 
on their ability and willingness to interpret properly and act effectively and 
creatively (Lin, 2001). 
Meanwhile, individuals who have less valued resources and thus lower 
standing in the community experience greater structural constraints and less 
opportunities to innovate. There are two types of actions these individuals can take: 
either appropriate more valued resources or change the values assigned to various 
resources (through education or deviant actions) (Lin, 2001). Therefore, this 
“opportunity structure” shows that individual actors, through their interactions and 
social networks, are differentially accessible to resources which constrains their 
choices (DeFilippis, 2001). 
The Super Typhoon Haiyan in Tacloban City was clearly an opportunity in 
the redistribution of valued resources in the communities. The collective interest of 
 
 
120 
 
Tacloban City at that time was to generate resources (specifically basic living 
amenities such as food, water, clothes and later, financial funds for the rebuilding of 
homes and businesses). Still, owing to the elites’ bigger networks and more valuable 
resources, the disaster instead favoured the elites’ as they either gained more valued 
resources or had the chance to manipulate the value assigned to their resources. 
This is what Christakis and Fowler (2011) argued when they stated that 
network inequality creates and reinforces inequality of opportunity. Those with 
many connections tend to be connected to other people with many connections, 
while those with few ties may get left farther and farther behind. Significantly, even 
in an increasingly interconnected world of social media, resources may flow even 
more toward those with particular locations in physical social networks. This is 
what most respondents in Tacloban City expressed with regard to Facebook use 
after Super Typhoon Haiyan (see also Chapter 6). 
“If I know how to use it [Facebook], probably I will. I will be more 
updated with the news [about aid and relief]. Yeah. But that’s how we 
older people are; we just watch news. Ask updates from our relatives. 
That’s just how we do things.” – Community resident #4, fisherman 
and father 
This case study has thus highlighted the importance of carefully considering 
the distinct social, cultural, and political realities of a specific locality as one explores 
the possibilities of using a mediated communication tool such as Facebook during 
disasters. Facebook, as a tool, can either become one of two things: a digital link or 
a digital divide. Thus far, Tacloban City has generally perceived the said social media 
as a repressive political tool. 
“Even I, I am already a barangay official, yet I still feel shy [to connect 
with city government officials]. That is the Filipino culture and respect. 
The way you see yourself, they are above you.” – Community resident 
#6, barangay councillor 
 
While the city vice mayor saw Facebook as an opportunity to “break the 
barriers of bureaucracy,” the rest of the respondents were cautious not to utilise it 
as an online form of padrino system. The need to forge a ‘personal relationship’ 
before one can access or contact those who are in leadership positions was 
repeatedly expressed in the interviews and focus group discussions. This signals a 
challenge toward finding more creative ways of using Facebook in facilitating a 
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more useful model of society, wherein strong ties bond with weaker ties without 
perpetuating a deceiving sense of connection that isolates those who have more 
from those who have less. 
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CHAPTER 8: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN 
TACLOBAN CITY’S POST-HAIYAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
“Haiyan spotlights the need for cities like Tacloban to be more prepared for the new normal, 
as the strength of each city comes from the mindset of its people, and that education and 
building of social capital is absolutely critical in order to incorporate resilience into all aspects 
of life.” 
                                                                                                 - Tacloban City Mayor Alfred Romualdez10 
 
 This case study sought to investigate the growing interest regarding the 
possibility of creating disaster-resilient communities by utilising and strengthening 
their social capital through social media. It specifically investigated Tacloban City, 
an area hit hardest by Super Typhoon Haiyan on 08 November 2013. Haiyan was 
considered as the most powerful tropical cyclone that ever landed on earth as of 
date, causing immense damage of infrastructures and loss of lives. It also highlighted 
the increasing role of Facebook in facilitating and influencing disaster aid and 
response, particularly in a developing country such as the Philippines. 
 Due to the increasing incidences of natural calamities, of which the poor are 
usually severely affected, disaster management has shifted into a developmental 
perspective that focuses on building or making disaster-resilient cities and 
communities rather than simply determining and addressing their risks and 
vulnerabilities (Bhatt & Reynolds, 2012). This socio-ecological paradigm posits that 
financial, technological, and governmental resources alone are not enough to allow 
communities to ‘bounce back better’ after a disaster. The inherent linkages within 
the society are crucial in activating these adaptive capacities to provide faster and 
better recovery for its members (Dufty, 2012). 
 This concept, called social capital, describes how people are connected 
within a given locality and how resources are deeply embedded in these networks. 
It suggests that communities recover faster when they are highly connected since 
the flow of information and resources are open and readily accessible (Aldrich, 
2012). Thus, it describes a society composed of strong networks that are 
continuously engaged in reciprocal relationships within a given set of norms that 
                                                          
10 Remarks of Mayor Romualdez during the special screening of a documentary produced by the 
Discovery Channel as it revisited Tacloban one year after Super Typhoon Haiyan. 
(http://entertainment.inquirer.net/155273/discovery-channel-revisits-tacloban-a-year-after-yolanda) 
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promotes trust, which in turn facilitates further exchanges that are cyclical and self-
reinforcing (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993). 
Social capital has been on the ascent because of social media, an online 
technology which has the ability to provide both timely access to information and 
social connectedness among its users beyond community or national boundaries 
(Lin, 2001). Its role and effects on the behaviour of people in disasters are generally 
perceived as useful, effective, and successful. However, few studies have actually 
examined how social media changes the way people, particularly in developing 
countries, mobilise themselves when facing risks while taking into consideration the 
underlying social order and power relations within their communities. 
This is where Tacloban City provides a conceptually fertile context with 
regards to this interest. Located at the eastern part of the Philippines, Tacloban City 
averages up to 20 tropical cyclones a year. While the people are used to typhoons 
and the local government adheres to an existing national framework for disaster 
management, these capacities are usually hampered by conflicting sectoral and 
political interests. In fact, the longstanding rivalry of two political families, from 
which the current president of the Philippines and the city mayor of Tacloban 
belong to, was said to have greatly impeded the disaster response following the 
super typhoon. This results in a diminishing capacity of the state to provide support 
and assistance to its people before and, all the more, after a disaster. 
It is thus not surprising that when Super Typhoon Haiyan hit Tacloban City, 
most survivors turned to Facebook to seek information and assistance. Who did they 
turn to? What made them choose these networks over other potential networks 
made more accessible by Facebook? Most importantly, were they able to generate 
enough resources for them to not just recover faster but become more resilient from 
future hazards? 
The responses from selected residents of Barangays 89 and 48-B, selected 
members of two local NGOs (Community & Family Services International and 
Operation Blessing - Visayas), and three members of the city government (vice-
mayor, urban and environmental consultant, and city councillor) during separate 
interviews and focus group discussions reveal interesting insights on the role of 
social media and social capital in Tacloban City’s post-Haiyan development. 
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Firstly, Facebook extended the geography of Tacloban City’s social capital 
after Super Typhoon Haiyan by allowing its residents to inform their families 
and relatives residing in different countries of their condition and consequently 
receive help from them. With over two million Filipinos who are working overseas 
as of 2013 (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2014), the residents of Tacloban City 
pushed the physical boundaries of their social connections by contacting their 
families and relatives abroad through Facebook. Most respondents reported to have 
received money and physical goods through their correspondences on the said 
social media site. However, looking closely at their statements, their social choice 
uncovers a deep-seated aspiration to be self-sufficient in a context of amplified 
political tension and competitive access for resources after a massive disaster. 
When people organise themselves, they do so in order to gain control over 
their lives or simply to successfully insulate themselves from the stabilities of daily 
life (David, 2001). Since the Haiyan survivors cannot rely on themselves or their 
families and friends who were nearby as “they were also victims,” they found an 
alternative pathway that would at least provide for a decent existence after the 
disaster. Nevertheless, while help from Facebook contacts reached them faster, it 
was still not adequate to help them recover. One respondent even mentioned 
receiving PhP4,000 (US$90) from a relative abroad and sharing it with three other 
siblings. 
This makes one think why the respondents did not consider seeking help 
from those with greater resources or wider capacities such as the government, given 
that an online tool is on hand. Instead, for respondents to say that “there was no 
government” or “we cannot rely on the government, otherwise we will die” has put 
the spotlight on the wide and entrenched culture of cynicism and violation of public 
trust in the Philippine society. 
The nation’s history describes centuries of oppression and exploitation not 
only by foreign colonisers but more so, the local landed elites and their oligarchic 
families ruling under a neopatrimonial system. This extended social capital, while 
very promising, actually means two things for the Philippine society: (1) Facebook 
can help make communities resilient as the technology allowed them to stand on 
their own without outside intervention. However, (2) this can cover up for the 
negligence, inefficiency and incapacity of the state in fulfilling its role towards the 
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people. There is even more danger posed in using Facebook in providing direct 
access to state services as this may allow government officials to think that they are 
actually doing their job. Yet in fact, they are just perpetuating a corruptive cycle of 
dependency and patron-client relationship – this time, in an online setting. 
This is because Facebook was limited in addressing the socio-political 
realities of Tacloban City, which is clouded with uncertainty and mistrust, 
rendering the application of social capital in developing countries a highly 
contentious endeavour. Interestingly, this research on a seemingly ‘neutral’ topic 
on Facebook use has instead led to a deeper probe into the unique sets of historical 
and social circumstances that formed the Philippine society today. It showed that 
Filipinos are highly connected people but due to periods of colonisation, they had to 
negotiate their inner core value of kapwa (treating the other as an extension of one’s 
self) into a surface, accommodative value that categorises the other person as either 
an ‘outsider’ or ‘one of them.’ 
This delicate distinction branches out into often ambiguous ways on how 
Filipinos form relationships through pakiramdam (or shared inner perception) and 
assign values on resources and exchanges through utang na loob (debt out of 
goodwill). Nevertheless, across all societal activities in the Philippines, there is a 
constant and essential significance placed on establishing personal relationships – 
one that gives a sense of kinship. This necessity to foster trust is a need that 
Facebook, as a mediated communication tool, obviously cannot address. 
Based on the respondents’ statements, the Filipinos see their online activities 
on Facebook as an extension of their personal identity. As such, they will not contact 
any person whom they are not familiar or familial with. Even more, they will not 
allow themselves to be continually indebted to someone whom they do not trust. 
This is because in a social consciousness wherein shared conviction and values are 
the basis of relationships, social exchanges do not just involve material or physical 
goods alone. Instead, an act of goodwill becomes a part of a lifetime reciprocal and 
contractual obligation. 
This becomes even more critical given the family-dominated structure of the 
Philippine state. The Filipino reality is that the values acquired by individuals from 
the family are neither lost nor given up as they interact with the larger society but 
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only extended, if not modified (Kaelin, 2012). Often, the Filipinos’ way of relating to 
the public is by including them in the private sphere, as evidenced by the padrino 
system or the negative principles of reciprocity in politics. This explains the 
expressed concern of the respondents to be careful and selective with whom they 
connect with after the disaster, especially among those in the government, lest they 
be placed in an even more vulnerable position. 
Paradoxically, Facebook has amplified the structural inequalities already 
present in Tacloban City before it was hit by Super Typhoon Haiyan. While it 
enhanced strong ties, it has failed to forge weaker ties. Worse, it has instead widened 
the gap between those who have more power over the access of resources and those 
who have less. 
This study recognised that those in power used their connections and 
relative advantage to assist others with the aid of Facebook, like what the city vice 
mayor, city councillor, and city consultant reported in their interviews. However, 
the widespread cynicism instead saw this as an opportunity to grandstand. Besides, 
the intention to reach out to the public using Facebook was constrained considering 
the limited internet access and technological proficiency of most Taclobanons. As a 
result, Facebook was viewed as a repressive, political tool: a utility for propaganda 
for those in power; and a new framework that further disconnects those who are 
already disconnected. 
Jennings (2007) noted that “when social capital is presented as a wonder 
drug to alleviate the impact of structural inequalities, it thereby becomes a 
rhetorical mechanism that dismisses institutional and policy causes of structural 
inequalities” (p.90). It is remarkable that despite the digital frontiers we have 
crossed, people still act in very human ways. Self-interest, greed, bias, altruism or 
affection are still very much at work even when we cross over to the digital world 
(Christakis & Fowler, 2011). 
This study thus offers a word of caution, so to speak, in using Facebook in 
promoting social connectedness and building community resilience. It 
acknowledges that social media provides a better alternative for disaster 
management as people can now communicate their priorities and expectations, as 
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compared to the traditional model which relies on the assumptions of political 
leaders and aid agencies who are often far away from emergencies. It likewise gives 
way to a rapid decentralization of power as communications technology makes it 
easier, even ignoring traditional hierarchies, for more participants to enter the fields 
of emergency and disaster response (UNOCHA, 2012). 
However, while social media allows greater connectivity, it is the element of 
social capital as “a social metaphor about competitive advantage” (Burt, as cited by 
Cao et al., 2013, p.1672) that favours people who are ‘better connected.’ Murthy 
(2013) argues that this sense of proximity may only be an imagined vision, 
particularly of the relatively well-off population of the communities, rather than a 
representative of reality.  
Moreover, while the value of social capital needs to be recognised and 
incorporated into early disaster recovery, this study shows that it is not sustainable 
for an extended period of time after the disaster. Hence, it is not enough to 
contribute to building resilience in communities. While social capital needs much 
greater attention and incorporation into planning, it does not mean that social 
capital can be a replacement for real federal disaster-assistance policies that will 
truly benefit the poor majority (LaLone, 2012). 
In other words, nothing can substitute for actual activities that strengthen 
physical social networks through effective public policy and conscientious political 
practice. In fact, to say it more radically, the disaster can be a timely opportunity for 
those who are at the top of the societal structure and relatively better off 
economically to level the playing field and reassign the values attached to resources 
and social exchanges. Echoing the words of DeFilippis (2001), connections 
themselves do not make people in any place rich or poor; it is exactly the opposite: 
isolation. If Tacloban City – and even the Philippine society in general – is really 
serious about building back better communities, what needs to change are those 
power relations, not the level of connections. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Interview and Focus Group Discussion Schedule 
 
“Social Capital and Facebook Use of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon Haiyan” 
 
INTERVIEW AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE 
1. What is your role in the community?  
Ano po ang inyong tungkulin sa komunidad? 
2. Can you describe your experience during Typhoon Haiyan? 
Maaari nyo po bang ilarawan ang inyong karanasan noong bagyong Yolanda? 
3. Who did you send out your request for help after Typhoon Haiyan? What are 
your reasons for choosing them? What were your means to reach them? 
Sinu-sino po ang mga hiningan ninyo ng tulong pagkatapos ng bagyong 
Yolanda? Bakit po sila ang pinili nyo? Paano nyo po sila naabot? 
4. Did you use Facebook after the typhoon? What do you think are the reasons 
why people use (or not use) Facebook after Typhoon Haiyan? 
Gumamit po ba kayo ng Facebook pagkatapos ng bagyong Yolanda? Ano po sa 
tingin ninyo ang mga dahilan kung bakit gumagamit o hindi gumagamit ang 
mga tao ng Facebook pagkatapos ng bagyong Yolanda? 
5. What do you think of the government’s Facebook page after Typhoon Haiyan? 
Ano po ang masasabi ninyo tungkol sa Facebook page ng gobyerno pagkatapos 
ng bagyong Yolanda? 
6. How do you feel about the other Facebook pages regarding Typhoon Haiyan? 
Ano po ang inyong pakiramdam tungkol sa ibang mga Facebook pages tungkol 
sa bagyong Yolanda? 
7. What do you think should be the most important thing a community should 
have during a natural disaster? 
Ano ba ang pinakamahalagang bagay na dapat mayroon ang isang komunidad 
tuwing may bagyo? 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Participant Information Sheet  
 
Participant Information Sheet for a Study on the use of Facebook in building 
the Social Capital of Tacloban City after Typhoon Haiyan 
 
Researcher: Arla E. Fontamillas 
School of Geography, Environment, and Earth Sciences  
Victoria University of Wellington  
 
I am a Masters student in Development Studies at Victoria University of Wellington 
(VUW), New Zealand. As part of this degree, I am undertaking a research project leading to 
a thesis. The project aims to find out how the use of Facebook contributes to the social 
capital (that is, the involvement of people in groups and the amount of solidarity and trust 
it generates) of Tacloban City after Typhoon Haiyan. The research has approval from the 
VUW Human Ethics Committee.  
 
This project involves the city government of Tacloban City (mayor, vice mayor, and 
city councillors), selected members of the barangays, and the NGOs working in the affected 
areas. One-on-one interviews will be conducted with the mayor and vice mayor and 
members of the city council. Meanwhile, the members of the communities and NGOs will 
be asked to participate in focus group discussions. While a conversational approach will be 
used, both the interviews and focus group discussions will employ a list of standardized, 
open-ended questions that will allow the participants to ask or probe further. The interviews 
and discussions will be recorded. Participants have the right to withdraw (including any 
information they have provided) from this project before 12 July 2014 without having to 
give reasons.  
 
The research will be conducted in English and Tagalog. Your responses are very 
important as this will form the basis of my research project and will be put into a written 
report on a confidential basis (with the exception, of course, to our public officials whose 
nature of work and other attributions may easily identify them). However, only grouped 
responses will be presented in this report. Also, all material collected will be kept 
confidential. No other person besides me and my supervisor, Professor John Overton, will 
have access to the materials. The thesis will be submitted for marking to the School of 
Geography, Environment, and Earth Sciences and deposited in the University Library. It is 
intended that one or more articles will be submitted for publication in scholarly journals. 
Audio tapes used during the interviews and focus group discussions and other related 
materials will be destroyed three years after the end of the project.  
 
If at any the point the participants experience any form of stress as a result of 
participating in this study, they may get in touch with Tacloban City Social Welfare and 
Development Office at Magsaysay Blvd., Tacloban City.  If you have any further questions or 
would like to receive further information about the project, please contact me at 0927-
4731743 or my supervisor, Professor John Overton, through his email: 
john.overton@vuw.ac.nz.  
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APPENDIX THREE 
Participant Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
Title of project: Social Capital and Facebook Use of Tacloban City after Super Typhoon 
Haiyan 
 
⎕ I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project. I 
have had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. 
I understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have provided) from this 
project before 12 July 2014 without having to give reasons.  
 
⎕ I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential to the 
researcher, the supervisor and the person who transcribes the tape recordings of our 
interview. I understand that the published results will not use my name. While it is not 
possible to guarantee total confidentiality in small-knit communities, the research will 
not identify any individuals where identification may cause risk or harm for the 
participant. I understand that the tape recording of interviews will be wiped three 
years after the end of the project unless I indicate that I would like them returned to 
me.  
 
⎕ I understand that I can withdraw from participating in the middle of the 
interview/discussions any time I want to without having to give reasons. 
 
⎕ I consent to information or opinions which I have given being attributed to me in 
any reports on this research.  
 
⎕ I understand that I will be given a summary of the interview before publication.  
 
⎕I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other purpose or 
released to others without my written consent.  
 
⎕ I would like to receive a summary of the results of the research when it is 
completed.  
 
⎕ I agree to take part in this research.  
 
Name of participant: ___________________________________________  
 
Signed: ______________________  Date: ______________________________ 
 
Mailing address (for the provision of report summary): 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
© Victoria University of Wellington 
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